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This project represents over a decade of coursework, research, and writing, 
beginning in Arkansas, Lebanon, and Ghana, and ending in Texas, Morocco, Ohio, New 
York, North Carolina, and Cairo. As a result, lots of people have had their hands on the 
spoon—stirring, adding some ingredients, suggesting others, turning up the heat, letting 
it simmer, and tasting and commenting on various sections and permutations. I have 
missed many who passed through the kitchen at one time or another, but I mention a 
few names here in the hopes that all will feel free to take their places around the table. 
When I arrived in Tangier in February 2006 with the barest sketching of a 
project, Abdellah El Gourd generously offered to let me learn from him, and for that I 
am eternally grateful. I hope my work approaches the high standards of his 
professionalism. I was received at Dar Gnawa and integrated into the community there 
by its members. Abdelkader El Khlyfy, Khalid Rahhali, and Noureddine Touati 
remembered me from previous visits and welcomed me, alongside Muhammad Lahya, 
Jamel, Muhammad Khayyat, and Abdelila Ibn al-Sahafi. Abdelila also translated and 
transcribed song lyrics and helped me out in many other areas. A whole host of others 
who passed through or stayed behind at Dar Gnawa, some from Tangier and many more 
from all over the world, were generous with their time and attention—Uwe, Sliman, 
Crofton, and Nicholas come to mind. At the Cafe du Paris in Tangier, Kenneth 
Lisenbee, Piers and Fatima Jessop, Tom, Clive, Rachid, Patrick, and Tony offered 
entertaining, enlightening and challenging conversation. At Cafe Vienna, Ahmad 
Hajjaoui served up coffee and advice. The staff at the Vienna Internet Cafe rescued my 
USB drive numerous times when I left it behind, while Muhammad al-Bawwab 
provided me his endless and fascinating wisdom in economics, philosophy, ethics, and 
life. Ali and Yusuf kept my apartment safe and kept me apprised of neighborhood 
events. I also benefited from getting to know, in Fez, Abdel Aziz Azuz, Idriss, Hamid, 
Mustafa, Alan, Ben, Khaled Gaga, Patrick, Mansour al-Oujdi, Mohsin, Abd al-Malik al-
Mashhur, and especially Ali and his dear family; in Marrakech, Baska, Abdeljalil, Tim 
Abdellah Fuson, Deborah, Jonathan, and Hammoud; and in Essaouira, Najib Sudani, 
Sidi Muhammad, Ahmad, and Muhammad. 
The project would not have been possible without generous funding from the 
American Institute for Maghrib Studies (CAORC), and from the US Department of 
Education’s Foreign Language and Area Studies program, administered through the 
Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. Also at UT-Austin, 
the Department of Anthropology and Americo Paredes Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies provided needed funding and support during my graduate career there. A grant 
also supported my participation in the Princeton North African and North African 
Diaspora Workshop at the Department of Near Eastern Studies in 2008, which was 
organized, under the direction of Prof. Abdellah Hammoudi and Prof. Lawrence Rosen, 
by Jessica Marglin and Claire Nicholas. During the workshop I met Rodney Collins, 
Nell Quest, and Marouane Laouina, who were generous with their advice. 
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At various times between 2001 and 2006, I became indebted to Prof. Taieb 
Belghazi and Prof. Abdelhai Diouri of Mohammad V University in Rabat, Prof. 
Bertrand Hell of Université de Franche-Comté and EHESS-Paris, Dr. Kyra Landzelius 
at the University of Gothenburg, and Dr. Ahmed Lemsyeh at the Ministry of Culture. 
Prof. Khalid Amine of Abdelmalek Essaadi University in Tetouan was welcoming and 
supportive in Tangier, both professionally and personally, along with his wife, Nadia, 
who also tutored me in Moroccan Darija. Also in Tangier, Thor Kuniholm offered 
advice and logistical support, as well as provided official status through the Tangier 
American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies (TALIM). Ms. Yhtimad Bouziane at 
the TALIM library gave me access and assistance. 
Throughout my time at Texas I have received strong, enduring, and warm 
support and friendship from my mentor and advisor Deborah Kapchan, who found me 
wait-listed in April 2000 and took up my application, who kept advising me even after 
she left UT and went on to NYU, and who, even as I write this, is advising me from her 
sabbatical in France. Ted Swedenburg has stayed with me through three years at 
Arkansas and nine years at Texas—a good advisor and friend. I have also received 
unwavering support from the three other members of my committee—Kamran Ali, 
Elizabeth Keating, and Ward Keeler. 
 My family members set me on the path to anthropology and kept me there—Bob 
and Nancy Schaefer of Tamale, Ghana; Paul and Jennifer Schaefer of Bole, Ghana; 
Susie and Donny Briscoe of Marionville, Missouri; Roger and Cindy Rode of Galion, 
Ohio; Bryan and Alicia Rode of Columbus, Ohio; and Brad Rode of Washington, D.C. 
My doctoral work grew out of my M.A. program, and I was fortunate to come to 
Texas on the very accomplished heels of Jamie Brandon and James Davidson. Others 
from Arkansas came to visit, and I also met up with them elsewhere—sometimes in odd 
places, but always fondly: Ted Swedenburg, JoAnn D’Alisera, Joel Gordon; Rachael 
Martin, Will Taggart, Teresa Iwaki, Bill Gardner, Kelley O’Callaghan, Melissa 
Zabecki, and many others. At Texas I was fortunate to study with great professors like 
Pauline Turner Strong, Richard Flores, Katie Stewart, Peter Abboud, Ward Keeler, 
Jonathan Shannon, Mia Carter, Veit Erlmann, Deborah Kapchan, Keith Walters, Joel 
Sherzer, and Jurgen Streeck. I was also privileged to work with Laura Lein and Henry 
Selby, and to get to know Kamala Visweswaran, Elizabeth Keating, Jose Limon, John 
Downing, and Barbara Harlow outside of class, among many others. Bob and BJ Fernea 
had retired by the time I arrived, but they welcomed me into their home on more than 
one occasion. In the anthropology department and folklore center, nothing would get 
done were it not for the capable and resourceful administrative and technical 
professionals. In folklore, for sure, I could not have made it without Frances Terry, 
Elaine Hrissikopoulos, and Amy Hendrick. Thank you for going above and beyond. 
One of UT’s strengths is the interdisciplinarity of the graduate programs. I 
benefited from meeting students through the Ethnographic Film Forum and other 
offerings through Radio-Television-Film, the regular parties of the Ethnic and Third-
World Literature Program in the English Department, the linguistics department’s 
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Symposium on Language and Society—Austin, and numerous concerts and lectures in 
the music department. As I recall the names of my friends, warm memories resurface of 
long evenings spent at various establishments around Austin in quiet conversation and 
sometimes heated, but always friendly, debates over politics, culture, film, literature, 
music, language, identity, and other topics that had spilled over from classes, films, and 
lectures. Close friendships grew out of our experiences as fellow graduate students (in 
no order at all): Mark Westmoreland, Alisa Perkins, Galeet Dardashti, Afra al-
Mussawir, Shaka McGlotten, Dan Gilman, Scott Webel, Ben Chappell, Ben Hodges, 
Guha Shankar, Mieke Curtis, Sandya Hewamanne, Whitney Battle, Peggy Brunache, 
Nick Copland, Faedah Totah, Adam Gordon, David Raichlen, Rob Scott, Olivier 
Tchouaffe, Nafiz Aksehirlioglu, Diya Mehra, Melissa Forbis, Halide Velioglu, Chantal 
Tetreault, and many, many others. Scott Webel and Mathangi Krishnamurthy provided 
excellent critiques of a portion of Section 2. I owe Leighton Peterson and Bennie Klain 
more than I can repay. 
 Upon leaving Texas I found myself in a succession of academic and professional 
contexts. I worked with Gary Levine and Sue Huff at Ashland University and with 
Terry Prendergast in the Writing Center at the College of Wooster. Barb Hampton, Barb 
Hustwit, Linda Bromund, and Jenny Derksen were terrific colleagues there. David 
McConnell and Pamela Frese advised when I taught anthropology at Wooster. Felipe 
Millan-Calhoun was a colleague, student, assistant, and friend. Faculty Dean Shila Garg 
offered me several jobs and kindly provided advice and recommendation letters long 
after I left Wooster. After I returned from the field, Mike Woost invited me to spend a 
year in the vibrant anthropology department at Hartwick College with Connie 
Anderson, Jason Antrosio, and David Anthony. In the history department, Mieko 
Nishida was generous and welcoming, as was Jon Roberts. When I needed a second 
one-year appointment, Margaret Bender and the anthropology department at Wake 
Forest came through: Eric Bowne, Steve Folmar, Sandya Hewamanne, Ellen Miller, 
Jeanne Simonelli, Paul Thacker, and Steven Whittington, all held together in the 
capable hands of Rosemary McCarthy. Michaelle Browers in Wake Forest’s political 
science department was also very welcoming. Overall, I have been fortunate to find 
such warm and supportive colleagues. I look forward to my future position in the 
anthropology program at the American University in Cairo with Soraya Altorki, Joseph 
Hill, Marisa Ensor, Adrienne Pine, Hanan Sabea, and Mark Westmoreland. 
 While readers of various portions of this dissertation have tried, it would have 
been impossible for them to spot all of the errors in typography and in fact, lapses of 
judgment, injudicious emphases, misattributions, weaknesses in argument, and other 
faults contained herein. They did their best and should in no way be held responsible for 
any mistakes I have made. Instead, if anything here is found to be clearly stated or 
useful, it’s no doubt due to the sharp eye and perceptive comment of one of my readers. 
Finally, I could not have even attempted to complete any of this without the help 
and encouragement, and at times the total emotional and material support, of my wife, 
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 This dissertation asks how conceptions of race have informed popular cultural 
expressions in post-independence Morocco. Further, how have these expressions helped 
shape Moroccan modernity? What does an analysis of the history of the Gnawa in 
Morocco tell us about changes in Moroccan society, including the religious landscape, 
and the relation of these changes to globalization? This dissertation tracks the often 
contradictory paths that modernity has taken in Morocco through a focus on one 
racialized subculture, the Gnawa, ritual musicians originally from sub-Saharan Africa 
who have lived in Morocco for centuries without losing a certain African identity. The 
first part of the dissertation assesses Blackness in Morocco, considering Moroccan 
history in light of its relations across the Sahara desert. I examine cultural patterns of 
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the Niger River region to which the Gnawa trace their origins, as well as crucial 
elements in the Moroccan past that involve racial formation. The second part of the 
dissertation considers how newcomers come to take on these new spiritual and musical 
identities, whether through a kind of musical transposition or an economic conversion. I 
argue that mass media have been central in Gnawa conversion narratives in the past, 
while more recent Gnawa identities have revolved around the consumption of 
commodities. The third section details my own conversion through a series of 
engagements with the Essaouira Festival of world music and Gnawa music in Morocco. 
I attended the festival as an informed tourist and also behind the scenes as an interested 
participant, and I found that the festival serves multiple purposes in Morocco’s cultural 
economy. I conclude that Morocco’s aesthetic history is deeply influenced by 
conceptions of race. These conceptions have in turn influenced commercial media 
expressions of post-independence Moroccan identities. Finally, since the opening of 
Moroccan society in the 1990s, the clearest expression of the future of Moroccan 
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2001: A GNAWA ODYSSEY 
In 2001, on my first trip to Morocco, I attended the Gnawa festival in Essaouira 
almost upon arrival. I had visited my family for a few weeks in Ghana, and then I was 
invited to a conference in Gothenburg, Sweden for a few days, my first (and, so far, 
only) visit to Sweden. And so I was feeling very cosmopolitan as I passed through 
Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport for the third time in six weeks on my way to Casablanca. 
I arrived at the Casablanca airport late on a Sunday evening and spent the 
remainder of that night in a hotel near the Casablanca train station before catching the 
morning train to Fes with all my bags. The train arrived around 3 p.m. I took a taxi to 
the language school where I would be taking classes after the festival and dropped off 
my bags, looking to return soon to begin my first instruction in Moroccan Arabic. I had 
studied Modern Standard Arabic in Lebanon, and I knew Moroccans read it because of 
the Arabic newspapers and magazines I saw everywhere. It was thus very disappointing 
to learn how useless it was to be verbally competent in MSA in Morocco. After 
dropping off my bags I had four hours to kill until the evening train to Marrakech, so I 
went to order a cup of tea at a cafe in Fes. I found that I couldn’t even do that 
competently, since I ordered “shay” and was directed by a mocking waiter to ask for 
“thé,” while the other customers laughed too. I later learned that the Moroccan Arabic 
word for tea is at-tay. I also found out that young Americans speaking formal Arabic in 
that neighborhood formed a running joke among local cafe patrons. 
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I changed my Swedish crowns into Moroccan dirhams and headed for the train 
station. That evening I caught the all-night train to Marrakech. On the train I read 
Salman Rushdie’s novel The Moor’s Last Sigh until I fell asleep. I awoke at dawn to a 
stark panorama outside my east-facing train window—a huge red sun rising over a 
rocky cactus desert—and thought for a few minutes that I was in north India. The 
memory of that impression lingered for days. 
At the Marrakech train station I got a taxi to the bus station and caught the bus 
to Essaouira at around 6:30. At 11 am on the second morning of my first trip to 
Morocco, I arrived in the small tourist city of Essaouira. I found a hotel in the madina, 
the old city, that could take me only for that night, so I had to spend a few more hours 
searching for another hotel. I finally located one a mile down the beach that would take 
me for the full festival period. I began hunting for contacts that Ted Swedenburg had 
made two summers before, when he had gone to the festival. Ted, a former professor, 
had given me photographs to distribute to friends he had made. With the help of a shop 
owner, I found Najib Sudani, the son of one of Essaouira’s premier Gnawa m’allims 
who had recently passed away. I sat with Najib in his shop for a bit and chatted, but I 
had real trouble communicating with him due to his lisp, missing teeth, and more 
colloquial Moroccan register and pronunciation. I walked around the corner, looking for 
the music shop Ted had told me about, and I recognized Muhammad and Ahmad from 
the pictures. I found them easier to understand, especially Muhammad, since they a 
higher level of education and thus had access to a more formal register of Arabic. All 
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three remembered “Dedd” fondly and accepted with pleasure the pictures he had sent 
with me. 
 It was still a few days before the concerts began, so I sat in that music shop 
sampling what Muhammad and Ahmad were listening to and observing what their 
customers were buying. I bought a large number of cassettes as well, making myself 
useful by redistributing my summer grant funding in a way that benefited all of us. My 
unnecessarily fancy hotel included breakfasts and dinners; I snacked for lunch most 
days. One day Muhammad invited me to his home for a traditional Moroccan lunch of 
couscous. He introduced me to his family, including his wife and his three daughters. 
His oldest daughter was just finishing her secondary schooling, in a French school, and 
he had two younger girls, the youngest around nine or ten. The food tasted so good! I 
had been disappointed thus far in the Moroccan cuisine I had encountered in the hotel. 
Their warm welcome led me to feel as though I could survive in Morocco. Otherwise, 
in those early days of Wednesday through Friday, I sat in shops and cafes talking with 
people about music and Gnawa. 
 Soon after that, my experience transformed rapidly. More people began arriving, 
including anthropologists Deborah Kapchan and Jonathan Shannon. They were due to 
present at an academic conference associated with the festival, which highlighted the 
music of the Gnawa. The Gnawa are descendants of sub-Saharan slaves who were 
brought to Morocco from West Africa in past centuries. The contributors were speaking 
on slavery, forced migration, Africa, and music. Deborah was my new PhD advisor. We 
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had socialized together a few times the previous year, and in the spring I had taken a 
class taught by Jonathan as an adjunct faculty member at UT-Austin. The conference 
was being held at a large tourist hotel, but not the large tourist hotel identified in the 
official program. (Deborah and Jonathan were staying at a third large hotel, several 
miles from town, with other conference attendees, academics from the United States, 
Canada, and Europe.)  
That Friday, the first day of the conference, I was wandering around the listed 
hotel trying to find the conference, when I ran into a man who was similarly frustrated. I 
found I could communicate perfectly with him in Standard Arabic because, as a 
journalist, he was required to speak that variety of Arabic comfortably and fluently. We 
walked together to the other hotel. When we got there, he began interviewing attendees 
for his story, while I went in and sat down. Presenting that afternoon at the conference 
was Tim Abdellah Fuson, an American graduate student in ethnomusicology who had 
been conducting long-term fieldwork on the Gnawa of Marrakech, the major city of 
southern Morocco and, along with Essaouira, one of the central cities for Gnawa music. 
After the afternoon session I joined Tim on the walk back to the main part of town. He 
was staying with friends in a rented apartment in the madina, graduate students in 
ethnomusicology and anthropology at French universities. We hung out in cafes and 




Over the weekend I attended lectures and socialized with Muhammad and 
Ahmad during the day and went to concerts during the evenings with American and 
Canadian academics. I even attended some of the tourist lilas, which began after 
midnight. One of them Saturday night was held in the courtyard of a two-story building. 
Hundreds of people packed the central area. I found a spot on the balcony. The 
musicians were on an elevated stage at the far end of the space, before a line of trees. 
Barricades and police officers were in place to keep the audience away from the 
performers. Every so often, though, a member of the audience—almost always 
female—would go into trance. Some of those standing around the trancing woman held 
on to her as she whipped her head around; others got out of the way. She was slowly 
guided, trancing all the while, through the audience to the stage, where the police let her 
behind the barricades. An old man on stage brought a veil and the incense brazier, and 
she tranced before the musicians for a few minutes, rocking back and forth or whipping 
her head around in circles, her head and shoulders covered with the veil, as she inhaled 
the incense from the brazier. At the climax of the song, she collapsed, whereupon 
women came and half-carried her to a space behind the stage to recover. 
Sunday morning I went back to the conference, and then went late to meet with 
Najib to buy a ginbri from him. He owned a workshop that produced the ginbri (also 
known as hajhuj or sintir), the large wooden bass lute that is the primary ritual 
instrument of Gnawa music. 
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I wanted an authentic ginbri, with its body hewn from a single piece of wood 
about eight inches across, 20 inches long, and six inches deep, hollow across the front. 
A wooden pole about two inches thick and 15 inches long was attached to one end of 
the body, which had a thick camel skin stretched across the front. Three sheep-gut 
strings were secured to the base of the body and stretched over a light wooden bridge. 
These strings stretched up to the “neck” of the pole to the “headstock,” where they were 
attached to leather straps wound tightly around the pole. Two strings were attached 
closer to the end of the pole. These two, typically tuned to C and F, were fingered on 
the fretless “fingerboard” of the pole, producing other tones in a pentatonic scale. The 
third string, a shorter drone, tended to be tuned to a constant G. It took a long time to 
select and buy my ginbri. Najib also showed me how to tune it, which involved 
estimating the string lengths and then tugging and straining on the leather straps. (Later 
ginbri teachers alleged that he had done so wrongly, but it was more likely my own 
limitations that prevented me from learning how to tune it competently.) I later learned 
that it is not uncommon for the tuner to brace one or even both feet against the ginbri’s 
body in order pull hard enough on the leather straps. But I missed the afternoon concert 
by Algerian rai superstar Cheb Mami on the main stage. I hung out with Deborah and 
Jonathan that evening at their hotel. Monday morning I caught a shared taxi to 
Marrakech. 
 All in all, my 2001 experience was a bit overwhelming. I couldn’t understand 
very much, and I tried to participate in as much as possible. The concerts I found 
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disappointing, for the most part. The Gnawa music was nice, but the collaborations 
seemed forced and not very well planned or executed. I later learned that such failures 
are typical for the Essaouira festival, and not necessarily a bad thing. According to 
Victor Turner, “a celebratory performance rejoices in the key values and virtues of the 
society that produces it, and in a history whose high points of success and conquest (or 
even noble failure) exemplify qualities of moral and aesthetic excellence” (1982:14). 
The collaborations might have been failures, but with such virtuoso musicians, what 
noble failures they were. 
What I found most striking, however, was the popular nature of the festival. The 
streets were filled with strange-looking people, it’s true—dreadlocks, spikes, leather, 
hemp clothing, scantily clad tourists, and the like—but the vast majority of the crowds 
were composed of ordinary-looking Moroccan extended families. There were 
grandmothers in scarves and veils and fancy glasses, keeping up with toddlers and 
young children. Young parents pushed strollers; teenagers acted badly and were scolded 
by middle-aged moms and dads. Some families camped in tents or slept in their cars and 
vans on the beach. Some of these vehicles were driven by Moroccans but bore 
European license plates, which means that they were owned Moroccans who lived and 
worked abroad and who were on vacation back in Morocco. Many more vehicles bore 
Moroccan plates, driven by middle-class Moroccan families visiting temperate 
Essaouira from one of the big, hot cities of the interior or from the coastal cities of 
Casablanca or Rabat. The festival was a middle-class social event. But why did all these 
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people come to Essaouira? There are many festivals in Morocco and many other ways 
for families to spend their leisure time. Why come to the festival that celebrates 
Morocco’s local Black musical tradition? 
 This dissertation asks how conceptions of race have informed popular cultural 
expressions in post-independence Morocco. Further, how have these expressions helped 
shape Moroccan modernity? The dissertation focuses primarily on the Gnawa, a group 
of Moroccans who share a spiritual and musical identity and who trace a common 
heritage with sub-Saharan West Africans enslaved and brought to Morocco between 
1100 and 1900. The first part of the dissertation assesses Blackness in Morocco, 
considering Moroccan history in light of its relations across the Sahara desert. I examine 
cultural patterns of the Niger River region to which the Gnawa trace their origins, as 
well as crucial elements in the Moroccan past that involve racial formation. The second 
section of the dissertation considers how newcomers come to take on these new 
spiritual and musical identities, whether through a kind of musical transposition or an 
economic conversion. I argue that mass media have been central in Gnawa conversion 
narratives in the past, while more recent Gnawa identities have revolved around the 
consumption of everyday commodities. The third section details my own conversion 
through a series of engagements with the Essaouira Festival of world music and Gnawa 
music in Morocco, an engagement whose beginning I have outlined above. I attended 
the festival as an informed tourist and also behind the scenes as an interested 
participant, and I found that the festival serves multiple purposes in Morocco’s cultural 
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economy. I conclude that Morocco’s aesthetic history is deeply influenced by 
conceptions of race. These conceptions have in turn influenced commercial media 
expressions of post-independence Moroccan identities. Finally, since the opening of 
Moroccan society since the 1990s, the clearest expression of the future of Moroccan 
expressive and popular culture has been the rise of music festivals. 
 
GNAWA TRADITIONAL 
 Gnawa scholar and anthropologist Bertrand Hell has completed the most holistic 
and exhaustive description of the traditional Gnawa ceremony (Hell 2002). In his study, 
he shows how the Gnawa form a popular religious fraternity like the Hamadsha 
(Crapanzano 1973), the ‘Issawa, and other groups. These religious orders inhabit a 
position toward the bottom of the religious world in Morocco, below the great Sufi 
orders (tariqas), and separate from orthodox Muslim impulses which are often more 
pietistic, including the so-called salafiyya movements, which seek to emulate seventh-
century Islam. Like in the Sufi orders, in Gnawa bands (taifas) the focus is on ritual 
practice. However, the Gnawa are separated from the tariqas and even from the 
Hamadsha, ‘Issawa, and the like because the Gnawa do not have any central authority, 
defining text, or chain of transmission of a heritage through the centuries. Instead, the 
Gnawa are made up of these local groups of taifas that associate with each other and 
gather together under a common heritage of enslavement. 
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 The Gnawa consider themselves to be the descendants of sub-Saharan Africans 
who were enslaved in West Africa and then brought to Morocco across the Sahara 
Desert on foot. They maintain a memory of that passage that is evident in their songs. 
For example, one Gnawa song details the injustices of enslavement (here, “Sudan” 
refers to the archaic “Western Sudan” or central West Africa, now Senegal, Mali, and 
Niger; bilad al-sudan is Arabic for “land of the Blacks”): 
They brought from the Sudan 
The nobles of this country brought us 
They brought us to serve them 
They brought us to bow to them 
They brought us  
Oh there is no God but God 
We believe in God’s justice. 
   (El Hamel 2008:256) 
Another song mourns the lost homeland: 
The Sudan, oh! Sudan 
The Sudan, the land of my people 
I was enslaved, I was sold, 
I was taken away from my loved ones. 
   (El Hamel 2008:256) 
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Although many Gnawa leaders are darker-skinned than most Moroccans, not all, or 
perhaps not even a majority of Gnawa, might be perceived by non-Moroccans as 
“Black.” Nevertheless, the legacy of enslavement is a commonly voiced point of unity 
for Gnawa. Thus they form a group that shares a common heritage and a common 
mythical homeland south of the Sahara Desert. Despite this heritage, however, the most 
basic means for identifying Gnawa is as a religious group or order. Membership in a 
group derives from an initiation into the group, and a group’s leaders must display some 
sort of proficiency over the group’s knowledge, beliefs, and practices. Certain of these 
beliefs and practices are distinct within Moroccan popular religion. The two primary 
elements among these are a fundamentally adorcist approach to spirit possession, and an 
all-night ceremony called a lila. The songs that are performed during the lila form the 
primary route of access for interested outsiders to learn about the group. 
 Adorcism is a belief that possessing spirits should not be rejected but rather 
accepted and appeased. It is the opposite of exorcism. Almost uniquely in Morocco, the 
Gnawa are strong adorcists. Spirits, called jinn more generally in the Muslim world and 
mluk by the Gnawa, are mentioned in the Quran. Many Moroccans and other Muslims 
fear jinn and try to avoid contact with them. Moreover, many Moroccans believe in the 
existence of saintly spirits. At least, they recognize the existence of material and 
substantive blessing given by God to a saint, known as baraka, which can be shared to 
an adept through interaction with the descendants of the saint or by visiting a sacred site 
associated with the saint. Pilgrimage to these sites forms a basis for much that has been 
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termed “Moroccan Islam.” The Gnawa subsume both of these kinds of spirits—saintly 
spirits as well as jinn—into a larger category that they call mluk, possessing spirits that 
can come upon a person for numerous reasons. For example, one person might be 
possessed by ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, an Iranian jurist and orthodox theologian who died 
in Baghdad in 1166 C.E.; meanwhile, another person might be possessed by Aisha 
Qandisha, the terrifying camel-footed “she-demon” who seduces men in the dark and 
binds them to her, who threatens the life and health of small babies. Whereas other 
religious traditions in Morocco tend to try to exorcise a possessing spirit, the Gnawa 
believe that the spirit could possibly be a permanent resident in an afflicted person’s 
body. Rather than seeking to oust the spirit, a Gnawa leader tries instead to identify the 
spirit properly, with the aim of appeasing him or her. This process of identifying the 
specific spirit that is afflicting a person is usually the primary goal of a lila ceremony. 
The secondary goal involves determining how to appease the spirit. 
 Lila (or “leela”) means “night,” and the lila ceremony takes place at night, either 
in an entire night from the late evening to dawn, as is the case in southern Morocco and 
Rabat, or spread across three nights, as tends to be the case in northern Morocco. A 
ceremony will be scheduled before-hand by the main person who needs healing. He or 
she will take the responsibility of organizing it, usually with the help of a mqaddim 
(male) or mqaddima (female), the religious professional who officiates at the ceremony. 
The mqaddim knows the names of the spirits and their attributes and typical desires. 
Together, the afflicted person and the mqaddim engage a m’allim or master musician, 
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always a man, who heads a troupe of three more musicians. These musicians play three 
principal instruments: ginbri, qraqib, and tbel. The single ginbri, also known as hajhuj 
or sintir, the large bass lute mentioned above, is principally played by the m’allim and, 
during some songs, by one of the senior members of the troupe. It is held like a guitar, 
fingered on the neck by the left hand and strummed by the right. The method of playing 
resembles a “slap bass” style—the thumb and forefinger pluck and strike the strings, 
while the other three fingers drum on the camel-skin cover (the equivalent of the 
soundboard of a guitar). Thus the instrument produces both tone and rhythm. 
Sometimes a rattle in inserted into the end of the “headstock,” producing a snare effect. 
The qraqib (sing. qarqaba), two paired sets of large metal castanets, are played in 
unison by all the junior members of the troupe, who usually number three to six players. 
The qraqib tend to be around 10 inches long, shaped like barbells and cupped at the 
larger ends. A paired set is linked at one end with a metal staple; they are free at the 
other end. Leather straps attached to each neck are looped around the thumb and the 
first two fingers, to help pull the free end apart quickly after clapping it. The two paired 
sets are clapped alternately, one by each hand, in double and triple rhythms, in response 
to the rhythms played on the ginbri. The tbel, a large bass drum, is played at the 
beginning of the ceremony.  
Once an official offer has been accepted and a date set, then other members of 
the taifa as well as other Gnawa might decide to attend. A lila can be expensive, and 
while the initial cost is borne by the person requesting the ceremony, there is the idea 
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that the total cost will eventually be shared by the entire community. This is usually 
done so through donations during the course of the ceremony. After a specific song has 
been played, some members of the audience respond by donating money in exchange 
for the blessing the receive. The greater the blessing, the greater the number of donors 
for that song. (The amount of a single donation tends to be fixed, at 10 or 20 dirhams.) 
As a result, a better performance that involves a more successful ceremony can cause a 
greater amount to be raised and directed toward paying off the initial investment, after 
the musicians are paid. Money can also be raised by auctioning off various ritual items 
used during the ceremony. 
 Over the course of the night or series of nights, a number of musical suites are 
played. Before these more “instrumental” songs are played, however, there is the 
welcoming ceremony, followed by the more “expressive” fraja (“entertainment”) songs. 
The welcoming ceremony begins outside of the house where the ceremony is to take 
place. The drums are played very loudly and a song of welcome is sung. This ceremony 
not only welcomes any hearer who wishes to attend, but it is also directed toward any 
spirits that might be inhabiting hearers within earshot. After beginning in the street, the 
troupe enters the home and continues to drum and sing for a few minutes. Then the tbel 
is laid aside and not used again, and the fraja songs begin. The fraja songs are marked 
by virtuoso and athletic dances by the members of the troupe. 
After these two introductory sections are completed, there is usually a break of 
30 minutes—or much longer—before the possession suites begin, usually around 
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midnight. The possession suites correspond to the broad groupings of spirits, which are 
identified by color. Although the number of groupings tends to vary, Bertrand Hell 
(2002) determines a typical number of groupings for Marrakech to be seven. Each of 
the seven pantheons of spirits has a unique suite of songs, a main color, and a specific 
incense. Hell further divides the spirits into two broad groupings, the white and the 
black. The white, or “Muslim” spirits, are those that belong to the White, Red, Green, 
and Blue pantheons. The black, or “African” spirits, fall into the Yellow, Multi-
Colored, and Black pantheons. Hell further distinguishes the “First Black spirits” from 
the “Second Black spirits,” which come later in the ceremony and are even more 
dangerous than the Yellow, Multi-Colored, and First Black spirits. 
Determining the precise identities of the possessing spirits is the paramount goal 
of the ceremony, particularly for those people who are afflicted but whose possessing 
spirit has not been identified. The spirit al-Jilani, the Standard Bearer, knows all the 
spirits and helps in this process. The easiest spirits to identify are those of the White, 
Red, Green, and Blue pantheons, which are never jinn, even though all the mluk are 
difficult to control and provoke ambivalence among the Gnawa. The really fearful jinn, 
however, are those of the other pantheons, the Yellow, Multicolored, and Black. These 
are associated with Baba Mimun, the guardian of the Gnawa, who is known as the 
“Master of the Doors to the Sudan” (Hell 2002:141) and who is a member of the First 
Black pantheon. The White spirits are associated with birth. The Multi-Colored spirits 
represent the wandering hermit, voluntarily poor and poorly fed but on a holy quest for 
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wisdom. The First Black spirits are those of blacksmithing and forging, representing the 
fire of knowledge. Other key First Black spirits include Lala Mimuna the Gnawiyya and 
al-Ghumami or “the Stormy.” Al-Ghumami, “Master of the Sword,” is “the most 
dreadful avatar of Baba Mimun” (Hell 2002:173). When those who are possessed by 
Ghumami dance, they cut themselves with knives, more violently than those who are 
possessed by al-Jilani. The Blue spirits (associated with water, sea, and sky) and the 
Red Spirits (blood) represent the vital bodily fluids, while the Green spirits are Muslim 
saints. Many of the songs from the Green suite are keyed to an “oriental mode,” in 
contrast to the rest of the songs, which tend to be in a pentatonic scale.1 A well-known 
Blue spirit is Sidi Musa, the spirit of the biblical Moses, associated with water because 
he parted the Red Sea and led the Israelites across on dry land, and he later struck the 
stone and caused it to yield a spring. The Second Black spirits, the awlad ghaba or 
“Sons of the Forest,” represent the wilderness and wild animals. Their key spirit is Bala 
Bala Dima, the Great Serpent. Following through the door opened by Baba Mimun, 
these spirits are more ferocious and aggressive than the First Blacks (Hell 2002:250). 
Many of them are nameless wild animals. Finally, the Yellow spirits represent rebirth 
and feminine sweetness and laughter, and they share a taste for sugar, pretty ornaments, 
bright colors, sweet perfume, and gracious dance. They practice seduction and value 
sensual pleasure. An early dance involves overturning a plate of sweets, which elicits a 
                                                       
1 Thanks to Tim Abdellah Fuson for pointing this out. 
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mad scramble for them, the audience laughing and pushing on all fours. The Yellow 
spirits come at the end of the cycle, at dawn, the rebirth of the day. 
Often newcomers to the ceremony do not know which spirit has possessed them, 
or even whether they are possessed, so those around them who are more experienced 
tend watch for signs that they might be entering into trance—for example, a person 
might begin to rock slowly and then more vigorously, ending up in a trance state. Or a 
person might go suddenly rigid and need to be carried to the dance space. People who 
already know their possessing spirit might make their way to the dance space when their 
spirit’s song begins. Sometimes the occasion of the lila is the first hint of a new 
possessing spirit, and so a member might be prepared for a later possession, but be 
taken by surprise at an unexpected possession. In any case, once the possessing spirit 
takes over, the person is led to the dance space, where he or she is covered with a veil of 
the appropriate color, and the brazier with the appropriate incense is presented, so that 
the person in trance can inhale the smoke. The possessed person then dances, often with 
someone not in trance assisting him or her. Usually men assist other men and women 
assist other women, but this is not always the case. While women are dancing, they 
often remove their veils and swing their hair freely in a large circle. This image is 
visually arresting, particularly for outsiders. As such, it forms one of the most 
symbolically charged images of the Gnawa ceremony, sparking intense debates among 
supporters and opponents of the Gnawa over liberation versus license. A particularly 
intense possession might extend for several minutes or even 20 or 30 minutes, the 
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person dancing alone immediately before the m’allim, who must continue to play, as the 
possessing spirit continues to demand that the song not stop. In such cases the spirit is 
considered to be communing directly with the ginbri. 
 Outside of the ceremony, male Gnawa musicians are highly visible on the street. 
They can be seen in residential as well as commercial districts, usually in pairs (one 
with a tbel, the other with qraqib) but sometimes alone, dispensing blessings from door 
to door and from passerby. A Gnawa musician in this public role usually wears sandals, 
traditional trousers, and a tunic of red, green, or black cloth, often with a belt and sash 
covered with cowry shells. He also tends to wear a fez, also decorated with cowries, to 
which a tassel has been attached on a string. As he plays his qraqib, dances, and sings 
songs from the fraja suites, he moves his head so as to keep the tassel spinning around 
continuously. A song will tend to end with a flourish, perhaps with the dancer leaping 
high, followed by a deep bow. He then removes his hat and presents it for a donation. If 
a donation is given, the dancer will often recite a series of blessings over the donor’s 
life, family, possessions, etc. 
Tension exists between interpreting such encounters variously as spiritual 
service provided to the public, as begging, and as spiritual extortion. In addition to the 
reality that most Gnawa musicians inhabit a position close to the bottom of Morocco’s 
socioeconomic ladder, such encounters—perhaps the closest an outsider may ever come 
to first-hand experience with Gnawa beliefs and practices—may account for many of 
the negative impressions of Gnawa by non-Gnawa Moroccans. When I first got to 
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Morocco, I would seek out such Gnawa performing publicly and try to talk with them. I 
usually learned that most of them were visitors in the city, on a holy pilgrimage, who 
were staying long enough to make enough money to move on. Later, as I tried to go 
about my everyday business, especially if I was in a hurry, I would avoid such 
encounters. I would take a different street if I could hear qraqib playing ahead of me. I 
would also speed up or slow down, suddenly get interested in a shop window, or create 
an animated conversation with a companion—anything to avoid getting sucked into the 
high-pressure sales tactics of the Gnawa. In Tangier, I tended to recognize the dancers 
in the street, because visiting Gnawa pilgrims tended to end up at Dar Gnawa at some 
point. I would often leave a cafe to go and chat for a few minutes. Waiters and 
acquaintances tended to be horrified when I did so. 
 
GNAWA MODERN 
Exceptions abound to the above description of what is signified by the word 
gnawa. In this section, I hope to complicate these accepted stereotypes as a means of 
showing Gnawa beliefs and practices to be dynamic and fluid. I first met Gnawa 
m’allim Abdellah El Gourd later during the summer of 2001. Halfway through my 
language course I traveled to Tangier to visit Deborah Kapchan there. She had been 
interviewing Abdellah for a project and invited me along on a visit. Abdellah was a 
short, powerfully built man with dark brown skin and a thick white beard. I later learned 
that it was prematurely white—at the time he was 58, a year younger than my own 
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father, of whom Abdellah reminded me. I was still speaking what appeared to 
Moroccan ears to be Arabic in a formal register: After inviting us to sit down and 
offering us tea, Abdellah started speaking to me in precise and correct formal Arabic, 
but very quickly. I stumbled a bit in my response. I guess I looked like I was panicking, 
because he suddenly grinned and said, “Relax, man! Speak English!”  
Abdellah’s spoken English occasionally gave evidence of his early years 
socializing with African-American jazz musicians a generation older than he, who were 
living in or visiting Tangier during the 1960s, when Abdellah was a young man. Pianist 
Randy Weston in particular was an early friend—Weston’s training under Thelonius 
Monk and others in Harlem in the 1950s explained Abdellah’s occasional but 
comfortable use of a distinct variety of African-American vernacular English. As the 
interview continued, Deborah asked Abdellah to show us his luha, a large chart 
containing an outline of the entire Gnawa lila. The chart, hand written, held the titles of 
243 Gnawa songs and the ceremonial order in which they came. In 2006, Abdellah told 
me that from the 1960s to the 1980s he had spent his weekends traveling around the 
country incognito, participating in lilas and learning the songs of other Gnawa 
traditions, “learning their knowledge,” as he liked to put it. This luha was a 
representation of his own knowledge of the Northern Gnawa tradition. The item became 
an object for Kapchan to pursue (Kapchan 2002a, 2007). Abdellah never permitted it to 
be copied, neither by someone copying the names of the songs by hand nor by taking 
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close-up photographs. He seemed to guard it as a valuable piece of intellectual property, 
but it was not for sale at any price. 
I visited Tangier briefly in 2002, but I did not return there to live until February 
2006. In February and March, during Tangier’s only intemperate season, cold rain fell 
often enough to keep us huddled in a small room in Abdellah’s home when we met. 
There were no tourists and few important visitors during this time. Instead, Abdellah 
gave his days over to educating the younger initiates, while he spent his evenings 
conversing with his friends and members of his troupe. He had two younger initiates 
whom he was “working.” By other m’allims, this was done informally and verbally, in 
conversations. However, since Abdellah and his students were all working-class or 
lower-middle-class, literate and accustomed to learning through reading and writing, 
Abdellah had decided to write down his knowledge. This would permit the initiates 
study the written text and copy it by hand, along the way to memorizing it, learning this 
knowledge as they had engaged other kinds of knowledge at school. 
This method struck me at the time as simultaneously conservative and 
innovative: Abdellah the Gnawa m’allim (“master musician”) had taken up the role of a 
mu’allim (“master teacher”) in a quranic school, who teaches the Qur’an to students 
using writing and memorization. At the same time, never before had a m’allim taken the 
time to write down Gnawa knowledge. It was revolutionary. I asked for a copy of his 
book when he was done, so I could translate into English. He was honored, he said, but 
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he told me that other people had also asked him for the book, and he just wasn’t done 
yet. He let me read from it, but he wouldn’t let me take it home or copy it. 
At the same time that Abdellah was proclaiming the value of his cultural 
products while resisting any monetary realization of that value, he was well into a full-
fledged second career performing on stages in North America and Europe. Between 
1965 and 1991 he had worked as a mechanic and electrician for the Voice of America, 
maintaining the generators that powered the broadcasting station south of Tangier. 
When new generators were installed in 1991, his skills became obsolete, and so he had 
retired with a full pension from the US government. It was then, financially secure at 
the age of 44, that he began to consider a new career as a professional musician. In the 
fifteen years since then, Abdellah had toured all over Europe, North American, and the 
Mediterranean. His performances abroad, often before elite audiences, nearly always 
involved a Question-&-Answer session before or after the performance. Abdellah told 
me that he considered these Q&A sessions to be the most stressful period of any 
performance, the most physically and emotionally taxing. The sessions were a kind of 
performance in themselves: During the sessions, Abdellah would translate his 
knowledge into English, French, Spanish, or Modern Standard Arabic, providing 
digestible synopses of very complicated performances and their even more complicated 
meanings. He “cooked” these sessions for the particular requirements of that audience, 
whether it was French or African-American jazz enthusiasts, Tunisian intelligentsia, 
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Spanish small-town festival attendees, German school children, or any other of the 
diverse audiences before which he has performed. 
Elsewhere, I point up the apparent contradiction between protecting one’s 
cultural heritage while simultaneously publicizing it widely. However, at this point I 
wish to underscore the “modernity” of holding both positions. I propose that a similar 
perspective with regard to capitalism is emblematic in the aesthetics of late modernity. 
Before we engage further with modernity, however, it is necessary to understand better 
where the Gnawa came from and how they came to hold the position they do in 
Moroccan popular culture. Doing so demands we examine the history of exchanges 
across the Sahara desert between Morocco and the societies of sub-Saharan Africa.
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SECTION I: HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY 
ACROSS THE SAHARA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Conceptions of race in Morocco bear a long history of interactions with Black 
people from sub-Saharan Africa. The history of the Gnawa is connected to the history 
of slavery in Morocco, which is further implicated in the history of Morocco’s 
interactions with West Africa. Below, I begin with a discussion of Gnawa origins in 
West Africa. Slaves were brought across the Sahara for nearly 900 years, and I begin 
with a reiteration of medieval Moroccan history, focusing on slavery and racial 
formation. I have chosen to focus particular attention, however, on the period of 
heightened conquest and forced migration, between 1591 and the middle of the 
nineteenth century. I have done so because this period saw tremendous expansion in the 
one-way trade in Black slaves north across the desert. After the historical synthesis, I try 
to synthesize Western scholarship on the Gnawa. This scholarship was conducted with 
certain biases in favor of assigning a unique West African character to Gnawa members. 
While this bias is not necessarily incorrect, much of the early scholarship does seem to 
assume a “salvage” task of discovering “survivals” of African traditional religion, 
“essential and primal” qualities that have been “hidden under a veneer” of Islam, so to 
speak. Later scholars of the Gnawa have tried to broaden the conversation as a means of 
correcting this bias, and I document these efforts since the 1990s. Finally, I conclude 
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with a study of ethnography in West Africa and Morocco. Throughout this section, I am 
driven by the question: What is the role of race in popular culture and the public 
imaginary in Morocco? In the following analysis of the history of the Gnawa in 
Morocco, I am primarily interested in how changes in Moroccan society, including 




Chapter 1: History of Blackness and Slavery in Morocco 
 
The world of our fathers resides within us. Ten thousand generations and more. 
A form without a history has no power to perpetuate itself. What has no past can 
have no future. At the core of our life is the history of which it is composed and 
in that core are no idioms but only the act of knowing and it is this we share in 
dreams and out. (Cormac McCarthy, Cities of the Plain) 
 
In the Theses on the Philosophy, Walter Benjamin famously describes Angelus 
Novus, an avant-garde watercolor of an angel. He bought the painting in 1921, soon 
after Paul Klee painted it, and he carried it with him until his death in 1940. Benjamin 
interpreted the angel through at least two other alternative readings in the 1920s and 
1930s (Jackson 2004); it was not until January of 1940, as Nazi armies were preparing 
for the invasion of France later that year, that Benjamin arrived at his ultimate reading. 
This time, he pictured history as an angel staring back in horror at the storm blowing 
from the origin of life, from Paradise. Despite the angel’s desire to stop and fix things, 
he finds himself carried backward by the storm, his wings fixed open by its force:  
“This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the 




The moment of modernity creates lapses in historical memory, as everything old 
becomes new or at least newly perceived. At the same time, however, even though 
memory might have lapsed, the events that contributed to it continue to exert a power to 
determine the objective social and material conditions that we perceive as reality. The 
rhythm of history is conceived by Juan Flores (2000), using the ideas of Johannes 
Fabian (1998), as a sequence of “moments of freedom”: conditions under which social 
relations across boundaries are achieved. “Catching” these moments—documenting 
them ethnographically—demands an “art of timing” in Michel de Certeau’s (1984) 
words. The art of timing is a skill necessary both to enact meaningful cultural practices 
(by musicians, for example) and to comprehend, document, and analyze them (by 
scholars, perhaps) (Flores 2000:21). This is a historically bound art, in the sense of 
historical memory as imagination, as a sequence of remembered events, actions, and 
conditions, and as “the association of social experiences through and in time by means 
of interpretive recognition and recollection” (23). There are many ways to discuss 
history and memory with regard to Morocco. Here, I offer a consideration of Moroccan 
modernity in light of Morocco’s relations across the Sahara Desert, relations that have 
encouraged Moroccans to identify themselves as Africans and with Africa. 
The art of timing with which this project is concerned speaks to the moment 
Gnawa music inhabits in modernity, a condition and a period of articulation into a 
global capitalist system. Because Gnawa ideologies and practices have so recently 
captured popular and scholarly attention, it is necessary to describe and understand 
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them. This moment is wrapped up in discussions and debates over Africanness, the 
Black Atlantic, Islam and modernity, the respatialization of West Africa, and the terms 
of interaction between people and between ideologies that well reflects Stuart Hall’s 
(1980) definition of articulation in all its forms. According to Hall, articulation can refer 
to the act of “giving voice” to something once silenced; to the relationship between 
ideology and social and material reality; and finally, in the sense I proposed earlier, to 
the terms of the relationship between the music and the market. All of these 
articulations are bound in time and determined by history. Studying the landscape of 
definitional struggles has been pointed up as a necessary step in avoiding the uncritical 
acceptance of “globalization” and other essentialisms (Tsing 2002:474-475). 
 
ORIGINS AND ETYMOLOGIES 
The origin of the word gnawa continues to puzzle scholars. I argue that the 
original pronunciation of “ghana” was “gana,” and that Arab scholars used a ghayn 
(voiced velar fricative, similar to the “French r”) because of the Arabic script’s lack of a 
conclusive means to represent the “hard g.” This helps explain why Arabic speakers 
continue to perceive such a huge leap from ghana to gnawa, one that is not so evident to 
non-Arabic and non-French speakers. Despite continued ambivalence (e.g., El Hamel 
2008), this conclusion seems to me to name the word’s likely origin, based on Arabic 
transliteration patterns. The sound used in gnawa, “hard g” as in golf, presents problems 
of transliteration into Arabic orthographies. Standard Arabic has no symbol for the 
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sound, and as a result typically uses the kaf symbol with three dots or a line above it to 
signify this sound when needed to transliterate other languages. A unique feature of 
Colloquial Egyptian Arabic, however, pronounces all incidences of the letter jeem as 
“geem.” Since Egypt comes on the route from Arabia to Morocco and West Africa, we 
can trace something of an orthographic shift as well. This particular phonological 
substitution is not commonly evident in Colloquial Moroccan Arabic, but it can be 
found. For example, ijlis (in Modern Standard Arabic, the imperative “sit”) becomes 
glis in CMA. It thus seems appropriate to postulate that a geem or a jeem could be 
transliterated as a kaf or a ghayn—and vice versa—through the vagaries of local 
pronunciation and orthographic inconsistencies of transliteration. Moreover, if the 
Soninke phonology has been reasonably consistent over the past 1000 years, we can see 
that the voiced velar fricative (i.e., ghayn) does not exist in modern Soninke, the 
modern form of the language of the ancient West African civilization of Ghana. We can 
thus propose that the ancient Ghanaians, like the modern ones, probably pronounced the 
word gana.2 As a result, the word Gnawa is most likely derived from the word Gana 
                                                       
2 Due to some limitations of the Arabic and Roman alphabets, here is some slippage between the gh, g, 
and j sounds. Although most Arabs pronounce “ghana” with a gh, a sound not very different from the 
“French r,” the citizens of present-day Ghana pronounce the word gana, with a “hard g.” Admittedly, 
present-day Ghana is geographically, historically, ethnically, and linguistically distant from ancient 
Ghana. Nevertheless, Trimingham (1959) transcribes the name of the ancient city as Gana. Were I to 
pursue this line of inquiry further, I might find that the words Ghana, Jenne, Gnawa, and Guinea all share 
a common root that has particular resonance in some language once or still spoken along the northern 
bend of the Niger River, most probably Soninke. Hell (2002:75) notes that the term could have come 
from the word Ghana, since the citizens of Ghana “were known to Arab authors of the twelfth century as 
the Djinawa.” But Hell considers numerous alternative origins as well. He points to the Bambara gnahua, 
the name of a West African guardian spirit; the Arabic djennawa, the name of the inhabitants of Djenné, 
the Songhay capital; the Chleuh Berber term igri ignawan (citing Paques 1978), which refers to the star 
Aldebaran; and finally the Touareg word gunawiya, which refers to black slaves and allegedly comes 
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and signifies the people of Ghana. After the demise of that civilization, the term was 
still used in Morocco to refer to people from that region, exactly as “Farangi” and other 
similar words used throughout the Middle East and Asia to refer to Western Europeans 
have far outlived the Frankish state of Charlemagne. 
Etymology is an academic question, but it signals a larger, related question that 
is not merely academic. Statements about etymologies speak to debates over the 
primary identifications the group makes with regard to its origins. It seems reasonable 
to assume that arguments supporting a Berber origin or a Soninke origin of the word are 
attempting a subtler argument concerning the place of Gnawa in Moroccan society. Are 
they originally from Morocco? Are they originally from the Arab lands? Are they 
originally from West Africa? How can statements about these origins lend themselves 
to arguments concerning their position today? The answers to such questions typically 
involve secondary assumptions concerning Islam and orthodoxy. Hell’s unwillingness 
to commit to an exclusively sub-Saharan origin is important, because it also reflects 
what he calls a “double filiation” among the Gnawa. Within the ceremonial Gnawa 
context, the two broad groupings of Gnawa spirits, Black Spirits and White Spirits, are 
                                                                                                                                                                
from the Berber root gnu, “to sew,” and thus gnuwa, “sewn up,” a reference to the fact that slaves were 
not permitted to speak. Chouki El Hamel (2008) argues that the Berber word is primary, but he fails to 
furnish enough evidence that usage of the Berber word preceded contemporary knowledge in North 
Africa of the West African empire. All of the alternatives appear to me either derivative of gana or folk 
etymologies. Thomas Hale (1998) faces similar problems in his search for the origin of griot, a word used 
to identify praise singers and poets across Saharan and Sahel West Africa. After presenting alternative 
origins of griot, Hale advances his theory that guinea, gnawa and griot share a common origin in gana, 
the name for the war leader of a 1000-year-old West African capital. This term later came to stand for the 
capital itself, and by extension the empire. Hale argues that the Berber word agenaou, “land of the 
blacks,” was itself derived from this place-name through trade and contact across the Sahara, and this 
conclusion seems most likely to me.  
 
31 
represented by spirit leaders. The Muslim spirits, the whites, are led by the saint of 
Baghdad, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, who binds together both believing spirits and Muslim 
saints within the bonds of ecstasy. The white spirits are a representation of an “Eastern” 
origin, related to Islam. The second group is associated with Baba Mimun, the patron 
saint of the Gnawa, the master of initiation who wears a red fez decorated with cowry 
shells. In Morocco, cowries are seen as a symbol of Africa, and the Black Spirits 
likewise represent an African origin for the Gnawa. The duality between West Africa 
and the central Arab lands is represented in the Gnawa ceremony when the dancers 
sometimes appear to metamorphose into savage beasts and at other times make the 
Muslim profession of faith. This duality has led to some confusion among antagonistic 
observers, for whom “the Gnawa are exorcists and ‘chasers of devils’”; meanwhile, for 
the initiates, “the alliance with these same entities represent the actual end and goal of 
their rituals” (Hell 2002:118). Hell argues that the bipolarity should not be understood 
as opposite but as complementary: “The ecstasy and the incorporation of genies permits 
the adepts to cross all the states necessary for a total possession, one complete lila 
(night) being assimilated into a real voyage across the different cosmic lights” (119). 
We can attribute the duality to a strong assertion that the Gnawa are Muslims and West 
Africans simultaneously (El Hamel 2008), and are fully Moroccan. 
Hell ties the bipolarity to a slippage between East and South in the origin stories 
that are told. Some say the first Gnawa in Morocco was a griot from Mali in West 
Africa who was sent by his king to Mulay Isma’il. Carrying only his ginbri, the griot 
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was installed in the royal palace in Meknes in the seventeenth century, when he founded 
the first Gnawa group. In contrast, the Gnawa leaders of Fes and Meknes consider the 
Gnawa to be true sons of Bilal, a servant of the Prophet Muhammad who became the 
fourth Muslim converted (after Muhammad’s wife, Khadija, his uncle Abu Talib, and 
his cousin Abu Bakr). A slave, Bilal was tortured by his owner for his faith, and so 
Muhammad bought him and freed him. Bilal was the first muezzin, the one who calls 
the faithful to prayer, and is considered one of the closest of the Prophet’s companions. 
When Mulay Idriss, a descendent of the Prophet and the founder of Islam in Morocco, 
came from Arabia in the eighth century, they say, he brought with him an Ethiopian 
servant, a descendent of Bilal. This man founded the Gnawa sect. Similarities between 
the Gnawa sect and the Zar sect of East Africa and Arabia (Boddy 1989) seem to 
support the second theory, while the first one is supported by consilience between 
Gnawa practices and musics and those of West Africa, as well as by historical and 
ethnohistorical documentation. It should be clear that movement across the Sahara was 
not only vertical but also horizontal.3 Enough evidence exists to suggest that we can’t 
rule out an eastern origin for some of the beliefs and practices of the Gnawa. Moreover, 
simplistic analyses that produce two aspects of Gnawa practice, “African” and 
“Muslim,” have an unfortunate if unintended result of reinscribing narratives 
                                                       
3 The ancient civilization center of Kanem-Bornu, founded in the eighth century C.E. in the vicinity of 
Lake Chad, was the site of what is still the longest single continuous dynasty in world history, from the 
ninth century to the nineteenth century C.E. Kanem-Bornu mediated trade and travel from Egypt and the 
Levant to the Niger River and from Ethiopia and southern Arabia to Tunis. It is thus likely that many of 
the blacks in Morocco, like many groups across West Africa, can very likely trace their origins to the 
region that is now Chad (formerly a much more fertile and densely populated region) and beyond to 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Arabia. 
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concerning the perceived “shallowness” of Muslim identity among North Africans that 
were used as a means of colonial division and rule and that are sustained by popular 
Western exoticism (Hammoudi 1993; Schuyler 2000). 
Nevertheless, questions of origins are usually predicated around contemporary 
concerns of identity. What is important is not to determine the exact origins of the 
Gnawa but rather to understand their place in recent Moroccan society, which is so 
prominent because membership is not limited to Black Moroccans. Within Morocco, 
three key distinctions separate the Gnawa from the other Moroccan sects: their 
Africanness, their strangeness and foreignness, and finally their low social status. The 
three are related, and in the rest of this section I tease apart some of the origins of 
Gnawa Africanness, strangeness, and low social status within Morocco. The key 
concept here is that of racial formation within a context of cultural mixing related to 
enslavement and forced migration. 
 
MOROCCO ACROSS THE ALMORAVID SAHARA 
In terms of history as the writing of events, North African history goes back to 
the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals of the classical periods, an outsider 
history of diverse conquests (Laroui 1977:27).4 A continuous historical record for 
                                                       
4 By appealing to written historical records, I am not excluding alternative historical methods and do not 
intend to imply that I am dismissing the voices of non-elite members of North African society. I do 
attempt a modicum of “reading against” the written record (Visweswaran 1996). In fact, I do feel deeply 
ambivalent about the strong dependence on written records alone. Nevertheless, a fully radical, feminist 
account that would seek to restore some of the hidden voices of history that have been obscured and 
effaced by nationalist and elite historiography is beyond the scope of this project. 
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Morocco can generally be established from the arrival of Islam and the founding of the 
first Muslim state (the Idrissid dynasty) in the eighth century CE. Laroui notes that the 
ninth century marked the “true opening of the Sahara” to North Africans (1977:128), 
because it was also around this time that the camel was introduced to West Africa. 
When discussing Moroccan interactions with West Africans, however, most scholars 
tend to focus on the subsequent dynasties of the Almoravids (1062-1147), the 
Almohads (1147-1269), the Merenids (1269-1465), the Saadians (1465-1659), and the 
‘Alawites (1659-), of whom the current king, Muhammad VI, is the most recent 
sovereign. 
The Almoravid dynasty (al-murabitun, 1062-1137) was founded by members of 
the Lemtouna Berber tribe, who “reconciled business with holy war” (Hell 2002:76) 
and first marked a continuous history of intensified relations between Morocco and 
West Africa. Converted to Islam over the previous two centuries, they came to control 
the ancient trade routes between North Africa and Timbuktu, which had revolved 
around the gold trade since the eighth century, when the city of Sijilmasa in southern 
Morocco had been founded (757 C.E.). During the Almoravid dynasty a confederation 
of Sanhaja Berber traders in that city “imposed their suzerainty” on the kingdom of 
Ghana and founded the city of Awdaghost in what is now Mauritania (Laroui 1977:158-
159). Awdaghost was taken by Ghana in 1040. When the Almoravids came out of the 
western Sahara, they turned first toward Sijilmasa and took the city in 1053. They then 
turned south to retake Awdaghost before they returned to retake Sijilmasa in 1056, 
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which had revolted in the meantime. The Almoravids then turned north and founded 
Marrakech (1062), which “replaced Sijilmasa as the great gold market” (Laroui 
1977:162). This northward expansion led to Almoravid rule over much of the northwest 
corner of Africa as well as southern Spain. 
After founding Marrakech the Almoravids went on to conquer everything 
between the western Sahara and Algiers by 1080 (Laroui 1977:163). Rather than 
continuing eastward, however, the leader Yusuf Ibn Tashfin turned north to support the 
embattled amirs of the taifa states of al-Andalus in what is now southern Spain. After 
taking control of much of al-Andalus, the Almoravids continued their forays into West 
Africa, which resulted in the capture of numerous black slaves in the wake of Ghana’s 
decline after 1100 C.E. The addition of black women (“concubines”) into the families 
of Almoravid leaders “contributed to the strong interbreeding of the Almoravids” (Hell 
2002:77). Jean-Marie LeSage (1999) also emphasizes the “métissage” of these tribes, 
their racially and ethnically blended nature. The “veiled men” (LeSage 1999:24) of the 
desert Sanhaja Berber tribe had already been successful in gaining control over the trade 
routes of the Niger River cities. When these Berbers turned their attention to the cities 
of northern Morocco and southern Spain, Black soldiers played significant roles in the 






MEDIATING BLACKNESS IN ALMORAVID AND ALMOHAD MOROCCO 
Many important Black religious leaders and figures arose during the Almoravid 
and Almohad periods (Cornell 1998). We should note that these were not necessarily 
transported slaves or even their descendents—Black people were identified as living in 
North African in antiquity. One story takes place in 1141 amidst the civil war waged 
between the falling Almoravids and the ascendant Almohad dynasty (al-muwahhidun, 
1147-1269). In this story the Almoravid sultan is ‘Ali ibn Yusuf. Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali Ibn 
Hirzihim (d. 1164) is the famous “Sidi Harazem,” a great scholar whose pilgrimage site 
is near Fes. Abu al-Hakam Ibn Barrajan is a famous mystic and political activist of 
Seville who has been brought before the sultan in Marrakech: 
When Abu al-Hakam ibn Barrajan was ordered to be brought from Cordoba to 
Marrakech, he was asked about the matters causing his censure and brought 
them forth, commenting on their implications and differentiating [his beliefs] 
from those for which he was accused. Abu al-Hakam said, “By God, I will not 
live, and the one who brought me here [i.e., the sultan] will not live after my 
death!” Then Abu al-Hakam died [i.e., was executed] and the sultan commanded 
that he be thrown on the city garbage heap and that no one make the funeral 
prayer for him. This [command] was authorized by the jurists who were his 
accusers. 
A black man who worked for ‘Ali ibn Hirzihim and attended his lessons 
went to [the shaykh, ibn Hirzihim] and told him what the sultan had ordered 
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concerning Abu al-Hakam. Then Ibn Hirzihim said to him, “If you wish to sell 
your soul to God, do what I tell you.” 
“Command what you wish and I will do it,” the man replied. [The 
shaykh] said, “Proclaim in the streets and markets of Marrakech: ‘Ibn Hirzihim 
orders you to be present at the funeral, the legist, the exalted ascetic Abu al-
Hakam ibn Barrajan. May the curse of God be upon him who is able to come 
and does not!” 
The man did as he was commanded and when [Ibn Hirzihim’s challenge] 
was made known to the sultan, he said, “He who is aware of [Ibn Barrajan’s] 
excellence and is not present will be cursed by God.” (Cornell 1998:26) 
A Black person here plays a mediating role between the political dissident and the new 
ruling authority that needs the legitimacy offered by that dissident. The assertion might 
also be made that the one taking on inordinate risk is Black. 
Also from at-Tadili’s at-Tashawwuf comes the story of Munya bint Maymun (d. 
1199). Known as Mimuna Tagnawt, Berber for “Maymuna the Black Woman,” she 
lived as a widow in Marrakech where she prayed alongside her male counterparts and 
practiced mortification of the body. She could discern whether food came from a lawful 
or unlawful source: 
A merchant invited me for dinner and I accepted reluctantly. When he placed the 
platter of food before me, it spoke to me and said, “Do not eat me, for I am 
forbidden!” Because I was concerned not to offend my host, I put a small piece 
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of meat to my lips and then put it down. After that, I was prevented from making 
invocations and supererogatory prayers for three days and voices spoke to me 
from my right and left, saying, “This is how it is with dogs whose stomachs 
cause them to wander!” (Cornell 1998:53) 
The great Sufi saints Abu Shu’ayb and Abu Yi’zza were also Black. During the 
civil war, they were involved in the siege of Marrakech by the Almohads (1146-1147). 
Abu Shu’ayb, commonly known as Mulay Bush’ayb, was Abu Shu’ayb ibn Sa’id al-
Sanhaji (d. 1166). From a prominent family of Sanhaja pastoralists of Azemmour in the 
Dukkala region on the Atlantic coast, Abu Shu’ayb studied from Masmuda masters, 
including Abu Innur (Sidi Bennur), at Iliskawen in Dukkala, and he practiced “ethical 
hypersensivity” (Cornell 1998:59): For example, when his cow crossed over to feed 
from a neighbor’s garden, Abu Shu’ayb first reached in the cow’s mouth to remove all 
the illegally gotten food he could, and then for the next three days he donated all the 
milk the cow produced to the poor. Abu Shu’ayb said he would never eat raisins from 
grapes that had come from vines watered by a shared canal, since there was no 
guarantee that the land over which the canal flowed had been lawfully obtained (Cornell 
1998:59). A political activist against the Almoravid regime, Abu Shu’ayb protested the 
onerous taxes it imposed on Dukkala: 
When the Almoravid governor of Azemmour wanted to execute a group of tax 
rebels, Abu Shu’ayb went to him in order to plead their case. When the haughty 
Saharan imashagh noticed the shaykh’s dark-brown complexion, he considered 
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him to be of low status and rebuffed him. After roughly ordering Abu Shu’ayb 
to leave his presence, the governor was stricken by severe stomach cramps. “The 
man you have just sent away is Abu Shu’ayb,” someone told him. “He is one of 
the awliya [“friends” of God] and he is angry at you for rebuffing him.” The 
governor quickly apologized to the shaykh and allowed him to intercede for 
those he had condemned to death. Henceforth, whenever this particular governor 
heard that Abu Shu’ayb was coming, he would release all of his Sanhaja 
prisoners before the shaykh arrived. (Cornell 1998:60) 
Despite his alliance with the Almohads, Abu Shu’ayb’s legacy was that he 
“‘merged the horizons’ of Sanhaja and Masmuda Sufism under the Nuriyya tradition” 
(Cornell 1998:57), reconciling competing religious factions and playing a mediating 
role between them. He spoke out strongly against the Almohad massacres of Sanhaja 
Berbers after the Almohads came to power, and he was arrested by the caliph Abd al-
Mu’min in connection with the Dukkala tax revolt. During his trial Abu Shu’ayb cursed 
the caliph three times. In fear, the caliph asked what he could do for the shaykh, who 
took the opportunity to intercede for the wives and concubines of the former Almoravid 
leader and those of his sons, thereby mediating politically as well as religiously, and 
again acting as a buffer between forces competing for power. 
“Mulay Bu’azza,” whose shrine is in Taghiya between Rommani and Oulmes, 
south of Rabat, is an enigma—his genealogy and even the pronunciation of his name 
are in dispute. According to Cornell (1998:68), Abu Yi’zza was an “illiterate and 
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monolingual Masmuda Berber from the mountainous region of Haskura.” He was 
“Shaykh of the Shaykhs of the Maghrib” to his fellow Sufis and a miracle worker to the 
masses across Morocco, among whom he had become famous by the time of his death 
in an epidemic in 1177, aged over 100 years. 
During the Dukkala tax revolt that resulted in the Almohad inquisition of Abu 
Shu’ayb, Abu Yi’zza was also implicated and put on trial, because he was aligned with 
his Nuriyya master Abu Shu’ayb, who in turn was identified with his master, Ibn 
Wayhlan. Living in Marrakech, Ibn Wayhlan had resisted the Almohad siege of the city. 
Upon his arrest, Abu Yi’zza was imprisoned in the minaret of the Kutubiyya mosque. 
Like Abu Shu’ayb, he answered all questions with Quranic quotations and was released. 
Abu Yi’zza practiced strict vegetarianism, the result of observing a systematic 
asceticism. To deny his selfish nature, Abu Yi’zza would laboriously prepare simple 
meals and then refuse all but a tiny portion of them (Cornell 1998:68). He wandered 
about the wilderness eating wild plants for 25 years. For another 20 years he lived in the 
mountains above Tin Mal, the fortress headquarters of Ibn Tumart, the founder of 
Almohadism. During this time he wore only a woven reed mat to cover himself. Later, 
Abu Yi’zza lived for 18 years along the Dukkala coast, known during this time as “Abu 
Wanalgut” for eating only wanalgut, a certain plant that grew in trash heaps. For 
another length of time, he ate only “the edible hearts of oleanders and wild acorn mash, 
which he would make into flat breads and carry in a small pouch on his belt” (Cornell 
1998:69). It was during this time that Abu Yi’zza became the disciple of Abu Shu’ayb. 
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Abu Yi’zza practiced malamatiyya-inspired devotion, the “path of shame” involving the 
intentional breaking of specific religious codes that Sufis sometimes adopted when they 
felt they were being held in too high esteem: 
One of the companions of Abu Yi’zza got married. His wife asked him for a 
female slave, but he did not have one. So Abu Yi’zza said to him, “I will 
substitute myself for the female slave,” for he was black and had no hair on his 
face. He dressed himself in the clothes of a female slave and served the man and 
his wife for an entire year. He ground wheat, kneaded dough, made bread, and 
poured the water—all at night—while in the day he performed his devotions in 
the mosque. After a year had gone by, the wife said to her husband, “I have 
never seen anyone like this slave! She does all that is [normally] done during the 
day at night, and never appears in the daytime.” Her husband turned away from 
her and neglected to answer, but she continued to ask him until he said, “No one 
works for you but Abu Wanalgut, and he is no female slave!” Then she knew it 
was Abu Yi’zza and said, “By God, this one will never work for me again, and I 
swear that I will do my work myself!” From that time on, she did her work 
herself. (at-Tadili, at-Tashawwuf, 218-219; cited in Cornell 1998:70) 
Both Abu Shu’ayb and Abu Yi’zza were native and free born Berber Muslim 
Moroccans. However, the fact of their Blackness led them to show solidarity with the 
newly enslaved immigrants from across the Sahara, including women slaves. Moreover, 
their ambiguous racial and ethnic status also enabled them to play mediating roles 
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between Sanhaja and Masmuda, Almoravid and Almohad, rich and poor, powerful and 
powerless, and even husband and wife. 
The Almohads (1147-1269) opposed the Almoravids on moral grounds, 
perceiving that the Almoravids had become weak and corrupt. Sedentary residents of 
the High Atlas, the Almohads were less “Africanized” (Hell 2002:77) than the 
Almoravids, focused more on salt than on gold, and consolidated their commercial ties 
with the desert caravan cities of Teghazza, Tawdeni, and Walata. The struggle over the 
greatest of these cities, Sijilmassa, led to their downfall. On the whole, however, the 
Almohads so neglected the Saharan trade routes that by the time the Almohad empire 
was collapsing between 1238 and 1275, the Saharan trade “had either died out or been 
diverted” (Laroui 1977:199).  
Laroui distinguishes between maritime and trans-Saharan trade in the fourteenth 
century. He argues that, although the sea trade was seen as bestowing wealth on 
Almohad and Merenid society, it actually benefited only the political leaders, leaving 
the rest of the country worse off. Laroui contrasts the drawbacks of sea trade to the 
benefits of the overland trade across the Sahara, which involved the whole country and 
pulled it together: “The significant fact is not that the one was operated at a profit and 
the other at a slight loss, but rather that the one unified the country while the other 
divided it” (Laroui 1977:218). The Saharan trade, and the connections to West Africa 





 Before continuing beyond the thirteenth century, it is necessary to establish 
more clearly what contemporary authors intended when they pointed out the physical 
attributes of individuals, what we can interpret as contributing to a racial typology. 
Bernard Lewis (1999:40) has more recently argued that, while race is “still of 
overriding importance” in some parts of the world, “in the Middle East race matters 
less.” By race, he appears to be referring to the existence of a lighter-skinned elites 
ruling over diverse societies in which poorer and more marginal members have darker 
skin. In an earlier work, however, he made a subtler argument. 
 In Race and Slavery in the Middle East (1990), Lewis presents a dilemma: On 
the one hand, scholarly and popular attitudes have noted that racism runs counter to the 
ideals of Islam. Lewis cites Toynbee in the Study of History on Umayyad Arabs, who 
argues that there was no racism against Black people, even though he claimed that 
swarthy White Arabs considered ruddy White Europeans to be inferior. Lewis 
(1990:18) judges that such symptomatic statements are not accurate for the Medieval 
period. Instead, the pointed nature of elucidating an absence of racism in the Middle 
East dates to the nineteenth century, when world-wide press coverage of the American 
Civil War linked race with slavery for many Muslims and Middle Easterners. The case 
is nevertheless made that numerous Black attained positions of leadership in Medieval 
Muslim states, and that Muslim law explicitly forbade excluding people based on their 
physical appearance.  
 
44 
Meanwhile, in The Thousand and One Nights, Lewis shows us repeated images 
of kings who return to their harems to find their wives and concubines being raped or 
seduced by Black criminals or servants. The kings, who unleash all sorts of horrific 
punishments on these couples, are 
clearly white supremacists, with sexual fantasies, or rather nightmares, of a 
sadly familiar quality. This resemblance in The Thousand and One Nights to 
certain aspects of the old American South is confirmed if we look more closely 
into that work. Blacks appear frequently in the stories that make up the Nights. 
Where they do, it is almost invariably in a menial role—as porters, household 
servants, slaves, cooks, bath attendants, and the like—rarely, if ever, rising 
above this level in society. Perhaps even more revealing in its way is the story of 
the good black slave who lived a life of virtue and piety, for which he was 
rewarded by turning white at the moment of his death. (Lewis 1990:19) 
Lewis thus presents the dilemma: On the one hand, historical sources present the 
Medieval Arab and Muslim empires as a “racially egalitarian society free from 
prejudice or discrimination”; on the other hand, contemporary popular and artistic 
representations reveal a society dominated by light-skinned rulers who hold “a familiar 
pattern of sexual fantasy, social and occupational discrimination, and an unthinking 
identification of lighter with better and darker with worse” (Lewis 1990:19). Which of 




In Hellenistic and Roman antiquity, physical differences did not equate to 
superiority and inferiority. Enslavement was widespread, but the criteria for producing 
slaves were related to foreignness: Any foreigner was held to be inferior and enslavable 
(Lewis 1990:18). There were no “slave races”—the civilizations in Ethiopia and China 
“were both respected, and there is no real evidence in Jewish, Greek, or Roman sources 
of lower esteem for darker skins or higher esteem for lighter complexions” (Lewis 
1990:18). Why did this situation change after the seventh century? Lewis offers two 
arguments: First, the range and scope of the Arab and Muslim empires are much greater 
than for previous empires. Rome and Byzantium were limited largely to the 
Mediterranean; Alexander’s empire, though much bigger, was quickly divided into 
regional sub-empires. Only the Umayyad and Abbasid states, and their successors, 
ranged from Western Europe to West Africa, from the Eurasian steppes to China, 
around the Indian Ocean through East Africa and India to Southeast Asia and Indonesia. 
The second argument concerns the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which brought 
annual pilgrims to the same site. When scholars from all these regions began to 
compare their respective cultural values, they began as well to recognize the visible 
differences between them and to theorize these differences along the lines of race 
(Lewis 1990:18). Their conclusions used some of the terminology of classical antiquity, 
namely the concept of the barbarian and the method of humoral medicine, but with 
important adjustments and refinements.  
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In “Barbarians in Arab Eyes,” Aziz al-Azmeh (1992:6) presents this schema: 
The known world began at the equator and ended at the North Pole. It was divided into 
seven zones or “climates,” whose chief determining attribute was temperature: the first 
zone was unbearably hot, while the seventh zone was unbearably cold. There was some 
question whether any creatures lived in the first zone. Zone 2 contained most of Africa 
and Arabia. The central Arab lands were in the temperate third and fourth zones: Syria 
and North Africa (Zone 3), and the Mediterranean, Iran, and parts of China (Zone 4). 
Zones 5 and 6 included the lands of the Franks, Slavs, and Turks, while the frozen 
regions of northern Europe and Asia fell into Zone 7 (al-Azmeh 1992:7-9). 
In addition to temperature, a secondary determinate of climate was humidity, 
from dry to humid. These two factors combined to correspond to the four humors of the 
body: Atrabile (“Black Bile”), Bile (“Yellow Bile”), Phlegm, and Blood, which 
produced the four dispositions: Melancholic (hopelessness), Choleric (anger), 
Phlegmatic (calmness), and Sanguine (courageous and also amorous). Cold and Dry 
climates caused too much Atrabile to be produced in the body, which explained why 
people from cold and dry climates tended to be irritable and despondent. Hot and Dry 
climates produced too much Bile in the body, which led to people who were easily 
angered. Cold and Humid climates produced too much Phlegm, explaining why people 
from such climates tended to be calm, even unemotional. Finally, Hot and Humid 
climates produced too much Blood. People gestated in hot and humid regions tended to 
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be courageous and hopeful, but also very amorous. A temperate climate produced a 
good mix of all the humors (al-Azmeh 1992:6). 
Climate was most important during gestation of a fetus. In temperate climates, a 
good mix of the humors during gestation led to temperate dispositions. However, in 
extreme climates that were too hot, cold, dry, or humid, the fetus was “cooked” or 
“dried” too much or not enough, with a resulting defect in disposition (al-Azmeh 
1992:8-9). Contemporary critics of this theory raised the problem of regions like 
Arabia, alongside southern China and southern India, which fell into Zone 2 but which 
clearly produced temperate babies. This anomaly was easily explained away: Since all 
of these regions could be represented as peninsulas or coastal areas, they were thus open 
to increased humidity from the sea, which moderated the heat. Al-Azmeh notes that this 
explanation was not extended to account for Somalia or other similar regions. 
Significantly, 
It was social judgment which ultimately determined the degree to which 
credence would be given to geographical determinism, and this determinism was 
applied mercilessly only in the construction of sheer barbarism, which was not 
merely a distemper with varying degrees of severity, but fully a disnature. (al-
Azmeh 1992:8) 
In other words, scientific laws were contravened or explained away whenever it was 
necessary to rationalize racial difference and an attendant statement of inferiority. 
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 Despite the racism of such attitudes, though, it bears stating that they does not 
bear much resemblance at all to the racialism we associate with nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century anthropology, with its appeal to unchangeable gene pools. 
Racial differences in the Middle Ages were connected entirely to climate. The only 
major argument concerning the sustainability of traits was that between what I’m 
calling geographical determinism and congenital determinism. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) 
and his followers argued that the temperaments of the various races were thus only 
because of continued effects of the sun or lack of it: “Negroes ... tended to be given to 
erratic behaviour, to levity, to prodigious sexuality, and to be disposed to dance and 
rhythm” (al-Azmeh 1992:9) exclusively because of the effects of too much sunlight and 
heat, but they could change if they moved to a more temperate climate. In contrast, the 
congenital determinists, followers of Galen like Mas’udi (d. 956), were convinced that 
effects of the too much sunlight and heat during gestation were permanent and 
irreversible. Even if they were moved to a temperate climate, many of these authors felt, 
Blacks remained “virtually unteachable” (al-Azmeh 1992:9). It is not mentioned what 
they thought would happen if two Black people parented a child who was gestated in a 
temperate climate—we can assume that such a situation would form yet another 
aberration and inconsistency in such theories. 
 Al-Azmeh points out that such contradictions abounded: A single text might 
present blatantly false ethnological stereotypes on one page and a detailed ethnographic 
description that directly contradicted the stereotype on another page. This was because 
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the two kinds of evidence supported different purposes: Both discourses proposed to 
describe a world created by God, including cultural and racial diversity, which could be 
“read” to reveal God’s purpose and character in his creation. Nevertheless, ethnographic 
description was a segment of adab, “urbane secular writing” like history and geography, 
which promoted cultural unity by “cultivating a common cultural identity” (al-Azmeh 
1992:18). In contrast, ethnological theorization was intended as the management of 
diversity by those positioned within a “cultural and political centrality and associated 
empowerment which was very real” (al-Azmeh 1992:18). The continued necessity for 
asymmetries of power to be explained, particularly during moral panics but also in 
relationships concerning war, conquest, and enslavement, explains the continued appeal 
of such discourses. 
 Lewis attempts a full description of medieval slavery and race relations. His 
evidence relies largely on scholarly legal opinions and histories, though, and as a result 
it suffers from the deficiencies of any history of the written record, which would 
naturally paint those elites responsible for writing it in a more favorable light. 
Mohammed Ennaji (1999) argues that very point in his analysis of race and slavery in 
nineteenth-century Morocco; Ennaji dismisses legal ideals in favor of looking closely at 
actual legal cases. These often show entire segments of Moroccan society disobeying 
the letter as well as the spirit of the laws laid down concerning enslavement—free 
people are enslaved, Muslims are enslaved and even sold to non-Muslims, children of 
freemen are enslaved, Black people are automatically considered to be slaves, etc. I 
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present key features of Ennaji’s description in a later section; at this point, however, it 
must be said that the basic outlines of Lewis’ arguments concerning Medieval 
enslavement and racial formation are no doubt accurate, particularly when he describes 
how the law ideally prescribed who could be enslaved and how they should be treated. 
Nevertheless, if we are interested in learning how slaves and Black people were actually 
treated in the Medieval Arab and Muslim empires, we might still be missing an accurate 
representation. 
 The change wrought by Arab and Muslim civilization on racial formation was 
paradoxically contradicted by its effect on slavery. While racial formation could be 
argued to have gotten its start at this time, with “universal” ethnological typologizing, 
the treatment of slaves by law was greatly improved. This was particularly the case in 
Arabia in the early years. Prior to the seventh century in Arabia, slaves were considered 
merely chattel and horribly mistreated. The advent of Islam “enormously improved the 
position of the Arabian slave, who was now no longer merely a chattel but was also a 
human being with a certain religious and hence a social status and with certain quasi-
legal rights” (Lewis 1990:6). Islam promoted the idea that slaves should be freed, and it 
also limited greatly the source of new slaves: either a child whose parents were both 
slaves (natural increase of pure parentage) or capture in war. Moreover, the only just 
war was a war of jihad, involving a Muslim state fighting against a non-Muslim state.  
People who were already Muslims, who were raised in Muslim homes, in 
Muslim countries, or as members of protected religious minorities in Muslim countries, 
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could not be enslaved (Lewis 1990:8). Slaves could convert to Islam without it affecting 
their slave status, but owners of such slaves were encouraged to free them before they 
died. Children of a Muslim father were automatically free when they were born, even if 
their mother was a slave. In fact, such mothers were also free in some respects, holding 
the position of umm walad, mother of a (free) child, upon such status being confirmed 
by law. Judges were also entitled to declare the liberation of a slave who had been a 
victim of a cruel master. Other paths to freedom included manumission by the owner 
and a kind of “self-purchase” whereby an owner and a slave would sign a contract in 
which the owner promised to free the slave after a fixed sum of money had been paid. 
The contract could be broken at any time by the slave but never by the owner. 
The new laws limiting the sources of slaves greatly reduced the supply of slaves 
in the seventh century and afterwards (Lewis 1990:9). There were four: direct capture in 
war, tribute from non-Muslim vassals, natural increase, and purchase. The first three are 
quickly dismissed: After the first few centuries, the boundaries of the Muslim world 
stabilized, and new territories were added only in India and Africa. Tribute continued 
from a few vassal states, most notably Nubia, which preserved its non-Muslim status 
and independence for a time precisely because its tribute was so valuable, but 
eventually Nubia, too, submitted to Islam. Lewis dismisses natural increase for four 
reasons: Castration, military service, menial labor, and disease. Some male slaves were 
castrated prior to being brought to Muslim regions. (They could not be castrated 
afterwards, since bodily mutilation is illegal under Muslim law.) Thus fewer slaves 
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could be fathers, and children born to slave mothers tended to be fathered by free men. 
Military slaves usually were awarded freedom as a condition of their service. Lewis 
states that menial, domestic, and manual laborers were discouraged from marrying one 
another. Finally, slaves faced very high death rates. Lewis attributes these rates to 
disease, since many slaves who were brought from rural regions to cities lacked 
immunity during urban epidemics. The only reliable source for newly enslaved people, 
then, was purchase. Lewis notes that the laws promulgated to improve the situation of 
slaves and to limit slavery paradoxically led to the creation of an enormous network of 
slave routes and markets on the margins of the empire (Lewis 1990:11). 
Lewis takes care to note that, even in pre-Islamic Arabia and the time of the 
Prophet, Blackness was not identified with enslavement. He partly explains the slave 
status of Bilal, the first muezzin in Islam (caller to prayer). Bilal was a Black slave who 
converted to Islam and was punished for this conversion by his owner. Abu Bakr, 
Muhammad’s uncle, purchased him and freed him, and he became Muhammad’s closest 
companion, friend, and personal aide. Lewis cites early Arab manuscripts that refer to 
Ethiopians, known as Habashin (“Abyssinians”), Christian allies of Byzantium that 
were active militarily in Arabia in the sixth century. The Christian empires of 
Byzantium and Ethiopia were allied against Persia. Following the invasion the 
Ethiopians set up a client Christian regime in southern Arabia that was subsequently 
overthrown by rebels from within the Ethiopian military forces, and this rebel state was 
eventually accorded legitimacy by Ethiopia and Byzantium. When the Persians later 
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took Yemen, some Ethiopians from that state—soldiers and other—were captured, and 
some of these captives were enslaved in and around Mecca (Lewis 1990:22-23). Lewis 
doesn’t go so far as to suggest it, but it seems to me not impossible that Bilal’s origins 
might be traced to some of these communities of enslaved soldiers. In any case, though, 
given the power and wealth of Ethiopia at the time, it is unlikely that slave raiders were 
inordinately targeting Ethiopians for capture and taking them to Arabia to sell them 
there. 
Racial categories, particularly in the earlier decades of Islam, were largely 
descriptive. Lewis notes that color differences were personal and relative. There were 
many terms used, and these reflected differences in skin brightness, intensity, and 
shade: terms equivalent to black, white, red, olive, yellow, and two shades of brown—
the rough equivalent of “swarthy,” “sallow,” blonde,” or “ruddy” in “modern” (i.e., 
White) usage. Moreover, sometimes the Arabs were described as “white,” in relation to 
“black” Africans. When contrasting Arabs to Persians, Arab writers sometimes referred 
to themselves as “black” relative to “white” Persians (Lewis 1990:25). Several early 
Muslim leaders were Black or partly Black, like the Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab; ‘Amr 
ibn al-‘As, the conqueror of Egypt; and Abu Bakra (d. 672), one of the early 
companions of the Prophet (Lewis 1990:25). 
After 632, important changes came about that rigidly fixed the color terms used 
to describe people, reducing these to Black and White and making them “ethnic and 
absolute instead of personal and relative” (Lewis 1990:26). Black people nearly 
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exclusively came from Africa, while White (“white” and occasionally “(light) red 
people were “Arabs, Persians, Greeks, Slavs, and other peoples to the north and east of 
the black lands” (Lewis 1990:26). The second important change was that black skin 
came to be equated with inferiority. After this time, it is clear that “a new and 
sometimes vicious pattern of racial hostility and discrimination had emerged within the 
Islamic world” (Lewis 1990:36). 
What brought about these changes? Lewis provides three causes: Conquest, 
material development, and slavery (Lewis 1990:37-42). First, during the Arab 
conquests, Arab discrimination against non-Arab converts was a significant source of 
conflict in early Islam. Half-Arab offspring of the Arab conquerors and rulers were 
never considered equal to the children of free Arab mothers. The pre-Islamic Arab 
model was that free fathers of slave children could choose to recognize those children, 
which would render them free. Islam made that recognition mandatory, but many Arab 
fathers continued to resist doing so. Among Mediterranean peoples, a child of an Arab 
father and a Syrian or Persian mother would not look very different from his or her 
father. Due to the Arabs’ lighter skin, however, a Black mother would produce a 
difference in the child that was “recognizable at sight” (Lewis 1990:40). He goes on to 
claim that “‘son of a black woman’ was a not infrequent insult addressed to such 
persons, and ‘son of a white woman’ was accordingly used in praise or boasting.” 
(Lewis 1990:40). Lewis’ second explanation for the change concerns the experience of 
material civilization: Arab conquerors who went into Southwest Asia and Europe met 
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larger cities and higher levels of material development—cities, despotic kings, large 
markets, etc.—while those who went into North Africa, East Africa, and West Africa 
found lower levels of such development. Third, slavery played a major causative role in 
racism. Lewis reiterates that the ban on enslavement within Muslim territories led to the 
exportation of the slave trade. This export led to Africa being targeted for the slave 
trade, which led to Blacks being inordinately identified with slaves as early as the 
eighth century. Moreover, this enslavement of African non-Muslims often led to the 
conversion of their home countries. “The notion that slavery is a divine boon to 
mankind, by means of which pagan and barbarous peoples are brought to Islam and 
civilization, occurs very frequently in later writers” (Lewis 1990:42). These “pagan and 
barbarous peoples” inhabited regions to the north of the Mediterranean as well as to the 
south, and moreover, unlike East and West Africans, many Europeans and Eurasians 
never converted to Islam. Why, then, are paganism and its resulting enslavement so 
exclusively associated with Africa? 
Lewis does not clarify why European “pagan savages” came to be enslaved at 
lower rates than African ones. Perhaps much later (after the fourteenth century), greater 
wealth among the Europeans led to slave raids becoming too expensive, since 
Europeans were better armed than Africans and were also able to pay higher ransoms 
for captured slaves. A more likely cause, though, is the widespread belief among 
scholars that Africans are natural slaves. This perspective does not originate from the 
Qur’an and is not a problem of Islam: “At no time did Muslim theologians or jurists 
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accept the idea that there may be races of mankind predisposed by nature or 
foredoomed by Providence to the condition of slavery” (Lewis 1990:54). Instead, 
Muslim scholars “unanimously reject[ed] the enslavement of free Muslims, of whatever 
race or origin” (Lewis 1990:55). Rather, Lewis argues, the idea that Blacks are natural 
slaves comes from antiquity and most especially from Aristotle’s concept of the slave 
nation. Although Lewis notes that Aristotle did not identify which nations were natural 
slaves, he did indicate that they were barbarians—definitely not Greeks or Romans, and 
more likely Asians than Europeans (Lewis 1990:55). Aristotle’s ideas were influential 
among dominant Medieval Muslim scholars like Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037) and Ibn 
Khaldun (1332-1406). Following humoric medicine, Avicenna identifies those in 
extreme climates to the north and south as “peoples who were by their vary nature 
slaves, and incapable of higher things—‘for there must be masters and slaves,’” 
apparently citing Aristotle (Lewis 1990:55). More to the point, Ibn Khaldun argues that 
“the Negro nations are, as a rule, submissive to slavery, because [Negroes] have little 
[that is essentially] human and have attributes that are quite similar to those of dumb 
animals” (Lewis 1990: 53). As a result, “the perception remained, disputed but 
widespread, that African Muslims were somehow different from other Muslims and that 
Africa was a legitimate source of slaves” (Lewis 1990:53).  
Such views were strongly opposed by individuals, even after 700 or 800 years of 
their being taken for granted. Lewis cites Moroccan historian Ahmad Khalid al-Nasiri 
(1834-1897), who lamented the continued enslavement of Black people, such that 
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“many of the common people believe that the cause of their enslavement in Holy Law is 
that they are black of color and imported from those parts” (Lewis 1990:58). Nasiri 
vehemently denies the validity of such views, using the strongest language imaginable: 
“By God’s life, this is one of the worst and greatest abominations against religion, 
because the black people are Muslim people, with the same rights and duties as 
ourselves” (Lewis 1990:58). We can interpret in the angry tone and vehemence of his 
protest Nasiri’s intent to gain the attention of people whose ordinary attitudes are 
completely opposed to his. In other words, by the nineteenth century, at least in 
Morocco, Blackness was firmly identified with enslavement and with inferiority. I 
return to the nineteenth century in a later section; at this point, I need to detail the 
transition from Medieval to early Modern Moroccan society, particularly the crucial 
period between the end of the sixteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth.  
   
MERENID AND SA’ADIAN EXPANSION 
The political confusion and upheaval associated with the dynasty of the nomadic 
Berber Merenids (“banu marin,” 1269-1465) should not overshadow the fact that, 
during this period, Morocco established formal ties to the now Muslim kingdom of Mali 
(Hell 2002). This was the period during which the great geographer Ibn Battuta made 
his historic trip to Gao, now in Niger, in 1352. Also around this time at the beginning of 
the fifteenth century, the Portuguese were searching for a way to bypass the caravan 
routes in order to find more direct access to cross-Saharan trade. To do so they occupied 
 
58 
Essaouira and Safi and built fortresses there, to which they brought a strong contingent 
of Malinke slaves. In any case, the Merenids represented a largely economic takeover of 
the Maghrib that was lent support by newly settled Arabs of the rebellious Banu Hilal 
tribe, resettled from Arabia across North Africa until finally settling in Morocco. One 
segment of these, the Banu Ma’qil, took over most of the overland trade routes in 
southern Morocco by the beginning of the fifteenth century (Cornell 1998:161). The 
period of Merenid rule was perceived by later historians as marked by the pursuit of 
easy living at the expense of state concerns. Opposition to this state of affairs was 
centered in the zawiyyas, which lent their support to an eventual takeover by the new 
Sa’adian dynasty that began at the start of the sixteenth century (Cornell 1998). 
The dynasty of the Sa’adians (“al-sa’adiyyun,” 1509-1659), originating in the 
Draa Valley in southern Morocco, marked intensified relations with West Africa. 
LeSage points to the period of the Sa’adians as the moment when the Moroccan empire 
came into its own. At the Battle of the Three Kings (1578), the thrones of Morocco and 
Portugal were thrown into uproar. The king of Portugal had backed a pretender to the 
Moroccan sultanate, and both the Portuguese king and the pretender died in the battle. 
The Sa’adian Sultan Abd al-Malik had enlisted the help of the Turks to win the battle, 
but he was also killed. Using the ensuing peace dividend, the Sa’adian monarch who 
survived the battle and inherited the throne, Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur, mounted an 
invasion of the Niger valley, armed with modern guns and European military expertise, 
in 1590-91 to gain control of the gold trade and was henceforth known as al-dhahabi, 
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“the Golden.” In so doing, Ahmad heralded the downfall of the Songhay Empire. 
LeSage argues that the region of central West Africa became a Moroccan “protectorate” 
shortly thereafter, and he further points out that at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, the Moroccan economy remained dependent on the lands of “Black Africa, the 
two banks of the Sahara still living in a common economy” (1999:43-44). We 
ultimately find counter arguments against the full integration of the two economies to 
be more convincing (see below). Nevertheless, even though there was no long-lasting 
integration of the two economies, we can still maintain that, following this event, ties 
between the two societies became stronger than ever before. 
It is at this moment in the sixteenth century, LeSage argues, that the first Gnawa 
communities were established in Morocco (1999:47). Hell agrees that the subjugation of 
the Songhay Empire in 1591 was “an event of first importance” (2002:77). Not only did 
al-Mansur obtain vast wealth for the throne, but also at this time large populations of 
slaves were brought by the Sa’adians to the coastal city of Mogador, renamed Essaouira 
after its recapture by the Sa’adians. This time, the slaves were brought to work in sugar 
plantations. This population of slaves was composed not only of poor peasants or 
herdsmen. Rather, protests lodged by the inheritors of the Songhay state show that some 
of the 12,000 Timbuktu residents taken to Marrakech by al-Mansur were people from 
elite classes. These included high dignitaries, religious clergy, and nobility (Hell 
2002:78). Since the region of the upper bend of the Niger River had been Muslim since 
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the eleventh century, including the Songhay Empire destroyed by al-Mansur, it is very 
likely that these elites were Muslims who had been illegally taken.5  
Finally, in 1659 the ‘Alawites (“al-‘alawiyyun,” 1659- ) came out of the region 
of Sijilmassa in southern Morocco. At the time, more and more, the labor of slaves had 
become necessary for everyday life in Morocco. The height of the ‘Alawite dynasty’s 
power came during the reign of the sultan Mulay Isma’il (reigned 1672 to 1727), who 
was compared by European contemporaries to King Louis XIV as much for the wealth 
and splendor of his court as for his capricious rule and absolute power. As a means to 
achieving these ends, Mulay Isma’il accomplished an upheaval of the army, 
reorganizing it around the enslaved black soldiers. Black soldiers became the backbone 
of the throne’s monopoly on power. ‘Alawite dominance in central West Africa 
lessened by the end of the eighteenth century as both Morocco and Africa together came 
to feel the increasing control of Europe. 
 
MILITARY SLAVERY UNDER ISMA’IL 
If the conquest of Timbuktu in 1591 marked the beginning of an intensifying 
period of contact across the desert, the forced conscription into the ‘Alawite army of 
tens of thousands of blacks in 1699 marks a moment even more significant for the 
                                                       
5 Strictly speaking, al-Mansur’s invasion itself could probably have been deemed illegal as well, since it 
was not a war of jihad against non-Muslims. The presence of slaves in the sugar plantations marked an 
innovation—since the fifteenth century, a nascent capitalist enterprise had been developing in Dukkala 
and the Sous, employing wage laborers to work in export-oriented industrial sugar operations owned by 




Gnawa. In 1672, Mulay Isma’il—“probably the son of a black concubine” (LeSage 
1999:59)—came to power. He created an independent, loyal army by declaring all 
blacks in Morocco subject to forced conscription—legal enslavement—by the state. He 
justified this enslavement through manipulating Islamic law, which barred Muslims 
from enslaving other Muslims. Despite some opposition from both legal scholars and 
from black Moroccans, his project was successful. 
Isma’il inherited a state that owed little to the zawaya (religious orders), since its 
income came mostly from taxes on French commercial activity (Laroui 1977:272-273). 
Isma’il continued what his brother and predecessor al-Rashid had started along these 
lines: destruction of the influence of the zawaya, imposition of heavy taxation, and 
creation of a strong military to accomplish both these ends. Previously, certain tribes 
and zawaya had rendered military service in substitution for paying taxes. According to 
El Hamel (2002:45), in this negotiated “clientele” system, Sufi orders and tribal groups 
supplied soldiers in exchange for tax exemptions and land rents. Isma’il could not rely 
on the soldiers so supplied to be loyal to him to the exclusion of their allegiance to 
leaders of the tribes and Sufi orders. As a result, he devised a plan to solve this problem. 
By canceling the military service, Isma’il was able to impose taxes on these tribes. 
Faced, then, with the need for a military, Isma’il got his “great idea”: that the military 
“should have ties with no one social group” (Laroui 1977:272-273). In his search for a 
slave army, Isma’il first looked to descendents of the slaves brought back by al-Mansur 
from Sudan in 1591. Finding these to be too limited in number, Isma’il eventually 
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declared that even privately owned slaves were state property. These formed the ‘Abid 
al-Bukhari, the “slaves of Bukhari” after the volume upon which they swore their 
loyalty to the king. This was the Sahih al-Bukhari edition of the Hadith, the sayings of 
the Prophet.  
El Hamel notes the creation of the ‘Abid al-Bukhari, also called the “Black 
Guard,” as a “crucial turning point in Moroccan history, shaping the future of racial 
relations and black identity” (2002:44). Isma’il’s legal defense for enslaving Muslims 
who happened to be Black was the argument that Blacks in Morocco were 
overwhelmingly of slave origin. Once freed, Isma’il argued, these former slaves lived 
lives of dissolution and rebellion. Those Blacks who were still enslaved, however, were 
hardworking, loyal, and strong, and peaceful. In effect, Isma’il’s arguments “tacitly 
imply that the blacks are natural slaves!” (El Hamel 2002:47). Such arguments should 
not be seen as exceptional, though; rather, Isma’il was merely restating the accepted 
opinions of scholars such as Avicenna and Ibn Khaldun (Lewis 1990). Blacks 
dominated the military for the next 150 years, even serving as kingmakers, until a new 
Sultan dissolved the Black army in 1757 and replaced the Black leaders with Arabs. No 
matter what were Isma’il’s strategic motivations for his action, such a racist conception 
on the part of the crown would certainly cement social separation and distinctiveness, in 




Hell supports the hypothesis that the Gnawa identity originated during the reign 
of Isma’il. By 1727 the armed force was 150,000 strong, and remnants survive today, 
still serving the ‘Alawite king, as a group of crack paratroopers. However, Hell rejects 
the argument that the current Gnawa are descended from conscripted soldiers. He 
argues that contemporary records of the Black forces mention “neither the Gnawa, nor a 
possession ritual, nor even a particular music” (Hell 2002:73). Rather, ancient sources 
point up “certain ‘dances of the blacks’ made to the sound of castanets and mention 
their appropriate ‘costumes.’ And the diffusion of large populations of black slaves in 
the countryside as in the towns is well supported prior to the seventeenth century” (Hell 
2002:73). Whether or not there are unbroken lines from Isma’il’s Black soldiers to 
established Gnawa troupes, the fact remains that Blackness in Morocco was once 
associated with an attempt at extra-legal mass enslavement, approved by the crown, and 
this point is significant not only for Black Moroccans who identify as Gnawa but for 
other Black Moroccans as well. 
 
WEST AFRICAN ORIGINS 
Before continuing into the nineteenth century, we need to describe the place 
from which many of these enslaved West Africans came. Historical and contemporary 
ethnographic descriptions are treated in greater detail in Chapter 2. To get closer to the 
period of the crossing of the ancestors, however, we may consult historian James L.A. 
Webb Jr.’s Desert Frontier (1995), a book that relies on oral history in addition to 
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exhaustive archival research in order to reconstruct narratives by reading through the 
prejudices of those who wrote the manuscripts. Webb notes that, with regard to the 
period 1600-1850, ecological changes in West Africa produced profound political and 
economic transformations. 
In the fourteenth century, Arabs began to migrate south into the Western Sahara. 
These movements south altered the relations that had previously obtained between the 
Berber herders and the Sudanic farmers already living there. Cultural transformations 
that accompanied these changes were profound. Webb argues that during this time there 
was cultural mixing of lineages, languages, and ethnicities.6 
In the period prior to 1600, there was a gradual period of increasing humidity in 
the region prior to 1600 (Webb 1995:5-14). As more rain fell and grass began to grow 
in formerly arid areas, herders pushed farther north with their animals. Farmers 
followed them into the former grazing lands in search of new fields to plant crops in. 
There were parallel ethnic transformations prior to 1600; for example, Berber and 
Songhay interactions had already begun to transform ethnic identities, with the 
development of at least one Berber-Soninke dialect. After 1600, the period of increased 
rainfall was followed by a gradual desiccation of the region. The subsequent reverse 
movement in human migrations following this ecological transformation had even more 
profound effects on subsequent historical events and cultural formations. 
 
                                                       
6 Webb avoids the use of the term “Arabization” to describe these changes, arguing that its use obscures 
more than it illuminates (1995:15).  
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As the crops of the farmers failed and the pastures of the herders became dryer, 
Arab-Berber herders pushed south toward the now-retreating frontier, establishing their 
power over areas formerly ruled by the established cities. At the same time, with the 
introduction of Arabs into the cultural landscape, groups began to identify themselves 
by the labels “White” and “Black.” These labels held salience only in the region where 
contact took place, along the frontier, and not in other regions. Further, Webb takes care 
to note that White and Black are “regional cultural constructs which refer to the cultural 
identities of the two groups . . . rather than to skin color, although individuals affiliated 
with White groups were in general lighter in complexion (that is, more olive) than those 
who were Black (more brown)” (Webb 1995:xxv).7 
Within this unstable context, conflicts occurred between the cities, along with 
the farmlands within their spheres of influence, on the one hand, and the nomadic 
raiders of the less-hospitable regions on the other. These conflicts did not reflect 
random or insignificant ebbs and flows in situational power. Rather, Webb argues, these 
empires’ expansion and contraction followed climatic changes and the cultural and 
political features of West African society that derived from these changes. As the area 
became progressively more arid, crops failed cyclically and croplands grew fallow. As a 
result, the border between the arable land and grazing land moved farther and farther 
south. 
                                                       
7 To prevent premature conclusions concerning racialization of these groups, Webb stresses the force of 
historical construction of these identities; indeed, Webb documents the situational dynamics of the 
histories of these labels throughout the book. Nevertheless, we can assume that some of the “Arabs” were 
familiar with contemporary attitudes concerning racialization that were widely held among elite circles in 
Morocco, as detailed above. 
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As I explain in the following section, ethnicity in West Africa as described by 
Webb was malleable, and changes in ethnic identification followed changes in primary 
patterns of subsistence. Politically, however, the power of the cities waned gradually as 
those who once held power over the cities—merchants, landowners, and feudal lords—
lost that power. Instead, desert chieftains and pastoral nomads became ascendant. In the 
seventeenth century, power in West Africa shifted as desert militaries swooped down on 
the cities of the Niger valley. 
 
VOLUNTARY ASSIMILATION AND FORCED MIGRATION 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cultural identities began shifting to 
reflect this transition, with the resulting demographic changes having profound effects 
for the future of the region. While the means of production changed, or as the nature of 
agriculture changed, either the farmers moved south and were replaced by pastoral 
nomads, or the farmers became transformed into pastoral nomads, in a process of 
enculturation similar to that described elsewhere by Fredrik Barth (1969) with respect to 
the Fur and Baggara in Sudan: ethnicity followed the means of subsistence. Fur 
ethnicity was associated with sedentary agriculture and Baggara identity with pastoral 
nomadism, and when individuals changed their primary means of subsistence, their 
primary ethnic identification changed as well. In West Africa, though, the means by 
which these changes were accomplished varied drastically.  
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During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the borderland at the southern 
edge of the Sahara diverged into two distinct regions, what Webb calls the 
Southwestern Frontier (1995:27-46) and the Southeastern Frontier (47-67). The 
Southwestern Frontier can be conceived sociologically as a space (now Mauritania, 
Senegal, and western Mali) in which various would-be hegemons attempted to coalesce 
around alliances between White Arab warriors, White Berber nomads, Black nobles, 
Black farmers, and European colonial and mercantile interests. The key point here is 
that cultural mixing took place on the Southwestern frontier as a result of these shifting 
alliances. Most of the conflicts were motivated by control over the slave trade. After 
1800, French conquest of the region became more complete and its influence more 
pervasive and assured. 
In contrast, the Southeastern Frontier (today eastern Mali, Niger, and southern 
Algeria) can be interpreted as the site of three major trends: (1) the fall of Timbuktu 
after 1591 and the end of Songhay central control, which Webb attributes to 
desertification; (2) the immigration of Arabs and Berbers into regions that had formerly 
been dominated by Blacks; and (3) the retreat of some Black populations to the south, 
amidst the conquest and enslavement of massive numbers of others by the invading 
White-led armies. In contrast to the Southwestern Frontier (Mauritania, Senegal, and 
western Mali), the Southeastern Frontier was the site of tremendous political violence, 
and much less cultural mixing. Greater numbers of blacks in Morocco, particularly in 
the seventeenth century at the promulgation of Isma’il’s edict, were likely to be 
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descended from populations who were captured and enslaved from the Southeastern 
Frontier. Meanwhile, the cultural mixing that is evident in their communities after this 
time speaks to greater influence, in terms of their social organization, from the kinds of 
assimilation practiced along Southwestern Frontier. It seems to me that the influence of 
this kind of mixing can be seen today in the position of Gnawa, as Black Moroccans 
who maintain a separate heritage but who are fully integrated into Moroccan society. 
 
CULTURAL MIXING ALONG THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIER 
What, specifically, did such cultural mixing look like? One illustration of the 
particularly local character of social and political events on the Southwestern Frontier—
and the mixing that resulted—can be seen in the jihad of Nasir al-Din (c. 1673-1677). 
Nasir al-Din was a Berber ascetic saint who “wanted the Black riverine and savanna 
peoples to embrace a stricter, more rigorous adherence to Islamic principles” (Webb 
1995:32). Al-Din gained support from among sedentary Black peasants in what is now 
Senegal who were being oppressed by elites. The forces of his zawiyya (religious order) 
were opposed by a coalition of Black nobles and Arab herders who had united to 
preserve the status quo, principally tribute paid by the farmers to the nobles. After some 
initial successes, Nasir al-Din fell in battle in 1674. His attempt to establish a caliphate 
failed, and the political elites returned to rule (33). 
The war has been interpreted in two ways: First, one scholar has argued that the 
war was caused by “a broad shift in patterns of long-distance trade” (Webb 1995:34); 
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i.e., the zawiyya forces attacked when they felt threatened by the trade in slaves through 
the French port of Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River. The jihad failed 
because the other side was too strong, and after its fallen charismatic leader could no 
longer call for its continuation. This reading, we can assume a variation of nationalist or 
anti-colonialist historiography, argues that the jihad was a Muslim anti-slavery response 
to French incursions. Webb favors a contrasting interpretation. In Webb’s reading, 
when Nasir al-Din called for an end to gratuitous raids against peasants, his reasons did 
not include any opposition to the slave trade or any concern that the French were 
becoming too powerful. Thus the jihad did not fail because its leader died or because 
the opponents were too strong. Rather, the jihad failed because alliances switched after 
a curious ethnic transfer had taken place. 
A formerly Wolof group, the Ahl Gannaar, had recently become incorporated 
into the world of desert-based Muslim herders, tied by fictive descent to four Berber 
groups around 1600 CE. As Muslims, they would remove themselves from being 
targeted by Muslim slave raiders. At the same time, in allying themselves with the 
Berber groups, they alienated the Black aristocracies who formerly obtained tribute 
from them. The conversion to Islam was thus partly motivated by protection from slave 
raiding, since their adoption into Berber lineages made any slave raiding subject to 
reprisal. Meanwhile, the assumption of Berber ethnicity marked a tax revolt, since 
Berbers were exempted from taxation. Nasir al-Din’s jihad had originally attempted to 
overthrow the Black aristocrats of the region. Despite its eventual failure, however, it 
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actually accomplished the breaking of Wolof aristocratic power over parts of the 
northern Wolof territories that had formerly been under Wolof control. These aristocrats 
were now replaced by Berber tribal leaders, but the new leaders did not tax the former 
Black farmers because these were now incorporated into the Berber tribal structure. 
It appears most likely that the largest expansion in numbers of black Moroccans 
through slavery came from slave raiding along the Southeastern Frontier and into 
regions farther south of this frontier, such as what is today Burkina Faso and northern 
Nigeria. Slaves also came from a Sahara-wide trade in slaves from all over Africa south 
of the Sahara. Nevertheless, features of black Moroccan social organization and identity 
(Arabic language, Berber cultural patterns and lineages, Muslim religion) suggest 
changes in social organization that resemble what happened along the Southwestern 
frontier.  
 
HARATIN: NON-GNAWA BLACK MOROCCANS 
There are many Black Moroccans, and few of them identify as Gnawa. With 
regard to one of these minority populations, El Hamel argues that the Haratin, a racial 
minority living in southern Morocco, “are not freed slaves and their descendents” 
(2002:39). Rather, El Hamel argues, the Haratin are descended from Blacks who have 
lived in Morocco “since time immemorial” (2002:39). Hell supports this argument, 
noting that slavery is not the only origin of Blacks in North Africa. Hell appeals to 
biological evidence of two “types of populations” residing in North Africa in Neolithic 
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times, “one presenting Mediterranean characteristics, the other specifically Negroid 
traits” (2002:73). He corroborates this physical evidence with archeological evidence 
that there were “western Ethiopians” (in the words of Pliny the Elder) throughout North 
Africa in classical times. Like the indigenous Berbers, Hell argues, “Blacks can thus be 
considered as a native population of Southern Morocco” (Hell 2002:73). 
Muhammad Ennaji disagrees with this conclusion. He accepts the etymology of 
“Haratin” as being derived from something like al-harar al-thani, literally a “second 
freeman.” Haratin, he argues, are  
literally second-class citizens. In the legal terminology of the day, a “remnant of 
servitude” continued to contaminate their status. In theory, once slaves acquired 
their liberty, they were free to enjoy in immediately, with the full legal 
capacities of the free-born; however, they and their male descendants actually 
remained in a client-patron relationship (al-wala’) with the man or woman who 
had freed them, or with their families. Patrons, patronesses, and their male blood 
relations took the place of the slaves’ family relations, in cases in which the 
slaves had none of their own, especially in supervising marriage choices and in 
collectively suffered legal sanctions. In addition, if freed persons or their male-
line descendents [sic] died without male heirs, their possessions reverted to the 
patron or the patron’s male blood relations: religious law equated patronage with 
kinship. (Ennaji 1999:56) 
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Whether all the Haratin are descended from freed slaves, or whether some freed slaves 
joined indigenous Haratin communities, it is probably impossible to know. It is certain 
that freed slaves faced numerous challenges in determining their status as freed, and 
they also faced everyday challenges of survival. Any segments of the Haratin who had 
always been free faced similar, albeit lesser, challenges in determining their status in 
Berber-dominated parts of southern Morocco, where they were excluded from 
important decisions on the basis of their skin color and their lack of ownership of the 
land which they cultivated as tenant farmers. In the everyday struggle for survival, free-
born Haratin and free Black slaves were no doubt exactly equal. 
Haratin have typically been considered to be tenant farmers existing at the very 
lowest economic rungs of society. Indeed, one Black Moroccan I met in Marrakech in 
2006 glossed the word haratin for me in English. We were walking together in the 
madina. When he called out a greeting to a friend, he used the expression malik al-
haratin, “King of the Haratin.” “Do you know what this word means?” he asked me. “In 
English, it means nigger.” He went on to explain that he could use the term because he 
himself was one of the Haratin, as the man he was playfully calling to, but I should 
never use it on the street, because it was offensive. This story suggests not only that the 
word is offensive enough to be considered an insult and that these people are considered 
to be at the lowest levels of southern Moroccan society, but also that insiders may be 
reclaiming the pejorative name for use within their community. My friend had been 
orphaned at a young age and grew up on the streets of Marrakech in abject poverty, but 
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by dint of hard and a bit of good fortune was now, like the man to whom he had called, 
a prosperous business owner. 
In recent years, Haratin living in oases in the south of Morocco have seen a 
gradual rise in their standard of living. In his political ecology of an oasis in Errachidia 
Province, Hsain Ilahiane (2004) reveals a black Haratin population that existed for 
generations at the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, working as sharecroppers 
on land owned by resident Arabs and Berbers from the higher strata. Through their hard 
work but also their expertise in agriculture—Ilahiane demonstrates that the plots 
worked by the Haratin tended to be more productive—and through remittances sent by 
community members working in Europe, some members of this socioeconomic 
class/ethnic group have seen their incomes rise through the strategic purchase of land 
and trees. Moreover, this rise in wealth has “allowed Haratin to appropriate what is 
essentially a Berber/Arab cultural capital of al-asl or a sense of rootedness and 
belonging (being anchored in land: al-asl)” (Ilahiane 2004:173). The term is tied to land 
ownership in southern Morocco; in Standard Arabic, asl has a more general sense, and 
in Morocco more generally it is also tied to blood.8 Ennaji places the Haratin at the 
bottom of a social ladder in nineteenth-century southern Morocco that included shorfa 
(nobles), igurramen (members of saintly lineages), and ahrar (literally “freemen”). He 
confirms that, as they were “barred access to land ownership, they could not take root in 
                                                       
8 Kapchan, personal communication. Shannon (2001:285) found that in Syria asl represented origin, root, 
or lineage. The related adjective asil brought in the related concepts of authentic and pure, which then 
were nominalized, in asala, to result in authenticity, rootedness, and purity of descent. Thus relations 
between rootedness, heredity, and purity are intertwined through the use of the term. 
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the region or legitimize their presence as citizens with full economic and social rights” 
(Ennaji 1999:60). 
For the Haratin, who have lived in that area “for time immemorial,” it is 
completely unexpected that they should feel to have been lacking asala in the land. This 
feeling of “not belonging” is no doubt connected to their class position and lack of 
ownership over the land, but a case could also be made that at least a portion their 
unease comes from Isma’il’s attempted enslavement, alongside subsequent effects. It 
should be noted that, in Ilahiane’s valuable contribution, class advancement was seen as 
a means to land ownership, which in turn conferred a sense of belonging among black 
Moroccans whose continuous residence in Morocco has never been in question, but 
whose Moroccan identity has been, due to the slave trade and Isma’il attempted 
enslavement. 
 
BLACK RESISTANCE TO CONSCRIPTION 
In 1699, according to El Hamel, Haratin in Fes directly opposed the conscription 
order: They “refused to accepted the servile status … attributed to them and hence 
refused to submit to the order of the Sultan” (2002:45). In Tetouan, a city in the 
mountainous Rif region of northern Morocco, Haratin refugees took sanctuary at the 
shrine of Ibn Mashish. Moreover, the Muslim ‘ulama (sing. ‘alim, “learned man”), the 
religious and legal authorities, did not overwhelmingly support the Sultan at first. One 
of these judges, ‘Abd al-Salam Jassus, even issued a fatwa, a legally binding statement, 
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that disputed the legality of the state’s enslavement of Muslims. When Jassus refused to 
rescind the fatwa, Isma’il ordered his execution. These acts of resistance establish the 
continuity of opposition to the state, at the time of the enslavement order. I point this 
out in order to correct a shortcoming noted by Fox and Starn (1997), termed “newness” 
scholarship. In speaking of the recentness of modern trends like “resistance,” such 
scholarship denies their historical continuity. The following few sections trace 
resistance, Black and otherwise, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
SLAVERY AND RACE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 In Serving the Master, Mohammed Ennaji presents a social and cultural history 
detailing the daily lives of slaves in nineteenth-century Morocco. He presents their 
family structures, means of escape and emancipation, the practice of kidnapping slaves 
and free people for sale into slavery, the often-illegal trade in slaves, and the lives of 
government slaves from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century. 
Moroccan society faced steadily increasing encroachment from European powers, 
especially France and Spain, which culminated in conquest after 1912. Such external 
pressure as was exerted coincided with a steady decline in the ability of the state to 
provide security and welfare to the Moroccan populace. In the words of one Moroccan 
historian, the nineteenth century was “the most immoral of times” (Ennaji 1999:77). 
Much of its immorality was visible in the condition of Moroccan slaves. 
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 It has been established that racialization in the Arab and Muslim Middle East 
drew most notably on the presence of slaves, most of whom were of African origins. 
The situation was such that, as early as the eleventh century, widespread stereotypes 
fixed White and Black identities, equated Blackness with enslavement, and held Black 
people to be naturally inferior to Whites. By the nineteenth century in Morocco, while 
enslavement was not limited exclusively to Black people, it was identified with them to 
the extent that most free Black people (as well as many people of lighter complexion 
who lacked powerful allies) were perpetually faced with potential enslavement. 
The point should be made that such enslavement bore little resemblance to 
situations in the New World: Slaves in the Middle East were often well-educated, 
highly trained, and trusted members of society with a modicum of legal status. They 
were selected on the basis of their education and intelligence: In 1843 an Egyptian slave 
owner instructed his purchaser to “look for youth, together with cleverness, intelligence, 
and aptitude for education and physical exercise” (Ennaji 1999:11). Only a minority of 
slaves, especially those newly arrived, were used in unskilled labor. Women were 
trained in music and cooking, but men trained in a wide variety of disciplines: military, 
construction, crafts, horticulture, scholarship, accounting, law, and religion (Ennaji 
1999:14-15). Despite such opportunities for most slaves, though, some slaves were 
tremendously overworked, usually the recently arrived who had few marketable skills 
and were useful only at unskilled labor, typically in the fields and at very risky tasks 
(Ennaji 1999:26-28). Despite laws that prescribed emancipation for any victim or cruel 
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and inhumane treatment, many slaves were treated with inhuman levels of cruelty and 
violence, and even some of those who were not mistreated still tried to escape and to 
gain control over their own lives.  
The slave markets produced much of this dissatisfaction, since they broke up 
families. Many slaves had no sense of who their fathers were—if an owner were 
acknowledged as the father of the slave, that was tantamount to legally freeing the 
slave, so owners took care to obscure a slave’s paternity as much as possible (Ennaji 
1999:35, 40). This situation, alongside the violence that sales often exerted in family 
relationships, resulted in stripping the personhood of slaves. Ennaji notes that “slaves 
very often had no family names, for the simple reason that they had no family. ... They 
changed names often, on their masters’ whims, at each new sale. ... Such enforced 
rootlessness, the lack of even a proper name, was a humiliation with few modern 
equivalents” (Ennaji 1999:36). Traders and owners often traded in slaves whose status 
was suspect. They changed the names of the slaves on paper in order to obscure their 
identities, should family members file lawsuits against them. 
In theory, female slaves who were intended to be concubines were supposed to 
be separate from those intended for domestic service, but in practice masters were free 
to rape their female slaves at will (Ennaji 1999:37). There was also a legal ban on the 
sale of pregnant slaves, because concubines were supposed to be bearing their masters’ 
children, who were legally considered to be freeborn Muslims. In practice, however, 
there were plenty of pregnant slaves for sale in the markets (Ennaji 1999:37). Ennaji 
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quotes on slave owner, a “mountain tribesman,” bragging at his profits from selling his 
own children from his valuable female slave: “She gives me more pleasure than two 
wives, and more profit than four cows. I get her pregnant every nine months, and when 
the child is four or five years old, I take him to the city, where I get a good price for 
him” (Ennaji 1999:37). So much for Lewis’ assertion that the bonds of Islamic law 
effectively limited the supply of slaves through natural increase. Such evidence may 
serve to give pause concerning numerous other broad statements about the universal 
improvement of the status of slaves after the rise of Islam. 
In the nineteenth century slaves were brought from West Africa, but Ennaji also 
presents surprising and disturbing evidence that many free Muslim Moroccans, 
presumably mostly Black, were also kidnapped and sold into slavery. It is logical to 
assume that, prior to being taken, such people were economically and socially 
disadvantaged. Upon being seized and quickly sold, either by criminals or merely by 
ordinary folk who saw an opportunity and took it, the victims came to represent a 
considerable investment for a wealthy and powerful man. As a result, even if their 
family members were able to find them, there were few avenues to pursue. Ennaji 
recounts a story told to him by one of his consultants (Ennaji 1999:65). The man had 
been born far away, but he had come to live in his present town as a child after his two 
sisters were kidnapped and sold into slavery. Their father eventually tracked them down 
to the home of a government official, but it proved impossible to get them back. The 
only thing he was able to do was to go back and bring the rest of his family to live in 
 
79 
that city, just so they could be near to the girls. They never left. Such evidence leads me 
to conclude that debates over the origins of the Haratin could be misguided. If such 
conditions prevailed at times during the centuries between around 1600 and 1920, 
presumably free individuals could have been enslaved, their descendants freed, and then 
re-enslaved and freed again, all within a few generations. 
Ennaji’s work contributes to this project not only by speaking on the general 
conditions of enslavement and emancipation, and thus to a primary factor of 
racialization in Moroccan society; it also comments directly on the historical remnants 
of Mulay Isma’il’s Black Guard, the‘Abid al-Bukhari. According to Ennaji, the Black 
Guard were still around during the nineteenth century, and their numbers were even 
augmented during this time. Such augmentation was more successful in the South than 
in the North. For example, in 1837 the Sultan failed in his attempt to recruit, from 
descendants of the ‘Abid al-Bukhari, “the racially pure among them, those who have 
remained in a state of Bedouin simplicity ... and who are more trustworthy and serious” 
(Ennaji 1999:7). Ten years later, the same Sultan tried again in the North, with a target 
number of 500 boys between the ages of two and four. He failed again in the North, but 
state efforts at recruitment in the South were much more successful. Ennaji cites a 
report of 621 Haratin being taken in 1837. The numbers were augmented by runaway 
slaves, and the state also secretly bought slaves in the markets. Hasan I (reigned 1873-
1894) also sought sources for his modernizing army from among Black communities in 
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the Sous; “some clans went so far as to procure slave contingents to replace the free 
men they had to furnish for army expeditions” (Ennaji 1999:7). 
Within the often-dismal social conditions of everyday life in nineteenth-century 
Morocco, enslavement was sometimes a fate better than death. Especially during times 
of extreme crisis, such as the drought and famine of 1878-1879, desperate people did 
desperate things. One witness describes how “People cried out, revolted, and came 
close to eating one another. Men fled their brothers, mothers, and fathers. Fathers sold 
their children” (Ennaji 1999:80). The Sultan himself wrote that the people of the Sous 
“are selling their children in order to eat” (Ennaji 1999:80). The selling of children into 
slavery was an established survival strategy during extreme famines, and Ennaji cites 
Leo Africanus as having observed the phenomenon during a famine in the sixteenth 
century. These were unnatural, even apocalyptic times, and took place under situations 
of nearly total breakdown in the ordinary functioning of society. The nineteenth century 
was similar, although the situation was never as dire as was the case in the sixteenth 
century. However, during this time the protection offered by the state and the religious 
orders was largely limited to the cities (Ennaji 1999:81). In isolated parts of the 
countryside, poor people could find themselves in very similar situations, forced to sell 
a child into slavery in order to keep the rest of the family alive for a few more days 
(Ennaji 1999:82). Faced with enslavement by private owners or the state, the state was 




Slaves of the Makhzen were among the most privileged slaves in the nineteenth 
century, but not all Makhzen slaves were equal. One’s situation depended on proximity 
to the royal cities and the palace, on training, on education, etc. Even within the palace 
compound there were slaves who existed on the margins, half-starved and poorly 
housed. Nevertheless, Makhzen slaves were entitled to receive an allowance and 
professional training (Ennaji 1999:91). The Black Guard (‘Abid al-Bukhari) are 
documented as having been so well-off that a group of them privately hired a Qur’an 
tutor to teach their children. They also received bonuses each year. Certain well-placed 
Makhzen slaves requested and received bribes in order to facilitate access to official 
power. The state provided some slaves with domestic servants, passage to Mecca for the 
pilgrimage, and usufruct concessions. Their daughters often married well. One region 
where Makhzen slaves were not treated well, however, was the South, particularly the 
Tafilalet (Ennaji 1999:92-93). Some veterans, recruited as slaves and having rendered 
their military service, could retire as free men and become farmers, some even enjoying 
tax-exempt status. Overall, the ‘Abid al-Bukhari slaves “stood on completely different 
legal ground from slaves of private citizens. Their de facto liberty came outside the 
usual channels of emancipation; service to the State granted them this dispensation” 
(Ennaji 1999:95). This special status actually seems very similar to the original 
justification for their original creation by Mulay Isma’il: In contrast to harar (freeman), 
slaves of Makhzen were known by the term wazif, which means state-owned slave 
(something akin to “servant” in the sense of “civil servant”). As indicating a 
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professional class external to the social structure of clan and lineage, Ennaji explains, 
the term wazif 
came to mean a particular category of the government’s servants, a group 
characterized by servile origins, but also by lack of clan connections. Unlike the 
soldiers of the Makhzen recruited everywhere, “who are unstable, and always 
keep one eye turned to their home regions,” wazfan had eyes only for the state, 
to whose service they devoted body and soul. (Ennaji 1999:95-96)  
Thus toward the end of the nineteenth century, as at the beginning of the eighteenth, we 
see Black slaves and Black Moroccans continuing to serve in mediatory roles. At both 
times, Black soldiers simultaneously provide to the sovereign an external means to 
deflect resistance, to the potentially restive powerful forces among the ruled an external 
frustration for their designs on influence over the sovereign. The major difference 
between 1699 and the nineteenth century appears to be that in 1699, at a time when 
Moroccan society was vibrant and functioning, enslavement was an onerous burden. In 
contrast, during the difficult years of the late nineteenth century, government 
enslavement was at least a reliable means of putting food on the table. 
 
EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND RESISTANCE 
More recent resistance movements have not been identified that tied Blackness 
to an oppositional stance vis-à-vis the state, apart from slaves escaping their owners, 
which Ennaji considers to be a primary form of resistance (1999:49). Nevertheless, 
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popular uprisings against the various powers that be are broadly characteristic of the 
Moroccan populace from the classical period (Laroui 1977:47ff.), through the Muslim 
empires (Cornell 1998), and into the colonial Gellner 1981:194ff.) and post-colonial 
periods (Slyomovics 2005). In one example, Laroui (1977:318) relates the story of how, 
in 1859, a Spanish army of 50,000 advanced on Tetuan to take the city, which was 
defended by 5,600 royal troops. Guerilla bands sprang up from the local populace to 
resist the Spanish, slowing their advance. The sultan thought it best to negotiate with the 
Spanish, but the guerilla bands resisted this move, preferring to fight. When the Spanish 
army arrived at Tetuan the “defending” soldiers threw open the gates, and the city fell. 
Meanwhile, the guerilla bands’ attacks on the Spanish army continued after it had 
“invaded” Tetuan. The sultan took back Tetuan only after, two year later, it paid the 
Spanish a 20 million douro indemnity financed in part by English bank loans that were 
guaranteed by Moroccan customs receipts. 
Such conquest through finance, in spite of popular opposition, is well 
documented. French and Spanish policies in Morocco involved the foreign purchase or 
unpaid transfer of property, as well as “divide and rule” policies and de-education. After 
military maneuvers took place during 1907-1912 near Oujda and Casablanca, the 
owners fled their property. A 1913 law induced by the French government enabled the 
foreign ownership of land, which led to result 30,000 hectares of this land being 
transferred to European ownership. A 1919 law ordered the comprehensive survey of 
collectively owned lands in order to begin the task of transferring these to colonial 
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ownership. After 1927, even privately owned lands were taken by the throne and ceded 
to the Europeans, at very high levels, as suggested by Laroui’s number for a single two-
year period in the Tadla alone: 62,000 hectares (Laroui 1977:330-331). After a 1914 
“Berber policy” law went into effect, all majority Berber-speaking regions were 
removed from the authority of the Moroccan throne. Finally, quranic schools were 
either shuttered by the French or allowed to die out and not replaced with French 
schools. By 1939, only 2 percent of Moroccan children were attending school (Laroui 
1977:342). 
Outright warfare took place against the Spanish during the well-known “Rif 
War” of 1920-1926 led by ‘Abd al-Karim (Laroui 1977:351). The level of European 
involvement in the effort to put down the rebellion shows how significant and 
widespread Moroccan resistance to the Europeans was. In 1921 at the battle of Anoual, 
the rebels captured 200 cannons and 700 prisoners, including a general; they also killed 
19,000 Spanish troops. In order to finally put down the rebellion, France and Spain had 
to send 500,000 troops supported by 44 air force squadrons. Across the Maghrib 
generally, there were three additional pre-colonial periods of intense agitation, in 1937-
1938, 1945-1949, and 1951-1954 (Laroui 1977:367). 
 
OPPOSITION TO OPPRESSION 
Susan Slyomovics (2005) documents the history of human rights protests in 
Morocco since 1912, paying close attention to the “days of lead,” the period of intense 
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state oppression between 1965 and the late 1980s. Slyomovics isolates the city of 
Casablanca (2005:105ff.) to demonstrate just how central oppressive living conditions 
for workers—and courageous acts to make known and change those conditions—are to 
the city’s and the nation’s history. A 1905 riot against a French building project led lent 
justification to increased French efforts at “protecting” European investments through 
eventual colonization of Morocco. French investment in Casablanca (a very minor and 
thus synthetic city in Morocco prior to 1900) resulted in the population growing from 
12,000 in 1913 to 111,000 in 1920. By the 1950s, these rapidly urbanized working poor, 
feeling trapped as in a “prison” (107) began to mount a series of numerous violent acts 
against colonial rule. These acts coalesced around general uprisings in 1952 and 1955, 
leading directly to independence in 1956. 
After Moroccan independence, opposition to the government was curtailed due 
to the direct control the Hassan II government held over Moroccan society, particularly 
after 1970. The government’s status as a stalwart supporter of the West and particularly 
the United States during the Cold war led to a police state maintained through a network 
of spies that meted harsh repression against any direct opposition, which was 
accomplished through the 1970s and 1980s only at great cost to the lives of activists and 
their families (Slyomovics 2005). 
The ascension to the throne of Muhammad VI in 1999 led to a considerable 
expansion in the means by which citizens could express dissent. On the one hand, the 
state power was dominated by the makhzin (Ar. “storehouse”), a political structure 
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centered around the throne that held real power over the key ministries of justice, 
interior, and Islamic and foreign affairs. On the other hand, elected and appointed 
representatives headed by a prime minister, served in a parliament that oversaw less 
strategic ministries such as commerce, education, and health. Direct action was noted in 
the public protests of the Graduates group, a collective from among the 100,000 
unemployed recent graduates from state schools, who publicly protested the lack of jobs 
in 2001 and 2002. It should be noted that this group never addressed its grievances to 
the king but rather to the Parliament. In 2001 Abdeslam Maghraoui characterized the 
prospects for democratic change in Morocco as “weak” (Maghraoui 2001:17). 
Nevertheless, the continued presence of such an in-between social movement (Fox and 
Starn 1997) could only have become possible under a less-restrictive regime. 
 
RESISTANCE AND ACCOMMODATION 
Fox and Starn (1997) call for the analysis of resistance, dissent, and direct 
action, as well as cultural consumption under capitalist regimes of signification. 
Identifying resistance within cultural consumption should be a relatively 
straightforward process, along the lines of the various projects of the Birmingham 
School, such as the work of Dick Hebdige (1979). What Fox and Starn would call 
everyday resistance—weapons of the weak—is well established as being expressed 
through consumption of popular media—for Hebdige (1979), when progressive white 
youth opposed reactionary ones in 1970s London came to interact with black youth 
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listening to reggae, they were led to develop punk music. The efforts of scholars like 
Fox and Starn, in turn, have lent credence to the contention that anthropologists over the 
past few years have been “looking for resistance in everything”—often the mistake 
results from an overly mechanistic interpretation of Gramscian theory, which posits the 
always-already existence of anti-hegemonic impulses within the hegemonic system 
(Bennett 1981). In this case, it is more useful to draw on Antonio Melucci’s theory of 
“movement networks” (1985). Under the conditions of social organization since the 
1960s, people may form loose movement networks around cultural symbols. These 
networks may or may not give rise to or transform into movements periodically at times 
of crisis; the essential point is that they encourage others to participate in these 
networks. These social actors may belong to multiple networks, they may be militant 
only partially and for a short period, and they tend to become personally and affectively 
identified with and implicated in the groups (Melucci 1985, 1996). In Morocco, we can 
focus on determining the kinds of music Moroccan youth and others producing and 
consuming Gnawa music listen to—reggae, rap, heavy metal—and particularly how 
strongly they identify with others who do so. This affective identification might lead to 
the formation of networks surrounding these identities, indicating some potential for a 
movement network. As Melucci points out, the medium of the network is the message 





BLACKNESS IN MOROCCAN POPULAR CULTURE 
Despite the presence of Blacks in Morocco, Mulay Isma’il’s black mother was, 
nevertheless, a slave of his father who had been brought from West Africa. Hell 
contends that the story “is not a gratuitous anecdote.” Instead, it can be interpreted as 
recurring evidence of a theme of “biological mixing” which reveals the “closeness of 
relations that have united Morocco with Black Africa over the course of centuries” 
(Hell 2002:76). An effect of this situational identification is that skin color and lineage 
really do not determine who becomes a Gnawa adept. Blackness is an origin of Gnawa 
identity, but not a necessary element. Nevertheless, if Blacks really are “native” to 
Morocco, why do they have feelings of being out of place? Why specifically are blacks 
so excluded? Berbers have also felt excluded, no doubt a colonial legacy of “divide and 
rule,” but they appear to express ownership over their indigeneity more successfully. 
Why do some black Moroccans not express similar ownership with greater success? 
The historical explanations of the slave trade, which produced an immigrant blackness, 
and the forced conscription by Mulay Isma’il (oppression and separation) contribute to 
this alienation. Ultimately, however, for the answers to such questions we must look to 
nationalist historiography—the development of a Moroccan nation that considers itself 
Arab—and thus we look to cultural history. What is the place of Blackness in Moroccan 
society? In particular, what is the role of race in popular culture and the public 
imaginary in Morocco? 
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We can find intriguing indications in the development of Moroccan popular 
culture. The development of a domestic market for Gnawa music by the end of the 20th 
century was neither anomalous, gratuitous, nor coincidental. Instead, we can determine 
that race played a primary role in the development of markets for Moroccan popular 
music in the twentieth century, beginning at least with the songs of Houcine Slaoui, the 
first Moroccan musician to record in Paris, for Pathe-Marconi. Slaoui captured popular 
attitudes of the 1930s and 1940s, and he held the Moroccan North and particularly 
Tangier in high regard. His son Muhammad lived in Tangier in the 1960s and 1970s, 
performing for and with some of the international celebrities vacationing there. But 
Houcine Slaoui himself died of a mysterious illness in 1951 at the age of 33. It is 
remarkable that he mad such a strong and lasting impression in the Moroccan popular 
imagination while still in his twenties. 
Slaoui was a professional musician, first making a name for himself as a 
traveling singer and performer in halqas, the performance sections of Moroccan 
marketplaces. He was an innovator in the instruments he used, the musical influences of 
which he took advantage, and the topical nature of his songs (Fuson 2007). At least two 
of Slaoui’s best-loved songs speak to physical appearance. The first is properly titled 
“Azin Oualain” (al-zin wa al-‘ayn, “The Beautiful and the [Blue-]Eyed”), although the 
song is often better known as known as “Lmirikan” (“The Americans”) or “Tsma‘ ghir 
uke uke” (“You Just Hear Okay, Okay,” from the chorus). The second song is “Yal 
cahla” (ya al-kahla, “O Black Woman”) (Hocine Slaoui: 20 Annees de succes). 
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According to Jamila Bargach (1999), when “Azin Oualain” speaks of the power of “the 
beautiful and the blue-eyed,” it conducts a sardonic commentary on the racism of the 
American soldiers who arrived in Casablanca in 1942 and went looking for prostitutes, 
who came from the popular classes and tended to have darker complexions. At the same 
time that it comments on American racism, the song works more subtly to reveal a 
Moroccan social hierarchy that kept the intermarrying urban elites lighter-skinned while 
relegating overwhelming numbers of rural-to-urban migrants—most of them darker-
featured—to the bottom of the social ladder (Bargach 1999). Thus both the American 
soldiers and Moroccans more generally were seeking out “beautiful” partners who tend 
toward light skin and “blue eyes.” 
In “Yal Cahla,” meanwhile, Slaoui uses what might be deemed offensive 
language to describe a black woman, a young domestic servant. The lyrics speak of a 
woman whose “kinky hair gets tangled up” (sha’ar mkerded taytkhebbel), whose 
“strong body odor stinks to high heaven” (snanha ya’ti bi-nahar), and who “snores like 
a buzz-saw” (shkhirha kif el menshar) (Boucetta 2006:66). These lyrics appear to be 
offensive and racist. However, based on photographs of Slaoui, it is clear that he 
himself had brown skin and kinky hair. Slaoui himself was Black! While this in itself 
should not excuse racism in his lyrics, it does shed light on Slaoui’s self-positioning vis-
a-vis anti-Black racial stereotyping. Further, the song’s offensiveness is not fully 
established, since Casablanca singer-songwriter Barry reprised the song on a 2006 
album, most likely intending the song as a tribute to the hundreds of thousands of young 
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women and girls working as maids in the great houses and upscale apartments of the 
Moroccan cities (for a discuss of maids in Moroccan society see Kapchan 1996:212-
234). Slaoui performed for years before recording his first records, and he had to go to 
Paris to make those recordings. Slaoui’s continued influence suggests that, although 
Moroccan audiences have become taken since the mid-1990s with Gnawa music as an 
indigenous style that operates as a local symbol of Africa and blackness in Morocco 
(Swedenburg N.D.), the current popularity of Gnawa music operates within an economy 
of commercially commoditized Blackness—mediated through European technologies 
and networks—that has been sustained successfully in Morocco at least for the better 
part of the past century. 
If Houcine Slaoui’s genius was revealed in his stereotyped position of Black 
entertainer, the 1960s and 1970s opened a new position: protest singer. Nass el-
Ghiwane, identified by no less than Martin Scorcese as “The Rolling Stones of Africa,” 
are nothing of the sort. Rather, the original quartet was formed when four men from the 
working-class Casablanca suburb of Hayy al-Muhammadi insisted on arranging 
traditional folk songs and playing all-acoustic sets on traditional instruments. If 
anything, Nass el-Ghiwane might be seen within a US pop context as mixing the 
intellectual folk enthusiasm of Bob Dylan or Joan Baez with the national popular 
affection felt for Elvis Presley or Johnny Cash. The band was very successful, even 
dominant domestically and with fans in the wider Arab world, throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. In its latest incarnation, returning two original members, Nass el-Ghiwane 
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remained a pricy concert ticket in 2006. (I saw them in a dinner concert in 2001 in a 
Rabat shopping mall.) After the first album in the late 1970s, one member left and was 
replaced with Abderrahman Paco. 
Paco, or Baca in Arabic, was the stage name of Abderrahmane Qirouch, a young 
Gnawi m’allim born in 1948 in Essaouira (Sadiq 2006). Sporting a flamboyant afro, 
Paco introduced the hajhuj, the three-stringed Gnawa bass lute also known as a ginbri, 
to the Moroccan pop stage and Gnawa songs to the national consciousness in the 1980s. 
For example, the Paco-written songs “Zad el Hem” and “Mahmouma” feature not only 
the “slap-bass” style of hajhuj-playing at the beginning of the tracks, but also a rising 
tempo that increases rapidly and reaches a crescendo toward the end of the track. A 
resonant bass line and a frenetic crescendo both appear to index Gnawa music for 
Moroccan audiences. 
In the lyrics to “Mahmouma” we hear more of the typical disapproval for the 
modern breakdown of civility in everyday interaction such as we heard from Slaoui, 
Paco sadly remarking that “today there is no more respect, neither for faith nor for 
religion” (Sadiq 2006: 125-126, my translation). But the anger goes deeper as the lyrics 
focus on admittedly ill defined but centrally located targets: “Aren’t the prisons filled 
with sad boys? Don’t men die victims of arbitrary actions? Haven’t public places and 
houses been perverted? Our good advice forgotten, our mouths gagged, the hand of the 
tyrant is tattooed on all our faces. ... Wait no more for this world that died a long time 
ago.” This is indeed strongly worded protest in a police state. In 1971 and 1972 two 
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major attempts were made on the life of the king, Hassan II. The second of the attempts 
was led by Hassan’s closest friend and military commander, General Oufkir. Hassan’s 
pain at the betrayal ran deep. As a result, for the next 15 years the entire country was 
plunged into “l’annees de plomb,” the years of lead, during which thousands of the 
regime’s political opponents were beaten, imprisoned, and even murdered (Slyomovics 
2005). Not until the 1990s did many Moroccans begin again to breathe freely. When I 
visited Tetouan in 2001, a city of the mountainous northern region of the Rif, I followed 
closely on the heels of a visit by Hassan’s son, newly instated King Muhammad VI, 
whose mother was a Berber from the Rif. I was told then that his visit had been the first 
visit to the Rif by a Moroccan monarch since the 1970s, retribution for perceived 
Riffian support of Oufkir during the native son’s attempted coup (McMurray 2001). 
Despite the political repression, however, popular music of the 1970s and 1980s that 
was “conscious” tended to involve veiled political commentary. Fans of the music could 
relate their mutual interest in the songs and discuss their meanings without overtly 
criticizing the government. 
 While the lyrics of Mahmouma update Slaoui for the years of lead, the sound is 
pure Gnawa. In 1998 the first Gnawa music festival was held in Paco’s hometown of 
Essaouira. I attended in 2001, 2002, and 2006. At the most recent event around half a 
million people traveled to the windy beach resort, North Africa’s wind-surfing capital, 
for five days of free concerts on three large stages and a dozen smaller ones. More than 
anything, the Essaouira festival has worked to popularize Gnawa music in Morocco (see 
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Chapter 4). It also serves as a site for fans of Gnawa music to meet one another and 
form longer-lasting networks. 
 Morocco is an African country, but its proximity to Europe and its Arab heritage 
serve to destabilize identification with Africa among Moroccans. Meanwhile, three 
centuries of European colonialism have obscured the centrality of trans-Saharan trade 
and interactions for at least the preceding 700 years. It is my intention to draw attention 
to this neglected history as a call to memory of alternatives to European-dominated 
narratives of Moroccan and West African indigeneity and locality—to propose a kind of 
globalization from below (Stokes 2004) and outside the European-dominated circuit of 
world-systems theory (Abu-Lughod 1989; Cornell 1990). This project demands the 
practice of a peculiar art of timing (Fabian 1998), and it also cannot escape entirely the 
bounds of European ways of seeing and knowing, particularly since my access to 
knowledge about cultural patterns in West Africa and North Africa is largely drawn 
from ethnographic accounts conducted under conditions themselves largely determined 
by colonial relations, even in those cases when the ethnographers cast themselves in 
opposition to the colonial enterprise—Rouch, for example, as well as most 
anthropologists working since the 1980s. Certainly, the topic of colonialism raises 
questions surrounding capitalism and modernity, questions that I have briefly raised 
here but that I explore further in the following chapter. The continuous thread through 
this chapter has been the place of race and in particular the position of Blackness in the 
Moroccan imagination. As I explain in the following chapter, Blackness is central not 
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only to Moroccan imaginaries but to global imaginaries as well, particularly the 
institution of Modernism. 
 
SLAVERY, RUPTURE, AND CONTINUITY 
The history of the “two banks” of the Sahara desert speaks of continuous and 
deep relationships of trade, migration, and conquest. Most significant of these 
interactions, for the purpose of this project, is the trans-Saharan slave trade, which 
peaked between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The historical and cultural 
continuity of the Gnawa communities can be traced to several causes, among them labor 
specialization and powerful social structures, which produced cohesive community 
bonds across the centuries. Thus is evoked the idea that West Africa and North Africa 
are not bounded units but rather a complex region mediated across the Sahara Desert 
and maintained through cultural flows on a super-regional scale (Tsing 2002:473). 
Given Webb’s evidence, it is small wonder that, when the peasants were 
attacked and their societies destroyed, cultural continuity was severely constrained and 
transformed. Whenever the point is raised that Gnawa often are unable to specify the 
precise geographical or ethnic origin of their ancestors, it is seen as evidence of an 
absolute rupture. Despite the near absence of lineages to West African origins for many 
black Moroccans, there are not only cultural continuities but also a significant number 
of them who do have such lineages, including the Sudanis of Essaouira. This Gnawa 
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family of mfiallims is descended from an ancestor who made the trip across the Sahara 
early in the last century. Namir (1998) reports the words of Hajub “Gubani” Sudani: 
My father was named M'Barek and was a native of Chnafou in Sudan from 
where he was abducted and sold in the Sahara, while my mother was originally 
from Bamako in Mali... Me, I was born in Essaouira in 1923... Since 1985, I 
have been Moqadem of the zawia of the Gnawa. In 1987, I was designated as 
Moqadem of the taifa of the Gnawa of Essaouira. (ellipses in original; Namir 
1998:para. 3) 
M’allim Gubani went on to become one of leaders who authorized the Gnawa festival 
and the popularization of the cultural heritage of Morocco’s Black populations. 
The history of interactions across the Sahara speaks to long-term interactions 
that continue to be felt in the culture of West Africa, even after a colonial attempt to 
reorient economies and ties of identity to the coasts and ultimately Europe. European 
cultural forms continue to mediate West Africans’ engagement with North Africa and 
the Arab World, through France in the case of Francophone countries through Britain in 
the case of Anglophone countries. Nevertheless, we can look for continued cross-
fertilization of cultural and social forms to continue, as well as race and specifically 
Blackness playing a mediating role in transnational cultural flows. These flows have 
taken place under the conditions of capitalist modernity and globalization, and the roots 
of changes in these flows can be linked directly and indirectly to the history of 
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racialization within Morocco. Such a history of the racialization of one subculture, the 




Chapter 2: Scholarly Approaches to Gnawa, Morocco, and West Africa 
 
A SYNTHESIS OF GNAWA SCHOLARSHIP 
 Gnawa scholarship has gone through several generations. There were some early 
mentions of Black street musicians, for example by Westermarck (1968), first published 
in 1926. However, it was not until the 1970s that academic books and articles began to 
be devoted to the Gnawa. In his book on the Hamadsha (1973), Crapanzano discusses 
the Gnawa briefly alongside the ‘Issawa. The greatest contributions of the 1970s and 
1980s, however, came from Paques, Lapassade, and Diouri. This heritage of scholarship 
helps show how scholarly approaches to the Gnawa have not only reflected the 
racialization undergone by the Gnawa but in some cases have also contributed to the 
construction of racialized identities. An analysis of the history of scholarship on the 
Gnawa in Morocco illustrates how changes have taken place in scholarly 
representations of Moroccan society, including the religious landscape. 
 Viviana Paques was trained in the rigorous ethnographic methodology of 
Germaine Dieterlen and Marcel Griaule, students of Marcel Mauss who pioneered long-
term fieldwork among the Dogon in West Africa in the 1940s and 1950s. Her early 
writing on the Gnawa (1975, 1979) was an outgrowth of her interest in West African 
cosmology. Her great contribution did not come until 1991, when a large volume was 
released that characterized her approach. In addition to describing the Gnawa ceremony, 
though, the book also made statements that made the best sense within the context of 
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Griaulian anthropology, concerning the relationship between Gnawa beliefs and pan-
West African ethnocosmology and ethno-astronomy. Many of these conclusions seemed 
controversial and a bit difficult to defend by Gnawa I spoke with, or even to understand. 
 Simultaneously, Abdelhai Diouiri wrote a doctoral thesis under the direction of 
Roland Barthes at the University of Paris (Diouiri 1979). Diouiri’s arguments 
concerning writing and trance were largely in conversation with other European 
philosophers and literary theorists, but his examples from Gnawa belief and practice 
constitute a rich trove of data. Finally, Georges Lapassade (1982), a sociologist with an 
abiding interest in ethnopsychiatry, analyzed the practical applications that trance-
dancing and possession held for Gnawa. 
 In the 1990s, as Gnawa music was attracting popular attention, scholars sensed a 
neglected corner of Moroccan society and began to look more closely. The most 
important scholars of the 1990s are Hell (1999, 2002) and Chlyeh (1998, 1999). 
Bertrand Hell, a student of Paques, approached Gnawa culture is quite a different 
manner. His earlier published work focused on shamanism of Central Asia, although he 
was working since the 1970s with Gnawa m’allims. His book on possession and 
shamanism (1999) does not focus exclusively on the Gnawa, but instead draws on 
ethnographic examples from around the world. In contrast to that book and most of the 
work that preceded it, Hell’s ethnography exclusively devoted to the Gnawa (2001) is 
not comparative at all—rather, he considers Gnawa culture and its place in Morocco 
and in the world. Abdelhafid Chlyeh, a professional psychoanalyst, had maintained an 
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interest in the Gnawa since the 1970s, but it was not until the 1970s that he began 
publishing and editing scholarly work on the subject. His books (Chlyeh 1998, 1999) 
are distinctive in that they include long, verbatim narratives from his consultants, which 
make them an invaluable resource, as I demonstrate below in Chapter 5. 
 Throughout this period from the 1970s to the 1990s, ethnomusicologists 
continued to maintain an interest in Gnawa music and culture. Philip Schuyler (1981) 
and Tony Langlois (1998) have described Gnawa music and the lila briefly. It was not 
until after 2000 that an ethnomusicologist devoted an entire project to studying Gnawa 
musical traditions. Tim Abdellah Fuson has presented on Gnawa music (2001), but so 
far he has not finished the doctoral dissertation for which he conducted long-term 
fieldwork among Gnawa musicians in Marrakech. After 2000, historians also became 
interested in the Gnawa, in relation to a focus on the submerged histories of sub-
Saharans in North Africa. Chouki El Hamel, who has written on this topic, published an 
article devoted to the Gnawa in 2008 in which he presents valuable evidence from 
primary sources concerning the Gnawa of Morocco.  
 After 2000, Deborah Kapchan, a folklorist and anthropologist who had been 
working with the Gnawa for many years, began producing a body of work that 
culminated in her hybrid ethnography (2007), of which the first half examines the 
cutlure of possession (embodied trance performance) and the second half examines the 
possession of culture (transnational musical performance). Her work is transnational, 
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following Gnawa around Europe and North Africa, and it is also ethnographically 
grounded with close attention to language. 
 Three other writers bear mention after 2000: Ted Swedenburg, Pierre Alain 
Claisse, and Zineb Majdouli. Swedenburg has written broadly on Middle Eastern and 
Muslim popular culture, and the unpublished manuscript I cite bears the markings of his 
unique approach to transnational popular culture, maintaining balanced conneections to 
Marxist critiques of globalization and liberal enthusiasm over cultural diversity. The 
work of Claisse (2003) and Majdouli (2007) came too late to my attention to enable a 
clear evaluation of their work, but a cursory examination shows great promise. 
 
COLONIAL ENTANGLEMENTS IN ETHNOGRAPHIES 
 Anthropological scholarship on the Gnawa can be seen as having followed 
broader trends in the ethnography of West Africa, a project that began early in the 
twentieth century as a part of the European colonial project. For example, Leiris (1981) 
and Clifford (1988:55-92) describe the research forays and projects of anthropologist 
Maurice Griaule in the 1930s. The later work of Griaule (1965), which explores Dogon 
cosmology, and the cinematic and scholarly work of Jean Rouch (2003), both throw 
light on interior West African beliefs during the period of the 1940s through the 1970s. 
Further, ethnographies by Paul Stoller (1987, 1989) chart the development of Songhay 
(Niger) beliefs and practices concerning witchcraft and spirit possession, respectively, 
through the 1980s. 
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Although France “won the right” to colonize much of West Africa after the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, control over the interior of its West African colonies 
was not established until early in the twentieth century. French ethnographers followed 
soldiers and missionaries into interior French West Africa early in the twentieth century 
with the Dakar-Djibouti Expedition of 1931-33, during which time Marcel Griaule and 
Michel Leiris crossed the continent from west to east with a huge retinue. Griaule’s 
assistant Leiris (1981) recorded the story of the trip in his diary (originally published in 
1933), which relates by turns “the boring, the passionate, the interesting, the 
unexpected, the banal” (Clifford 1988:168). The book was scandalized French society 
when it was published, since it told of Griaule’s military-style ethnography, complete 
with stealthy theft of artifacts and beatings for uncooperative workers. Griaule 
published Conversations with Ogotemmeli (1965) in 1948, and perhaps by this point 
Griaule had softened his approach. The book relates his effort to relay Dogon 
cosmology as presented by the Dogon scholar Ogotemmeli, unmediated by the voice of 
the anthropologist. This approach signaled a tremendous shift from such ethnographers 
of Africa as E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1972 [1937], 1969 [1940]) and Meyer Fortes (1969 
[1959]), in whose work the authorial voice is dominant. In Conversations Griaule refers 
to himself in the third person and never by name. Griaule does not speak Dogon and 
works through a translator, so the stories are actually mediated several times. 
Nevertheless, Conversations represents an approach that purports to let the subjects of 
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ethnography speak for themselves. Further, by objectifying himself in the text as “the 
white man” or “the European,” Griaule acknowledges his own presence. 
Such a reflexive approach is evident in the work of Paul Stoller (1989), which 
shares other aspects with that of Griaule (1965). Stoller’s primary informant, Adamu 
Jenitongo, is also an elder and sage. Stoller relates the possession spirits of the various 
movements, spirits that belong to separate groupings within the Songhay pantheon. He 
includes the Hauka and the Sasale, which are significant for their timeliness: The 
Hauka, which first appeared in the 1940s, are the spirits of the colonial encounter, 
jesters who enact a “horrific comedy” (Stoller 1989:147) of soldiers and governors at 
the expense of their mediums and those around them. The Sasale, having arrived after 
Nigerien independence, enact a sexuality and immorality that provokes opposition from 
both the government and the reformist Muslim leaders of Niger. Thus Stoller ties the 
arrival and existence of spirit possession not only to essential mystical beliefs, but also 
to historical social forces. Stoller’s predecessor in this project is Jean Rouch (2003), an 
ethnographer and ethnographic filmmaker who documented Dogon and Songhay rituals 
and everyday life for over 40 years. Rouch’s famous and controversial film Les Maitres 
Fous (1959) documented the Hauka spirits in Accra in 1954 on the eve of 
independence, mocking the “mad masters” of colonial rule. The film was criticized by 
Africans for its alleged sensationalizing of African religious practices perceived to be 
embarrassing to emerging national identities; it was banned by colonial governments for 
the ridicule and high parody performed by the subjects on the colonial officers 
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themselves. This trend toward a critique of colonialism and Western domination of 
Africa, begun in the 1950s by younger anthropologists like Rouch, came to characterize 
most anthropological projects by the end of the twentieth century.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the European study of modern 
Moroccan society can be traced to Westermarck’s monumental two-volume work 
(1968), first published in 1926, which reflects fieldwork conducted between 1898 and 
1926. It is exhaustive on the topics of beliefs and ritual practices, reflecting the interests 
of European folklorists of the time in ritual, magic, and other remnants of primitive 
man. In the 1960s, American symbolic and interpretive anthropologists (e.g., Geertz 
1968; Rabinow 1975) began to work in Morocco and provided continuity in their focus 
on interpreting key national symbols.  
In contrast to this American school, Ernest Gellner (1969) provides detailed 
study of the political role of members in Berber tribes in Moroccan society. He focuses 
on mode of production as the primary means of determining a group’s social role, and 
he poses a “static frontier,” a line dividing sedentary farmers from mountain herders, as 
a central site where the interaction takes place that forms the role of tribally organized 
pastoral nomads within the larger society. Along the northern slope of the Central High 
Atlas in the 1950s and 1960s, Berber-speaking pastoralists herd their sheep back and 
forth from the mountains to the plains, while Arabic-speaking farmers cultivate farms in 
many of the same areas. An unstable peace is maintained between the competing groups 
by a third class of people, the igurramen. These groups, recruited from holy and saintly 
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lineages, occupy a mediating position and act as judges and legal advisers to those in 
the surrounding communities. Gellner is primarily interested in the political question of 
whether the system of government formed by this “saintly state” can legitimately be 
called a state. He finds a solution by synthesizing the political evidence with evidence 
from social organization, namely the “tribal” or segmentary organization of both secular 
and sacred groups. The groups contrast, though, in their political structure: The lay 
groups are egalitarian and symmetrical, while the sacred groups are hierarchical and 
asymmetrical. 
In a later work, Gellner (1981) provides the larger arguments of political 
philosophy within which his earlier work is positioned. The main essay in that volume, 
“Flux and reflux in the faith of men” (Gellner 1981:1-85), attempts to reconcile the 
political aspects of Islam in North Africa—namely the theories of Ibn Khaldun—with 
those of David Hume, in the process attempting to correct Max Weber’s account of the 
role of religion in civic society. Ibn Khaldun theorized that political dynasties rose and 
fell cyclically. In the cycle, external groups (“tribes”) that valued strict and ascetic 
lifestyles came to dominate a bloated, lazy capital in North Africa and thus its failing 
empire. As they became acclimated to city life, these leaders became less suited for 
leadership positions, since the city’s luxuries and bureaucratic efficiencies separated 
them from the necessary conditions of leadership—regular military action, harsh 
climate, marginal lifestyle. After several generations, the descendants of the original 
leaders were themeselves in need of being replaced. Gellner sees a parallel here to 
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Hume’s “oscillation” thesis, which held that human beings oscillate between rational 
theism and irrational polytheism, and they do so for irrational reasons. Gellner contrasts 
the positivist sociology of Ibn Khaldun and Hume, skeptical toward any alleged 
progress in the human condition, to Weber, who had greater faith in social progress. 
Instead of Weber’s puritan monotheists providing an increasingly rationalized society, 
Hume could also see the reverse, and in some cases saw the polytheism of Rome (in 
both its ancient and, in his words, “popish,” varieties) to be preferable, particularly for 
its tolerant attitude toward individual liberty. Gellner’s goal in this project is “to fuse 
Ibn Khaldun’s political sociology with David Hume’s oscillation theory of religion” 
(1981:35). 
How does his ethnographic project contribute to achieving this goal? Since 
Islam is far better suited than Christianity to reconciling the contradictions of modern 
capitalist society (1981:6-7), Gellner seeks to determine what specifically it is in Islam 
that leads to such success. In a very real sense, Gellner generalizes from the conditions 
that he observed in the 1950s and 1960s in the Central High Atlas, which he extends 
back in time at least to the eighteenth century and perhaps, even necessarily, all the way 
to the fourteenth century. He generalizes such a situation to typify “Muslim society,” at 
least as it is expressed in arid regions. This situation forms the concrete basis for 
Gellner’s thesis concerning the “stable frontier” (Gellner 1969), in which the area under 
government administration—bilad al-makhzen or “lands of government”—exists in a 
tense relationship with regions in rebellion, the bilad al-siba, the lands of “organized 
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dissidence” under the control of segmentary “tribal” structures. Mediating between 
these two forces are the members of the saintly lineages, who as living saints perform a 
kind of “tribal polytheism” at the same time that they, as literate and authoritative 
judges, represent strict monotheism of the variety sanctioned by urban authority. 
It seems to me that Gellner’s theory of this stable frontier is directly opposed to 
other perspectives on the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, especially 
contemporary ones and later ones. As represented to Stefania Pandolfo (1997) by some 
of her consultants who had lived under the conditions of siba, the early twentieth 
century was remembered it as a fearful time when there were few protections for people 
who lacked powerful allies. In such perspectives, the lack of effective government is an 
aberrant time of extreme and unnatural lawlessness and violence. Ennaji (1999) cites 
the nineteenth-century historian Ahmad Khalid al-Nasiri (1834-1897), who claimed that 
“the nineteenth century was the most immoral of times” (Ennaji 1999:77). And Gellner 
himself notes that Jews, Blacks, heterodox believers and others (Gellner 1969:14) 
outside of the landowning segmentary structure were little better than non-entities: “The 
poor and weak are not merely excluded informally from political decision, but are even 
formally excluded from important aspects of legal life” (Gellner 1969:28). At the same 
time, Gellner’s theory appears to make such crisis the norm, and to make the relative 
stability of the rule of law, and a state that seeks to alleviate conditions of desperation, 
the aberrant situation. Gellner also seems to hold a position that valorizes so-called 
“tribal” society, in which there is no hierarchical government, but rather self-rule by 
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landholders through the political avenues afforded by the free competition between 
segmented kin groups and lineages, mediated by the saintly lineages in a kind of 
minimal government. When we combine these two emphases—crisis and 
decentralization—an ideal type of Moroccan society (and thus, in Gellner’s conception, 
“Muslim society”) emerges that resembles a pseudo-state that is proto-capitalist, or even 
ideally libertarian-capitalist. 
After the symbolic approaches of the 1960s, American ethnography of Morocco 
also became known for the “life-history” ethnography, which has the explicit intent of 
illustrating social processes through the model of the “social biography” (Eickelman 
1985:14) that Eickelman, Waterbury (1972), and Crapanzano (1980) follow. A third 
type of ethnography that developed in Morocco between the 1960s and the 1980s is the 
memoir. Fernea (1965) had already established her mastery of the ethnographic 
memoir; her work on Morocco (Fernea 1976) and Rabinow’s (1977) further developed 
this genre, including even greater reflexivity and candor. 
Meanwhile, social anthropology continued its historical interest in political 
economy. In the interests of highlighting how my ideas interact with concerns of the 
mainstream of social anthropology, I want to cast this argument within a larger one 
concerning a global moment of modernity such as that expressed by Kamran Ali (2002) 
concerning interventions of the modern state into the lives of its citizens. Ali outlines 
ways the Egyptian state has worked alongside international donor agencies to transform 
Egyptian citizens into modern subjects, “self-disciplining and disciplined individuals” 
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(10). Ali points up the contradictory role the state plays in these transformations: While 
its stated goals use the language of individual freedom (rhetorically opposing 
“traditional” social ties), the practice of implementing this individualism leads to 
“freedom of choice [being] socialized as the state decides the parameters in which these 
choices may be made” (13). The means of the state to produce new subjectivities is thus 
presented as powerful but often contradictory. An example of this contrariness can be 
seen above at the turn of the eighteenth century, when Islam’s injunction against 
enslavement of Muslims came up against Mulay Isma’il’s need to form an independent 
military force and consolidate a source of authority separate from the traditional power 
structure. The result was a new subjectivity for many black Moroccans who had never 
been enslaved. 
 
ETHNOCOSMOLOGY AND GNAWA ETHNOGRAPHY 
Perhaps the heavy emphasis in Gnawa ethnography on religious beliefs and 
practices come about out of a particular sensitivity to cosmological expertise that 
Griaulian anthropologists tend to exhibit. In other words, rather than focusing on 
transitions in and out of the group—on marginal or liminal subjects, as students of Mary 
Douglas (1976) or Victor Turner (1967) might do—these anthropologists tended to 
study the leaders very closely and draw generalizations based on the observations of 
exceptional practitioners. Until recently French African ethnography appeared to be 
dominated by Marcel Griaule, who studied under Mauss and taught a generation of 
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French ethnographers (Clifford 1988). Griaule’s best-known work, Conversations with 
Ogotemmeli (1965), relates Dogon cosmologies that have seemed difficult for other 
scholars of Dogon cosmology to criticize, even Dogon people themselves, since they 
necessarily represent the esoteric knowledge of a greatly learned scholar. Certain 
relationships to power are thus elaborated and enacted in this kind of anthropology 
(Clifford 1988; Hammoudi 1997), and the same relationships bolster the reputational 
force of both the scholar and anthropologist. More to the point, scholars cited in such 
ethnographies tend to hold strong beliefs and to interpret the incorporation into a Gnawa 
community as involving primarily religious-type conversion, one that involves strong 
social ties and that is accomplished through a mystical operation. 
 
DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 
In the New World, the heritage of enslavement and the experience of racism led 
to the development among Black communites the condition of double-consciousness, a 
term first coined by W.E.B. Du Bois (1986). The contribution of Du Bois (1986) to 
questions of race and identity cannot be overstated, especially given that his 
explorations of the topic were part of a project developing a subject-oriented social 
research. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Du Bois has a premonition: The problem of 
the twentieth century (for America) is the problem of the color line. Perhaps because of 
the inherent frailty of prophecies, or because of Du Bois’ own inner struggle to come to 
terms with his life-long interest in race and social theory, the correlate of that 
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pronouncement is not fully developed until nearly 40 years later, in Dusk of Dawn 
(1940). It is here that Du Bois reveals the idea that the problem of the color line is not a 
one-way problem of white society repressing non-white society and the reverse impulse 
against that repression, but rather it is a problem of identity and the formulation of the 
subject. 
To elaborate this problem, Du Bois develops the idea of “double 
consciousness”—“an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it 
from being torn asunder” (Souls, Du Bois 1986:364-365.) Then, in the reparkable 
“White World” section of Dusk of Dawn (Du Bois 1986:652-680), Du Bois creates a 
“mythical friend,” ostensibly a composite of the white acquaintances Du Bois has 
debated for a lifetime. By naming this character Van Dieman, though, Du Bois suggests 
his continuing problematic relationship to his White (and Black) Dutch ancestry. If this 
friend can be considered an alter ego, then the conversation becomes an internal debate, 
a reflexive argument over self-identification, over the subjective experience of the 
researcher himself. This identity crisis reaches an anguished apex—“You are not black; 
you are no Negro” (665)—before Du Bois characteristically brings the example home to 
experience: “The Black man is the person who must ride ‘Jim Crow’ in Georgia” (666). 
But because of this color bar, black experience is cut off from white America. 
Du Bois extends the Platonic cave analogy (Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois 1986:650-651) and 
adds a soundproof glass wall cutting off those imprisoned inside from interaction or any 
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other meaningful contact with those outside. A Foucauldian panopticon (Foucault 
1977:195 ff.) that is a curious mix of dungeon and penitentiary, Du Bois’ cave is dark 
and inhabitants “entombed” (Du Bois 1986:650), completely separate from white 
society; at the same time, however, the black prisoners are on display to the white 
world. Surveillance is maintained, albeit without the crucial backlighting necessary for 
a fully functioning panopticon to open the entire world of the prisoners to scrutiny. A 
result of this condition of separation, Du Bois argues, is the continued separation of 
black from white. Sympathetic whites can “assume a facile championship of the 
entombed” (650), but without the inside knowledge, Whites seldom do more than 
complicate matters (Baker 1998). Like Foucault’s theory of the “insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges” (Foucault 1980:81), Du Bois’ model does allow for a positive 
solution: Liberation from the cave as well as “making articulate the submerged caste” 
(Du Bois 1986:651), a liberation that includes empowerment and speaking to power.9 
Du Bois’ conceptualization of race and identity depends very strongly on the 
idea that subjectivities are created through experience of bodily impositions. 
Enslavement and its attendant bodily practices are pointed up here, but also the new 
                                                       
9 In an attempt to rescue Du Bois from generalized hagiography (a charge to which I am also 
susceptible), Adolph Reed Jr. (1997) cites Kwame Appiah’s (1992:28-46) insight that Du Bois based his 
theory of “double-consciousness” on an already-suspect biological theory of race. Unlike Appiah, 
however, Reed refuses to accept that Du Bois historicized race in any way. Rather, Reed argues, Du Bois 
was “unambiguously in step with the conceptual orthodoxy defined by the Lamarckian social science of 
his day” (Reed 1997:121). Reed concludes that for Du Bois, double-consciousness signified neither a 
central principle of his thought nor a “distinctively black social-theoretical discourse”; instead, double-
consciousness was historically contingent and generalized beyond black sensibilities (124-125). This 
expansion offers a second way out of the conundrum, since it simultaneously narrows double 
consciousness to its historical context—Du Bois’ nineteenth-century bias toward the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics—and broadens it beyond the African-American experience. 
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Gnawa practices, which specifically provoke new kinds of diasporic identification. For 
example, images of Gnawa musicians are displayed around the world on posters and 
CD jackets, and in music videos. These stereotyped Gnawa images contrast sharply 
with the images on display in Abdellah’s Dar Gnawa (Kapchan 2002a). In the display, 
posed portraits of Gnawa musicians in costume are hung next to images of great jazz 
musicians, photographs that Abdellah received as gifts when he toured the Schomburg 
Center for Research in Black Culture in New York. In the “home” (in the lesser 
diaspora) of Dar Gnawa, images serve an instrumental function of legitimating the 
traditional ties between North America and North Africa. The function differs from the 
use of images abroad, in the greater diaspora, where they index something quite 
different. The use of Gnawa images diverges from that of images of Sikh martyrs; 
instead of stressing temporality and corporeality, Gnawa advertising images tend to 
stress an atemporal, two-dimensional image that is devoid of both sounds and smells, 
the very sensory elements that, along with color and movement, form the quintessence 
of Gnawa performance (Kapchan 2002b). 
Gnawa are members of the Northern African diaspora in both senses of the 
word: they are North Africans, and they came through the northern slave trading routes 
across the Sahara, rather than the western Middle Passage across the Atlantic. El Hamel 
(2002) discusses the conspicuous absence of any acknowledgement among Moroccans 
of the slave trade, which lasted until the end of the nineteenth century (Wright 2002). 
This distortion in the representation is a shortcoming that this project (along with 
 
114 
numerous forebears) attempts to redress. At the same time that this heritage of 
enslavement is reinforced, however, there remains a contradiction similar to that noted 
by Gordon and Anderson (1999) with regard to diasporic identification in Nicaragua. 
The authors mention Gordon’s early perplexity at discovering members of a black 
community who did not trace their ancestry to Africa but rather to the Caribbean and to 
England. The authors acknowledge the difficulty of distinguishing an academic “truth” 
of origins from the lived experiences of people, many of whom claim no identification 
with the African diaspora. A similar situation obtains as well in Morocco, where 
numerous darker skinned Moroccans are entirely comfortable with their origins in 
Morocco or southern Morocco, as autochthonous and indigenous Moroccans, while at 
the same time Gnawa and other Moroccans—both darker-skinned and lighter-skinned—
are claiming an identity that draws on a well-established historical legacy of violence 
and oppression as well as continued marginalization. Determining the bounds of this 
distinction is a key point of interest and a goal of this project; nevertheless, one method 
that Gnawa use to draw adherents to accept their formulations of identity relies on 
Gnawa musicians’ masterful manipulation of ambiguities and ambivalences. 
El Hamel proposes that while Gnawa share much with African-Americans, one 
element of the Black diaspora that is missing from Morocco is any sense of a double 
consciousness:  
Unlike the African American double consciousness that Du Bois describes, 
black Moroccans perceive themselves first and foremost as Muslim Moroccans, 
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and only secondarily as participants in a different tradition and/or as belonging 
to a specific ethnic or linguistic, real or imaginary, origin. Similar to the manner 
in which Berbers see themselves and identify with the collective consciousness 
of Arabo-Islamic historical experience, Moroccan blacks have found a way to 
reconcile themselves with, and to integrate themselves into, a Moroccan 
collective identity. (El Hamel 2008:258) 
I concur that Gnawa are integrated into Moroccan society in a way that differs radically 
from African-American integration into American society. The “one-drop” rule and 
resulting segregation in US society challenges recent parallels, even for apartheid South 
Africa, where a variety of other racial categories existed, apart the white/non-white line 
in US society. Nevertheless, I am not so quick to dismiss the possibility that Moroccan 
racialization could in some way be understood as a variation of a global system of 
White supremacy. How else could be explained Moulay Isma’il’s willingness to enslave 
Muslim Moroccans who happened to be Black? Berbers were not targeted in the same 
way. And I have witnessed, if not as radical a separation as some African-American 
Black Nationalists, at least some articulation among Black Moroccans of a 
consciousness of their unique heritage and reduced status in Morocco. Moreover, the 
example of the Berbers is an excellent foil—why do Black Moroccans, unlike Berber 
Moroccans, continue to feel such exclusion? Moreover, I cannot discount the theory that 
capitalist modernity is based not on the rejection of slave labor but rather on the practice 
of enslavement itself, which in practice has involved Black people disproportionately.  
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One scholar who has engaged with double consciousness in ways that are most 
pertinent for this project, Paul Gilroy, has, within the tradition of the Birmingham 
School of cultural studies, presented just such a theory. The Black Atlantic interweaves 
American, Caribbean, and European elements of Black culture in “an explicitly 
transnational and intercultural” approach (Gilroy 1994:15) and in this sense can be seen 
as similar to Hebdige’s (1979) analysis of 1950s and 1960s white London street styles 
as responses to and reactions against the styles of African and Caribbean immigrant 
population. Gilroy explicitly critiques the encapsulated, airtight African-American 
tradition in this “polemic … against the ethnic absolutism that currently dominates 
black political culture” (Gilroy 1994:5). In this sense Gilroy’s project is a response to 
the nation-state’s intervention in black US cultural discourses. Gilroy also ties African-
American thinkers and writers more broadly to European nationalism, most prominently 
Du Bois to Germany (Chapter 4) and Richard Wright to France (Chapter 5). Du Bois 
lived and studied in Germany, and in his writing he demonstrates explicitly “the 
relationship of modern black political theory to European romantic nationalism in 
general and German nationalism in particular” (Gilroy 1994:112). Du Bois was heavily 
influenced by Hegelian and neo-Hegelian political philosophy (134-135), which also 
play a role in Gilroy’s conclusions.10 The influence of nationalism can be seen in the 
expressive culture of the “Black Atlantic,” and the theoretical underpinnings of this 
modern capitalist nation-state rest securely on Hegel’s “master-slave” dialectic. 
                                                       
10 Gilroy draws less clearly the ties between Richard Wright and France, choosing to focus on Wright’s 
fascination with Nietzsche (160) and his influence on Simone de Beauvoir (186). 
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Gilroy’s emphasis on double consciousness continues to isolate the Black 
transatlantic experience, but after the middle passage there is no attempt to connect this 
experience back to sub-Saharan Africa, much less North Africa. Nor is much attention 
in the book paid to religious subjectivities, such that the beliefs and practices 
surrounding spirit possession that pervade African as well as American religious 
patterns (Vodou, Candomble, Orisha, Santeria, Pentecostalism, etc.) and any effect 
these might have on double consciousness are not even considered. For sure, Gilroy’s 
argument might have benefitted from closer attention to Black Atlantic cultural 
production south of the Strait of Gibraltar and east of Brazil. 
 
CONCLUSION: RACE AND POPULAR CULTURE IN MOROCCO 
 What is the role of race in popular culture and the public imaginary in Morocco? 
To answer this question completely would demand reference to Jurgen Habermas and 
his analysis of the public sphere (Habermas 1991). In Habermas’ formulation, this 
public sphere developed in Europe alongside the modern nation-state and marks the 
transition from social forms derived from the influence of nobles within feudal states 
over the control of land and the regulation of mercantile trade to social forms derived 
from the influence of bourgeois elements within modern states over the control of 
industrial production and trade in commodities. It feels too ambitious for this project to 
propose to compare European political and economic developments in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries to Moroccan events in the twentieth. Moreover, doing so 
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would seem to imply that we could import as well all sorts of conclusions concerning 
instrumental rationality in the development of a “civil society” within the modern 
democratic (and European) nation-state. 
Nevertheless, I feel that it is still possible to speak about an emergent public 
imaginary in Morocco. I feel more comfortable doing so along the lines of Dipesh 
Chakrabarty in his chapter on adda (Chakrabarty 2000: 180-213). “Adda,” which 
implies a space of youthful sociality in Bengal—something like a “club” or a “salon”—
means more than the “transition from feudalism to capitalism” (188). Instead, 
Chakrabarty argues, it carries and contains a “history of modernity,” charting the 
emergence of the Bengali middle class and its public life (194). Instead of congruence 
between civil society and adda, Chakrabarty sees antagonism: 
They are mutually antithetical organizations of time and place. Civil society, in 
its ideal construction, builds into the very idea of human activity the telos of a 
result, a product and a purpose, and structures its use of time and place on that 
developmentalist and utilitarian logic (even which that logic is not simply 
linear). Conversations in an adda, on the other hand, are by definition opposed 
to the idea of achieving any definite outcome. Enjoying an adda is to enjoy a 
sense of time and space that is not subject to the gravitational pull of any explicit 
purpose. The introduction of a purpose that could make the conversation 
“instrumental” to the achievement of some object other than the social life of an 
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adda itself, kills, it is claimed, the very spirit and the principle of adda.” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 204) 
A proposed public imaginary in Morocco would most likely need to be similarly 
established. Recent scholars of Moroccan publics (Ossman 1994, Kapchan 1996, 
McMurray 2001) have been involved in this project, mirroring efforts in other parts of 
the Arab world and North Africa, for example Armbrust (1996) and Ali (2002). Such 
approaches tend to draw on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, “systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
structures” (1977:72; emphasis in original). Bourdieu situates the habitus directly 
between the two opposing poles of structure and agency. The transformation and 
transposition of structure are vital to this relationship, especially in the case of class 
habitus, which is the consciousness of class solidarity accompanied by the disposition to 
act (Bourdieu 1977:83). Within this framework, Bourdieu (1984) turns to the patterns of 
consumption of aesthetic products by a broad range of people, arguing against the 
typically Marxist belief that a class is defined by its production. Rather, Bourdieu says, 
“a class is defined as much by its being-perceived and by its being, by its 
consumption—which need not be conspicuous to be symbolic—as much as by its 
position in the relations of production” (Bourdieu 1984:483). Bourdieu convincingly 
demonstrates, through numerous charts and graphs derived from surveys, that “taste 
classifies, and it classifies the classifier” (1984:6). Much of the value of Bourdieu’s 
analysis is lies in his elaboration of numerous classes and social roles related to 
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occupation, education, social prestige, etc. To organize these roles Bourdieu introduces 
the concept of “cultural capital”—cultural knowledge—which can be inherited (through 
the education of one’s parents) or acquired oneself through education (1984:80) and is 
deployed by an agent. 
Cultural capital works within specific kinds of social conditions, as does 
“social” and “symbolic” capital, and Bourdieu terms these areas “fields,” such as the 
field of cultural production, the “set of social conditions of the production, circulation, 
and consumption of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu 1993:9). Bourdieu finds the primary 
hierarchical structure in the opposition between “high” and “low” culture, but he 
understands these functionally. “High” culture is a sub-field of “restricted” production, 
“production for other producers” and “art for art’s sake”; “low” or popular culture is a 
sub-field of “large-scale” production for the mass audience. In many ways, the shift in 
Gnawa practice could be linked to a shift of this type. It is apt to recognize that in the 
past 15 years, Gnawa music has become known to large-scale audiences. These 
audiences have fetishized it—treated it “as an object with magical and transformative 
powers”—on the way to its “becoming a form of symbolic capital” (Kapchan 2004b). 
The images we inherit from our upbringing and experience form the social imaginary 
(Taylor 1999:168) that we envision and attempt to restructure. The element of a social 
imaginary that impinges on our proposed existence as political and economic subjects in 
imagined communities (Anderson 1983) forms the public imaginary. In the following 
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section, I examine more closely some of the key aspects of these theories as well as 




SECTION II: ENCULTURATION IN MODERNITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 How do Moroccans think of themselves as subjects who are capable of 
determining their own identities? More specifically, how can metaphors of transposition 
and conversion help elucidate transnational flows of music and culture? In the following 
section, I begin with a discussion of modernism and modernity before examining more 
closely the processes of enculturation into a Gnawa identity. The monetary metaphor of 
conversion is appropriate because of recent Gnawa trends toward commoditization of 
their cultural heritage. Moreover, the musical metaphor of transposition is apt because 
of the musical context—religious identities can be seen to have been transposed, 
changed but still recognizable. 
 
ARTICULATION AND MEDIATION 
The following discussion of articulation relies on the incisive critiques of 
structures of power and hegemony developed by Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams 
from the theories of Gramsci and Althusser. I am interested in the complex, structured 
linkage between asymmetrical elements, including not only the correspondence between 
economic base and ideological superstructures (if we can still use such words) but also 
the ways these structures are maintained and challenged through such rubrics as 
nationalism, postcolonialism, and modernity. Below, I trace the development of 
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twentieth-century cultural Marxism and illustrate the application its critical apparatus in 
examples drawn from Veit Erlmann’s (1999) analysis of the participation of South 
African musicians in the global capitalist economy. 
From the 1930s to the 1960s the great concern was to debunk overly simplistic 
models that implied that the relationship between base and superstructure was one of 
determination or expression, and Georg Lukacs was followed by Theodor Adorno and 
other Frankfurt School theorists in championing the mediation thesis and its attendant 
concern with avoiding reification. By the 1970s, however, British Marxists such as 
Raymond Williams became concerned with the overly Hegelian impulses of such 
thinkers as Adorno to posit concrete and discrete categories of reality, which Williams 
considers a methodological fiction (1977:99). 
Rather, Williams suggests, we need to look at mediation as the symbolic, 
signifying, or cultural aspect of social process—language and signification—which are 
“indissoluble elements of the material social process itself” (1977:99). If we do this, the 
distinction between the social and the material fails. By considering the process of 
social production and reproduction, rather than society itself, Williams draws attention 
to his call for analysis of the dynamic, interrelated elements of societies in flux. This 
formulation draws heavily on the view of Antonio Gramsci that the state must be 
viewed as a “continuous process of formation and superceding of unstable equilibria … 
between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups” 
(Bennett 1981:199). Stuart Hall (1980) extends this argument to include a discussion of 
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political economy proper—the various racialized structures governing Caribbean and 
Latin American economies—even as he retains the more general application to social 
formation (Hall 1980:325ff.). Hall introduces as well the concept of “articulation” in a 
similarly doubly applied sense: Articulation, already with a double meaning (both 
“giving voice to” and “joining”), refers in this case to the site of a complex, structured 
linkage between asymmetrical elements. Articulation for Hall can refer both to the 
linkage of a disempowered economy into the global system (Hall 1980:323-324), as 
well as to the correspondence between economic structures and ideological 
superstructures (329ff.) 
The work of Erlmann (1999) can be understood within Hall’s (1986) 
interpretation of a Gramscian methodology that emphasizes historical specificity and 
the dialectical relationship between national characteristics (which we can interpret as 
“the local”) and regional unevenness (“the global”) (Hall 1986:23). Further, this kind of 
analysis follows the Gramscian model by giving centrality to the cultural factor in social 
development: “the actual, grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages, and 
customs of any specific historical society” (Hall 1986:26). In this sense, Erlmann (1999) 
argues that colonial and postcolonial projects have resulted in an articulation between 
Africa and the West that he calls the “global imagination”—interests, languages, styles, 
images, and other “means by which people shift the contexts of their knowledge and 
endow phenomena with significance beyond their immediate realm of experience” 
(Erlmann 1999:4). In South Africa the arts, in particular, became a focal point of 
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“colonial engagements with and contestations of nationalism” (Erlmann 1999:117). 
Examining the nostalgic musical style of isicathamiya, an a cappella style sung by the 
all-male vocal group Ladysmith Black Mombazo, Erlmann finds it to have been “born 
of the encounter between these two worlds--the world of rural homesteads … on the one 
hand and the realm of factories and urban popular culture on the other” (210) There is a 
paradox in the fact that, although the lyrics of the songs call for the return of migrant 
laborers to their homes in primordial Africa, that same search for home “draws them 
ever more inexorably into the West and modern world” (200). Thus the cultural 
expression of isicathamiya is diasporic and transnational. At the same time, Erlmann 
stresses the role of state-owned media under apartheid to develop “folk” (or in their 
terms, “tribal”) musics to emphasize divisions among the black population and contain 
access to power within the white power structure (207). In much the same way, state 
endorsement and promotion of Gnawa music—no matter how diasporic and 
transnational it may be—maintains some measure of control over it by governmental 
interests. 
In South Africa, the state was always present in some sense, as it is for Gnawa 
musicians, whose identities are largely professionalized by their government-issued 
cards identifying them as folkloric performers. In South Africa, the production and 
circulation of expressive culture under apartheid was accomplished with significant 
influence from the state. This consideration of the racialized (and racist) nation-state 
raises questions of race, identity, and modernity in the postcolony. Within Gnawa 
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cosmology, Hell identifies ‘Aisha Qandisha with the spirit of modernization. In the final 
five sections of his book, Hell takes on the changes that have occurred in the Gnawa 
ritual over the past 15 years. He characterized these changes as processes through which 
Gnawa ritual has been folklorized, desacralized, commercialized, dumbed down, and 
finally overturned and spilled out. The identification of ‘Aisha with the spirit of 
modernity enables us to use a local cultural symbol to examine the immanent movement 
networks (Melucci 1985), built under the conditions of what might be identified as 
“local globalization” (Swedenburg 2000), that are enabled by ‘Aisha’s current 





Chapter 3: Modernism and Black Modernity 
 
The terms through which Moroccans engage in capitalist modernity are under 
debate. This debate in turn relies in part on definitions of modernity. Dilip Gaonkar 
(1999) likes to think of “alternative modernities”: the emphasis here is on an emergent 
understanding of modernity as “a leap in the open air of the present as … history” 
(Gaonkar 1999:7, ellipsis in original). Gaonkar points to the contradictory nature of the 
two visions of European modernity. Weberian societal/cultural modernity draws on 
Enlightenment theories of social and material progress, but it fragments cultural 
meaning and results in a world of “deadening and meaningless routine” (8). In contrast, 
the Baudelairian cultural/aesthetic modernity, which “seeks to redeem modern culture 
by aestheticizing it” (8), focuses on the “cultural patina of modernity as a spectacle of 
speed, novelty, and effervescence” (8), but the absence of moral constraint offers 
potential for “narcissistic self-absorption and hedonism” (9). Arriving at a theory of 
alternative modernities demands that one “provincialize Europe” (Goankar 1999:14; see 
also Chakrabarty 2000) and understand the “cultural” nature of these theories, that 
modernity is itself a culture and largely bound to the European experience (Gaonkar 
1999:15). The contemporary situation of the Gnawa in Morocco shares features with 
each vision: on the one hand, Moroccans face an increasingly bifurcated society in 
which those with access to a quality education and social capital necessary to secure a 
job have found tremendous improvements in their standards of living. Meanwhile, 
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workers outside of these favored classes find it increasingly impossible to provide for 
their families. At the same time, since the 1990s, the Moroccan cultural landscape has 
undergone a transformation that has seen the sacralization of music festivals and the 
secularization of religious spheres. Within the context of such changes in the Moroccan 
social, cultural, and religious landscape, an analysis of the position of Gnawa in 
Morocco can describe textures and reveal details regarding passages along the often-
contradictory paths and routes of these changes that everyday identities are undergoing. 
 
SINGULAR AND ALTERNATIVE MODERNITIES 
Timothy Mitchell (2000) takes issue with the “alternative modernity” thesis for 
two reasons: First, Mitchell argues that in creating an “almost infinite” number of 
permutations, the thesis undermines the methodological means by which modernity 
theorists can apprehend the specific powers of “replication and expansion” that imperial 
modernity imposes. Second, the language of “alternatives” already begs the question, 
“Alternative to what?” and in doing so implies an “underlying and singular modernity” 
(Mitchell 2000:xii). Instead of following down this path, Mitchell argues, it is important 
to retain the singular focus of modernity for its illumination of the real effects of 
imperialism. As a result, Mitchell focuses on representation, the “forms of social 
practice that set up in the social architecture of the world what seems an absolute 
distinction between image (or meaning, or plan, or structure) and reality, and thus a 
distinctive apprehension of the real” (Mitchell 2000:xiii). 
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The debate between alternative modernities versus a singular modernity can thus 
be characterized by a concern for the disabling effects of Eurocentrism, on the one side, 
versus a recognition of the dangers associated with underestimating the continued 
power of empire on the other. Shannon’s (2001) argument for the specific nature of 
Syrian aesthetic notions of modernity comes down on the side of alternative 
modernities, since his subject—Syria’s economy as well as its rich heritage of aesthetic 
independence—is somewhat insular. He focuses on the concept of authenticity (“asala”) 
as a modern discourse on what is considered to be “valuable and good” in Syrian 
culture. No doubt this approach is warranted in the case of Syria. However, I’m not 
convinced that it applies equally to Morocco, whose experience of national 
development never went through the same anti-colonial steps as did Syria’s—
republican government, socialist-oriented economy, near-absolute rupture with Western 
European models, etc. The question remains to be seen whether Moroccan aesthetic 
forms enjoy similar liberty. As a result, I argue that the debate to a large extent can be 
settled by close consideration of the subject at hand, as well as through the researcher’s 
biases when considering questions of power and desire. I myself feel torn between these 
two “alternatives”: On the one hand, I hesitate to underestimate the continued influence 
of Euro-American imperialist hegemony in Moroccan aesthetics, particularly since 
Moroccan society is so closely intertwined with European languages, educational 
structures, and economic forms, not only historically and in formal political economy 
but also through the continued experience of international labor migration (McMurray 
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2001). My own experience in Ghana during the 1970s and 1980s, when Black 
revolutionary leftist anti-imperialism still held sway in that country, bias me toward a 
continued preoccupation with liberation by any means necessary. At the same time, 
though, it seems clear to me that Moroccan nationalist and pan-Arab anti-colonial 
tendencies within Moroccan society keep questions of influence and authenticity at the 
fore. Further, as an American anthropologist, my fundamental bias toward interpreting 
cultural patterns on the basis of their own particular historical trends of unique cultural 
logics leads me not to dismiss too quickly the thesis of alternative modernities. 
 Since Morocco’s articulation into global capitalism is long and well established 
(see Chapter 1; Cornell 1990), it makes sense to follow Mitchell. Nevertheless, 
Mitchell’s conception of modernity as “singular” seems insufficient to describe 
Moroccan experiences of capitalism. Moreover, the modernity that derives from Gnawa 
cosmology and lived experience are central to some European formulations of the 
modern. Below, I unpack some trajectories of Blackness, Morocco, and Gnawa culture 
in the transition from “high modernism”—a trend exemplified by the works produced 
during the early twentieth century up to the 1940s—and “late modernism,” a much less 
confident and progressive period that is too often forgotten and folded into the capitalist 
triumphalism of postmodernity after around 1970. 
I have slipped easily between modernity and modernism, from the “Weberian” 
side of Gaonkar’s duality to the Baudelarian side. Science or technology is not 
necessarily the most useful designation and determinant of “the modern”—instead, we 
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might also look to modernity as a structure of feeling (Williams 1977). The accepted 
usage might be to employ “modernity” when describing capitalist oppression and 
rationalism of society, and “modernism” when discussing twentieth-century art. But I 
wonder whether questioning this distinction might be useful as well. It seems to me too 
easy for postcolonial political theorists to split the two, as Partha Chatterjee has 
documented in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (1993), into a concrete 
problematic level of material modernity (“modern” technology or economics) and an 
esoteric thematic level of social modernity (“modern” ethics, human rights, gender 
equality). But ideologies are embedded in technologies, so to speak. Most particularly, 
embedded within the modern technology are the ideologies of capital, which is 
something not merely to have and invest but also to think with (Levi-Strauss 1963; see 
also Erlmann 1999, Jameson 1990). When human bodies engage with objects, these 
objects exert a form of control over the bodies, retraining them subtly and not-so-subtly 
too (Kapchan 2007). Moreover, Chatterjee himself notes subaltern scholars calling for 
the study of postcolonial engagement with modernity on thematic levels (1993).  
If we can accept that Black culture is central to modernism (Gates 1985, Gilroy 
1993), the question then becomes one of control. Who had control over this deployment 
of Black culture? For what ends? Was it under the “modernism” banner or the “anti-
modernism” one? And how does this struggle over representation and appropriation 




THE BLACK ATLANTIC: TANGIER 
 Tangier is wholly on the Atlantic Ocean. Although the coastline faces north 
within Tangier’s city limits, the Mediterranean Sea does not actually begin until farther 
to the east. One thing about Tangier that became evident upon my first visit in 2001 was 
the presence of sub-Saharan Africans there. They tended to be recognizable apart from 
other Black Moroccans—they spoke English or Portuguese and not French, or else they 
practiced Christianity or some other non-Muslim religion. If these cues did not identify 
them, I tended to be able to tell from the clothes they wore, the way they walked and 
comported themselves—all the details marked them as neither North African nor 
European (and there were numerous Black North Africans and Europeans in Tangier). 
Most of the West Africans were economic refugees limited from gaining employment, 
even if they had entered the country legally, although very few of them had. 
 When I first met Abdellah in 2001 and 2002 and learned of his pan-African 
vision, I asked about the West Africans. Abdellah spoke English and was Black, and the 
West Africans had recently congregated not far from his home in the madina, in the old 
Socco Chico of the Beat novels, where Abdellah met his friends every day to play 
Parcheesi. Had he met any? His face grew thoughtful and a little sad. Yes, he had tried 
to get to know some of them. “But they are hard, too hard,” he added. “Always...” and 
he made two fists and mimed boxing or pushing back and forth. At the time, I resolved 
that, when I returned to Morocco, I would try to understand what he meant. 
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 When I returned to Tangier in 2006, I met a few West Africans, but I didn’t 
pursue any relationships at first. Then one day in the Internet cafe a tall man, past forty, 
came up to me as I was leaving and began telling me a sad story in English. He was 
from Anglophone West Africa and he needed just a little bit of money to buy food and a 
shirt. I gave him what I had and arranged to meet him later—I was intending to trade 
money for time, to get his whole story. I knew that, since he was in the country 
illegally, professional ethics prevented me from using him as a consultant in this 
project, but I wanted to learn his story in order to corroborate the experiences of racism 
faced by others, as documented in published sources or reported in stories, that I would 
be using. 
 Over the course of a couple of weeks I had several meetings with the man. He 
always agreed to talk about his home and what drove him out, but he never did. 
Somehow our conversations always came back to his latest plan for making it to 
Europe, when inevitably led to his request for more money, far bigger amounts than I 
had promised. He always claimed to be a victim, a simple man from the countryside 
who needed to provide for his family back home, exploited by the big city and the 
various crooks who had swindled him. 
I recognized his lack of “street knowledge” and awareness: One day, when I was 
riding on a city bus with him, we were standing near the exit door. At a stop, a young 
woman wearing a veil who was standing before the door stumbled as she stepped down. 
Based on my experiences in Lebanon and elsewhere, I knew that, as an unrelated adult 
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male, it could be seen as offensive to make any physical contact with a veiled woman. 
But my friend, who was talking to me the whole time, reached out his hand and held her 
shoulder very briefly to steady her. I could perceive immediate reactions from the other 
passengers, especially the men. After our stop, I asked my friend if he had realized what 
he had just done and whether he knew that he should avoid physical contact with veiled 
women. He was surprised, and he said he would keep an eye out in the future. 
But despite his naivete, I eventually came to understand that I was a mark in his 
eyes, a source of more money. After several days of trying to ask him about his 
experience and getting only grander schemes for future actions, I could see I was 
getting nowhere. He was dominating my time and calling me at all hours to meet and 
discuss these schemes. As a result, I allowed a situation to develop in which he lied, and 
then embarrassed me publicly. I reacted with more anger than I could have and left him 
to find another mark. In this interchange, we were both attempting to use each other, but 
I had also had a dream of making an honest friend in the process. His marginal status, 
however, never allowed that possibility for him. He just wanted to use me and others in 
Morocco and move on to Europe, a miscalculation on his part, from my perspective, 
since I knew that I would have continued to help him had he treated me more kindly. 
Moreover, I was envisioning a kind of “New African Diaspora” in Morocco whereby 
West Africans could continue to find a place there. Of course, this man knew such a 
situation was impossible, since West Africans shared with Moroccans of any race a 
larger and broader position in the transnational division of labor—a flexible, external 
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pool of potentially underpaid and exploited unskilled labor in Europe, a goal that was 
still preferable to being unemployed in North Africa or in West Africa. Like many 
Moroccans, this man was just trying to escape to Europe. My encounter with the man 
led to my understanding much more clearly what Abdellah had meant when he 
described them as “hard, too hard.” No amount of proposed unity—a shared position 
within racial categories (with Abdellah and other Black Moroccans), a shared spoken 
language and familiarity with similar regions (with myself), common interests, even 
honest care and concern for a friend’s welfare—none of these could overcome the 
overriding social division between an undocumented migrant laborer and legal 
residents. 
 
ANTIMODERNISM IN TANGIER 
If the refusal to “buy into” the modernist project involves a rejection as well of 
the burden of establishing truth claims objectively, certain aspects of Gnawa practice 
that observed could be interpreted as doing just that. The refusal to establish objective 
means of evaluating truth claims that I observed chiefly concerned Abdellah El Gourd’s 
refusal to rule on the truth claims of others—scholars, interested fans—concerning 
Ganwa practice in other parts of Morocco. This was particularly the case for reports 
made by m’allims and others from various Gnawa traditions, and European and 
American scholars, the main interlocutors I presented to Abdellah in our conversations. 
When I proposed alternate meanings for rituals or practices that diverged from his own, 
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Abdellah had the same response: He had his own knowledge, and they had theirs. In 
fact, such contradictions form a great dilemma for Gnawa scholars. Many of them want 
to be able to say they understand what Gnawa “really” believe, but there are so many 
contradictory stories that they end up being able only to report what they learned from 
these people here or those people there. Abdellah concurred with this dilemma—he 
always insisted that he couldn’t speak for statements outside of their context. He had to 
know who said it and where before he could say anything. Once I brought the words of 
another scholar to him, published information that used untranslated words by an old 
m’allim. It had been requested that I ask Abdellah to explain what the words meant. But 
Abdellah refused to weigh in without knowing specifics: Who was the m’allim who had 
spoken these words? Which city did he come from? Who was asking the question, what 
question had he been asked, and what was the situation that had brought about the 
encounter? Of course, I had no information about these details. As a result, Abdellah 
couldn’t evaluate or interpret what the words meant. For him, Gnawa knowledge was 
almost entirely context-dependent, with the construction of a context producing the 
focal point itself (Goodwin and Duranti 1993).  
In the dispute between Dilip Gaonkar and Timothy Mitchell, what they don’t 
acknowledge is that they are both right, within each scholar’s constructed context of his 
argument. Of course there must be a European, capitalist rationalistic modernity in 
order for there to be either opposition or alternatives to it. European capitalism is 
logically and historically prior to capitalism elsewhere, and Mitchell is right to point to 
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predatory capitalism as determinant of these other modernities, supported by the Euro-
American concentration of capital. But what perhaps Mitchell resists is the premise that, 
although there has always been opposition to the Enlightenment, on its own terms in the 
Vico-Nietzsche tradition, this opposition was enlivened greatly by the late-modern/anti-
modern impulse. That impulse was itself generated out of the colonial experience and 
drew from the claims of people of the global south that they were modern individuals. 
These nationalists in turn co-constructed, alongside artists and writers of the mid-
twentieth century, a certain and influential vision of the failure of the Enlightenment 
project. 
Neither Gaonkar nor Mitchell goes so far as to deny the continued force of 
modernity, neither going as far as Armbrust in his assault on modernism. But I question 
how much Egyptians really reject modernism and how much they are merely 
disappointed in the failure of the Egyptian state to deliver on its promises of modernity. 
In his influential 1983 essay “The Decline of Modernism,” Peter Burger traces the 
development of what later came to be called postmodernism back to the development of 
the avant-garde in the 1920s. He presents a strong argument against the anti-modern 
thesis: namely that if it were anti-modernism, it would more clearly find a way out from 
the subtler (non-Weberian) arguments of Adorno concerning the rationality of the artist 
(Burger 1992:39-41). 
Burger’s noted aporia regarding the challenge facing artists—to conform to a 
standard, conventional non-conformism—raises anew the question of form vs. function. 
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I have found Jan Mukarovsky to provide the most hopeful reconciliation of these two. 
Mukarovsky’s intervention is not really a reconciliation but rather a Kantian bracketing 
of other questions to arrive at the useful notion of the “aesthetic function” of art, 
whereby we can perceive aesthetic functions inherent in all sorts of things (Mukarovsky 
1978). Taken in whole, Michael Berube tells us, “Mukarvsky’s work manages to 
authorize a complex sociohistorical analysis of how disparate social collectives have 
constructed and understood the features of cultural practices we commonly—and still 
usefully, I insist, with a full awareness of the paradox entailed in the invocation of 
utility—call ‘aesthetic’” (Berube 2005:15). In this case, the pertinent question becomes, 
what is the function of art under late capitalism in Morocco? And how does a Gnawa 
version of this Kantian “bracketing” contribute to reconciliation of anti-modern 
impatience at the limited access to modern life for the urban and rural masses, with their 
continued dream of “the good life” that modernity promises? 
 
MODERNISM AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA 
 How did Tangier come to be connected to the Black Atlantic and thus to Late 
Modernism? It happened through the African diaspora. A place of (de)privilege in 
modernity has been strongly asserted for the Black Diaspora (Gilroy 1993). A shared 
history of enslavement ties Gnawa musicians to globalized popular music, since four 
musical genres based on or derived from black culture—rock-n-roll, R&B, reggae, and 
hip-hop—achieved global exposure in the last half of the twentieth century. Roots of 
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these styles, as well as the less wildly popular jazz and blues, have been found in the 
history of the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993). Nevertheless, enslavement and Islam are 
barely connected in popular conceptions of each within the New World. Although 
Africans and African-Americans have been exploring such connections for over a 
century, these connections have only recently begun to receive serious scholarly 
attention.  
Many of the slaves taken to the Americas between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were Muslims. Nevertheless, more recent expressions of Islam in the New 
World hearken back to the early twentieth century. In a chapter on jazz bandleader Art 
Blakey’s troubled identification with Africa, Ingrid Monson (2000b) points out that a 
significant influence on Blakey’s early attitudes toward Africa stem from his conversion 
to the Ahmadiyya movement, a heterodox expression of Islam, in the 1940s.11 
According to Monson, the Ahmadiyya movement had a greater presence in New York 
in the 1940s than did the Nation of Islam (2000b:335). This history has been largely 
obscured in the subsequent pre-eminence of the NOI among African-Americans in the 
1960s and 1970s. Whether they are recognized as Ahmadiyya, NOI, or allied with one 
of the offshoots of the NOI, like the Nation of Gods and Earths (Swedenburg 1996), 
expressions of Islam in the US African diaspora have tended to be circumscribed and 
cast as heterodox by an unknowing public, both Muslim and non-Muslim. 
                                                       
11 The Ahmadiyya movement was founded in India in the 1880s by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), 
who claimed to the mahdi or messiah. After initial successes, anti-Ahmadiyya rioting took place in 
Pakistan in the 1950s, and the sect was declared non-Muslim in 1974 (Schimmel 1992). Nevertheless, 
Ahmadiyya members continued to find great success in education, social welfare, and active evangelism, 
finding converts in South Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. 
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As a result, a space opens for me to recast the African diaspora as it has moved 
(through a function of social imagination) and been moved (by the actions of scholars 
and activists) north from West Africa. I choose to focus on one small part of the trend, 
that of Gnawa identities and subjectivities. One of these trends in diapora studies, Islam, 
has been the victim of benign neglect until recently in the academy. Since numerous ties 
between Gnawa musicians and other musicians in the African diaspora are mediated 
through shared Muslim faith, however, it is vitally important that these histories be 
clarified and elaborated. The history of the African diaspora is taut with asymmetrical 
strands, pulled ultimately by the forces of imperialism: Europe and the West are ever-
present in these arenas. 
The “African diaspora” has typically referred to formerly enslaved Africans of 
Europe and the New World in an attempt to theorize black identification across the 
Western Hemisphere, a black identity that is neither completely African, European, 
American, Caribbean, North American, nor South American, but rather all of them at 
once (Gilroy 1993:205 ff.). The OED limits the term diaspora to the Jewish dispersion 
after the exile of the first century CE and, mimetically, the dispersal of the Christians 
across the Roman world. Similarly, blacks influenced by biblical stories have extended 
the prophetic return of exiles to their own predicament. In her introduction, however, 
Monson (2000a) recognizes that toward the end of the last century the African diaspora 
became the paradigmatic case of diaspora. 
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Clifford’s (1994) discussion of diaspora allies the term to exile and not 
borderlands, although he concedes that the distinction is blurred. Looking to Gloria 
Anzaldua (1987), we find a theorization of borderlands that illustrates very well this 
fuzziness. Anzaldua’s image of an Aztlan homeland is precisely the kind of diasporic 
homeland that we find in Morocco: Without leaving Aztlan (greater Mexico), Mexican-
Americans have been symbolically (and, often, physically) expelled from the northern 
(US) part of their homeland through racial, social, and economic exclusion. In a very 
similar way, black Moroccans—particularly as Haratin and Gnawa—have been 
deterritorialized without ever leaving home. Clifford notes this contradictory function: 
First, he establishes the essential difference dividing indigenous people “who have 
inhabited a territory since before recorded history” from those “who arrived by 
steamboat or airplane” (1994:309). He follows this statement with a discussion of 
“dispersed tribal peoples,” like Cherokees in Oklahoma or New York City, we assume, 
who have been dispossessed of their lands, noting that they share many features with 
diasporic peoples. Clifford confirms, nevertheless, that “tribal cultures are not 
diasporas; their sense of rootedness in the land is precisely what diasporic peoples have 
lost” (1994:310). 
Yet this is very similar to the condition that characterizes the Gnawa, 
particularly because Gnawa origins are so divergent. One the one hand, Gnawa maintain 
histories of the “Middle Passage” across the Sahara, and we can conclude that among 
their ancestors are West Africans captured and sold into slavery in sub-Saharan West 
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Africa. At the same time, Gnawa find origins in Arabia or at least in Ethiopia and Sudan 
(through Bilal), and further we have evidence from antiquity that at one time the only 
residents populating the southern Mediterranean coastline were Berber, black, or both. 
Thus the Gnawa are both alien to Morocco (in the sense of having been coerced into 
immigration) and indigenous, while the Berbers are indigenous but not alien, and the 
Arab, Andalusian, and other Levantine and Mediterranean populations in Morocco— 
“immigrant,” if you will—are neither alien nor indigenous. Due to these divergent and 
contrasting origins, I take it that the key defining event that has produced any current 
solidarity among black Moroccans is the action taken by Mulay Isma’il in 1699 to mark 
most Moroccan blacks as slaves and to impress them into the military. 
The originary event that produces a common diasporic identity is relatively well 
established in diaspora theory. For two millennia, the Jewish diaspora recalled Titus’s 
destruction of Jerusalem and the Herodian temple in 70 C.E. as the defining event of 
their history, the portentous event of expulsion. Thus the event that produces diasporic 
conditions (and the movement of bodies and minds that follows the event) takes 
precedence over any previous terms of common identity and coexistence. Brian Axel 
expresses the concept well: “Rather than conceiving of the homeland as something that 
creates the diaspora, it may be more productive to consider the diaspora as something 
that creates the homeland” (2002:426). The act of Mulay Isma’il brought together both 
enslaved sub-Saharan Africans and the indigenous Haratin (El Hamel 2002) in an 
enterprise that constructed a homeland. This homeland is not necessarily a real place in 
 
143 
West Africa, but also and more importantly can be considered the domain of specialized 
religious and musical practices that are legitimated by knowledge of the spirits, 
practices that in turn may draw on the experience of enslavement. 
Theories of diaspora coming out of the work of Gilroy (1993) take the view that 
the African diaspora exists in a dynamic between the West African and American 
shores of the Atlantic, with mediation through Europe. The Black Atlantic draws 
directly on the slave trade that made possible large numbers of Africans living in 
America, as well as subsequent less-coercive crossings and movements. Gilroy’s project 
is self-consciously in conflict with both essentialist and anti-essentialist perspectives. 
First, Gilroy opposes such essentialist perspectives as produced an idea of a unitary and 
cohesive African identity, based ultimately in scientific racism. Against this pole, 
Gilroy emphasizes the anti-essentialist arguments that stress the cultural construction of 
race, that race is not a mystical unity but rather a social category with a history. This 
conclusion is, in turn, insufficient for Gilroy when scholars and activists lose sight of 
any search for origins and deny or de-emphasize, in the free play of signifiers, any 
ongoing anti-black violence or oppression in a white-supremacist global system. As a 
corrective, Gilroy proposes an “anti-anti-essentialist” perspective that recognizes that 
although “race is a social construct, it is also a social fact whose effects are undeniably 
real” (Gordon and Anderson 1999). 
Gnawa are members of the Northern African diaspora in both senses of the 
word: they are North Africans, and they came through the northern slave trading routes 
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across the Sahara, rather than the western Middle Passage across the Atlantic. El Hamel 
(2002) discusses the conspicuous absence of any acknowledgement among Moroccans 
of the slave trade, which lasted until the end of the nineteenth century (Wright 2002). 
This distortion in the representation is a shortcoming that this project (along with 
numerous forebears) attempts to redress. At the same time that this heritage of 
enslavement is reinforced, however, there remains a contradiction similar to that noted 
by Gordon and Anderson (1999) with regard to diasporic identification in Nicaragua. 
The authors mention Gordon’s early perplexity at discovering members of a black 
community who did not trace their ancestry to Africa but rather to the Caribbean and to 
England. The authors acknowledge the difficulty of distinguishing an academic “truth” 
of origins from the lived experiences of people, many of whom claim no identification 
with the African diaspora. A similar situation obtains as well in Morocco, where 
numerous darker skinned Moroccans are entirely comfortable with their origins in 
Morocco or southern Morocco, as autochthonous and indigenous Moroccans, while at 
the same time Gnawa and other Moroccans—both darker-skinned and lighter-skinned—
are claiming an identity that draws on a well-established historical legacy of violence 
and oppression as well as continued marginalization. Determining the bounds of this 
distinction is a key point of interest and a goal of this project; nevertheless, one method 
that Gnawa use to draw adherents to accept their formulations of identity relies on 
Gnawa musicians’ masterful manipulation of mass media technologies. 
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Although Gilroy’s analysis affords productive new avenues of investigation, his 
perspective contains a lacuna with regard to Islam and North Africa, and it gives short 
shrift to the history of West Africa prior to the fifteenth century, when social identities 
and relations drew on inland Saharan crossing, a history of civilization and cultural 
efflorescence, not only war and slave raiding. Much work has already been done on this 
project by historians and others (e.g., Hunwick 1992; Segal 2001), but anthropologists 
have not been at the forefront. A corrective intervention would take an accurate vision 
of West African history that includes North Africa and Islam and tie direct links 
between this history and contemporary cultural ideologies and practices, treating the 
Gnawa and other such North Africans as members of the African diaspora. A critical 
intervention such as this might, moreover, challenge Gilroy’s model—perhaps the racial 
formation operant in Morocco differs qualitatively from racial formation in other parts 
of the world. Gilroy’s dependence on Du Bois requires mention of his contribution to 
questions of race and identity, which cannot be overstated, especially given that his 
explorations of the topic were part of a project developing a subject-oriented social 
research project. 
 This chapter has outlined the various means by which Black cultural forms again 
and again serve to bolster the cultural capitals of privileged members of the Metropole. 
Even when the borrowing has taken place at more abstractly aesthetic levels, the basic 
model remains unchanged: Cultural exchange takes place when the instability of one’s 
identity’s produces what Veit Erlmann calls a “vortex of racial ambiguity” (Erlmann 
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2000:87) that all too often is exploited by capitalism to “plunder and counterfeit black 
culture” (95).  Yet Erlmann remains hopeful that “a certain integration” is possible 
through Gilroy’s “diasporic intimacy.” Such integration is the broad goal of the second 
half of Kapchan’s work on the Gnawa (Kapchan 2007) in which she finds much to 
celebrate in collaborations between African-American jazz musicians and Gnawa 
troupes. Moreover, the means by which Gnawa have come to express their enculturation 
into a Gnawa identity has implicated mass mediated technologies for more than a 
generation. It is the rich legacy of Blackness in Moroccan history, as well as a particular 
experience of building a Muslim society, that determined the current status of Gnawa 
culture and enabled the strong influence that it exerts on Moroccan society at present. 
The changes that occurred in order for this state of affairs to come about reveal concrete 
details about the path that modernity has taken in Morocco. In the following chapter, I 
use the term “conversion” as a metaphor to help elucidate transnational flows of music 





Chapter 4: Conversion and Mass Media 
 
In this chapter I wish to tie religion to commerce and music within the context 
of a broader discussion of enculturation. If we discard Tylor’s definition of “culture” 
(Trouillot 2003), how can we still use the term? One way is through a more old-
fashioned return of culture to refer to, roughly, the arts, encompassing both fine arts and 
popular arts. If we define our concern as such, then what happens to enculturation? How 
is sociality implicated in aesthetics? One way is through subculture (Hebdige 1979), 
through the development of new means of identification through the production, 
circulation, and consumption of items, images, and sounds. 
From the perspective of capitalism, I speculate in this chapter on resonances 
between “conversion” as a religious rite of passage and “conversion” as a monetary 
function, from one denomination to another. I argue that monetary conversion is not a 
simple exchange of one specie for another but rather a transaction that results in a kind 
of double transformation through commodity exchange (Karatani 2004). In fact, the 
conversion of currencies is very similar to other commodity exchanges. As the 
Moroccan economy edges from an industrial-based economy to an information-based 
one, the distinction between commodity and money becomes less clear, and sometimes 
the mystification of money obscures how everyday conversions have taken place. In 
many ways, however, the trend of money’s role in capitalism can be seen as having 
come full-circle: Once human lives were the primary basis for determining the value of 
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money through the wergild or “blood money” payment for the taking of a human life 
(Simmel 1978).  
Marx’s labor theory of value argues in favor of a shift from the Asiatic mode of 
production to the capitalist mode. Instead of surplus value being simply a result of 
tributary economies (and any monetary surplus arriving in trade through price 
differences based on geographic distance), under industrial capitalism, human labor 
comes to reside in commodities and endow them with a value that exceeds or surpasses 
the value of wages paid. Scholars have been arguing for some time, however, that 
surplus value has undergone yet another change under the information economy, what 
Steven Shaviro calls the “network society” (2003). As the primary source of surplus 
value now tends to be not in the production of the physical item (e.g., a compact disc) 
but rather from a proprietary design or other “intellectual property” (the music or 
program imprinted on the disk), value comes to reside again in people themselves as 
they exploit their own identities. Alongside other features of the global economy, the 
development of such relations between musicians and their cultural production in 
Morocco made possible the “possession of culture” (Kapchan 2007) and its sale and 
appreciation. Such changes in Moroccan society, including the religious landscape, 
reveal a particular engagement with globalization, one that takes into account the 
heritage of enslavement among the Gnawa, the fact that slaves represent an original 
means by which human beings were considered property. Self-exploitation might still 
be exploitation, but it offers the warrant for potential self-enrichment, or at least control 
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over any surplus. I conclude the chapter by acknowledging that “conversion” does not 
completely capture the full texture of the shifts in religious subjectivity of those who 
identify with Gnawa. Nevertheless, I assert that it is an apt metaphor for transformations 
in subcultural identifications and expressions. 
 
CINEMATIC CONVERSION 
Deborah Kapchan (2007) relates the story of Fatna, a shuwafa possessed through 
media, perhaps by a mediated spirit. Fatna tells her story as a conventional narrative, 
using standard discourse markers (Kapchan 2007:84-105). She relates the first time she 
“fell” into a possession trance. A respectable married woman with children, she was 
washing the dishes during a party in her home. The television was playing in the 
background, and the next program happened to include a Gnawa performance. When 
she heard the music, she began to beat the rhythm with her feet: 
My feet were banging, banging, you know, I was about to bang into the wall, 
and they [her guests] all came running. They came running, and they found me 
trancing, trancing, trancing. Right here, right in the kitchen. I left the faucet 
running. I didn’t sense myself [ma sha‘rtsh b-ras-i]. I left the water faucet open 
and left that stuff and I kept trancing. That’s the first time that I ever tranced. 
(Kapchan 2007:84-85) 
After that experience, Fatna told Kapchan, visions of women came to her in dreams. 
She continues to narrate her lucid dreams during which women (the spirits) surrounded 
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her, cared for her, and ministered to her, encouraging her to come and begin her “work” 
as a seer, a shuwafa. 
Fatna’s first teachers were the spirits themselves. One woman spirit even 
brought Fatna a sacred bundle with the colored cloth she would need to conduct 
ceremonies. Kapchan asks whether this visit was a dream: 
Not a dream. I just do this with my eyes. At night. When I do this [she blinks]. I 
imagine, I see it right next to me. I’m not asleep. And when that stuff is over, I 
open my eyes. Like a film that’s turning. Like a film that I see. And afterwards I 
do like this with my eyes, and it does away. (Kapchan 2007:86) 
Kapchan notes Fatna’s use of cinematic vocabulary to describe her experience, and her 
subsequent dependence on a fqih, a religious specialist in the Quran and the divination 
of spirits, who is in private life a television director. The director oversees an attempt to 
exorcise the spirits from Fatna, which will also release her tongue—Fatna is mute 
throughout the ordeal. The television-director-cum-fqih manages to speak to the spirits, 
and the result, when Fatna speaks, is so visually arresting that the director regrets not 
having been able to film it, an apparent point of pride for Fatna. 
These early attempts to appeal the spirits ultimately failed, however, because 
they did not fulfill the needs of the spirits. Instead of an exorcism, Fatna needed an 
adorcism, someon who could appease the resident spirits rather than evict them. 
Ultimately, Fatna became a Gnawa shuwafa. The important cinematic quality of her 
possession is an element in other narratives of initiation. Both Abdelhai Diouri (1979) 
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and Abdelhafid Chlyeh (1998) recount the story of Abdeltif, a m’allim of Marrakech. In 
Diouri’s recounting, 
In the 1950s in Marrakech a new cinema was to open. The m’allim Abdaltif had 
the following dream prior to its opening: He entered the cinema, which was full 
to bursting. On stage was a group of Gnawa. Among them he recognized his 
own brother, the same one who, according to the dreamer, had counseled him to 
spurn any contact with the Gnawa. At the height of the trance, all the people 
quietly withdrew, following the members of the band. Only the narrator’s 
brother was left, along with the “plate” [tbiqa] loaded with different kinds of 
incense. A moment later, even his brother quit the scene, leaving the dreamer 
alone, face-to-face with the board, fascinated by the boxes of different colors of 
incense (Diouri 1979:198; my translation). 
The 1950s marked the beginning of indigenous electronically mediated cultural 
products, the first Moroccan recordings coming in the 1940s (see Chapter 1). Cinemas 
had been showing films since the 1920s in Morocco, with Egyptian films appearing 
during World War II, but the production of Moroccan films was much slower to take 
place, even in the 1940s (Carter 1999:195ff.). Abdeltif was much in advance of other 
Gnawa who would make the leap to electronic media in the 1970s and after. 
The story of Abdeltif’s initiation is much more elaborated in Chlyeh’s 
recounting than it is in Diouri’s. Beginning on page 56, Chlyeh begins the verbatim 
retelling by Abdeltif of his story, which takes up more then 10 pages. After his father 
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died, he had gone to see the Gnawa, of whom his father’s brother was a m’allim. After 
his mother died in 1945, Abdeltif and his brothers went out to find work. He found a job 
in a public oven, and at the same time he began to learn music of the Gnawa. His elder 
brother did not approve of his professional labor subsidizing his work with the spirits. 
At some point he changed masters, and he also owned a ginbri that he practiced on. He 
had ritual visits from spirits, visions, and struggled with his two m’allims, M’Barek, 
with whom he had begun apprenticeship, and Lahcen, the former teacher of M’Barek. 
Abdeltif transferred his allegiance from M’Barek to Lahcen. After both he and Lahcen 
had complementary visions to make a pilgrimage to the zawiyya (school and pilgrimage 
center) at Sidi Chamharouch, they made a pilgrimage. While at the zawiyya, Abdeltif 
woke one morning with the mark of a ginbri’s neck, a long round pole, burned across 
his left palm, a kind of stigmata. After returning from this trip, Abdeltif worked at a lila 
directed by Lahcen that was held at the home of a person named Ba Ali. At one point 
during the lila, Lahcen passed the ginbri abruptly to Abdeltif. Abdeltif was unprepared, 
but he played his master’s ginbri automatically. It was after all these events had taken 
place that the vision of the cinema took place: 
One day, well after my vision at Sidi Chamharouch, a town crier announced the 
opening of a cinema in the Kasbah district. I planned to visit this new theater to 
see a movie, but it had not yet been built. At that time, I had not yet formed my 
own troupe, but I already had the vision [at] Sidi Chamharouch with the ginbri 
traced [on my palm], and Maalem Lahcen had already ceded his ginbri publicly 
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(at Ba Ali’s house). At that time, however, I had not begun to make 
commitments on my own behalf to conduct derdeba lilas.  
One night, after the announcement that the cinema would open, I had a 
dream where I saw myself in this room as if I were there. On the screen, I saw a 
large number of Africans. There was no ginbri or any other instrument, but I 
heard songs with words in foreign languages. After a while, the film ended. I 
was about to leave when suddenly I saw people coming out of the screen. They 
headed towards me and encircled me. At the time I had been alone in the 
cinema—the spectators had all gone. These new people gathered around 
something in the aisle that led to the exit. I looked to see what was in the middle 
of their circle and saw a plate (tbiqa) that contained a brazier and incense boxes 
identical to those that are placed before the m’allim for the celebration of the 
derdeba lila. All these people disappeared and I found myself alone with this 
tbiqa. My dream ended with this vision. I can now interpret the vision as a 
premonition announcing my future rise to the status of m’allim, able to conduct 
the ritual celebrations on behalf of the brotherhood. 
After that I formed my own group by hiring two men of my age, then I 
became partners with a sacrificer. At the beginning I sacrificed the animals 
myself, but I realized quickly that this was a lot of work for only one person. 
(Chlyeh 1998:65; my translation) 
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In this second telling of the dream, the men on screen are not identified as Gnawa at 
first, and Abdeltif’s brother is not present among them. What I wish to draw attention 
to, however, is the sustained series of dreams, signs, visions, and other ordeals that need 
to be used as evidence in the initiate’s case to justify his status as a m’allim. I also want 
to point up the evidence presented by Chlyeh that this conversion came long after 
Abdeltif had already publicly identified as a Gnawi, and even had already played his 
master’s ginbri at a lila. By calling attention to these details, I hope to illustrate how 
conversion here is a long journey toward an ill-defined destination, filled with events of 
training and preparation, and sequences of signs and portents that need to be interpreted 
afterwards, before being concluded by a change in status. Moreover, the journey 
requires a tremendous investment of time and money. The choice to focus on such 
professionals is made consciously and deliberately by the researcher. In doing so, does 
the researcher implicate himself or herself? 
The instability between truth and reality is derived from a consideration of the 
“self” of the ethnographer, a self with considerable freedom to create imaginary worlds 
but simultaneously bound to reality (Buck-Morss 1994:47). Particularly when filming 
possession ceremonies, Jean Rouch speaks of filming as a particular kind of trance, a 
cine-transe, in which he mimetically identifies with the subjects of his cinema and 
becomes a self that is simultaneously a non-self (Rouch 2003:98-99). Russell (1999) 
calls this operation the “doubleness of the possessed body” (198). In contrast, for 
example, Bertrand Hell does not consider his own positionality vis-à-vis the 
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trance/possession of ethnography. Rather, in maintaining that trance and possession are 
not commensurate, Hell rejects Lewis’ argument that—although local interpretations of 
the trance-possession split must hold true—ultimately there is no qualitative distinction 
between the two: Possession merely “embraces a wider range of phenomena than 
trance” (Lewis 1971:40). Instead, Hell concurs with Rouget, who subsumes possession 
within a larger category of trance. While Rouget rejects the extreme position of Mircea 
Eliade and Luc de Heusch, who argue that possession and trance diverge completely 
divergent, he still argues in favor of a contrast between “shamanic trance,” 
characterized by a voyage of the person across space and time, an out of body 
experience, and “possession trance,” which is an “opposite … type of relationship with 
the invisible” (Rouget 1985:18). In possession, the alien spirit inhabits the person in 
trance, and the spirit is embodied. In shamanic trance, people “go to the spirits,” but in 
possession trance, “the spirits have to come to them” (19).  
These metaphors of travel are not just ethnographic conventions but are 
themselves conceptions motivated by mass media. The “self” of the ethnographer is no 
more singular than the “self” of the cinematic m’allim or shuwafa. Moreover, this 
metaphor of cinema that we use when describing ourselves derives thoroughly from 






CONVERSION VS. INITIATION 
Mystical operations resulting in changes in status call to mind the question of 
why I persist in using the term conversion but not initiation. Although it is used in a 
more limited sense, for example by Hell (1999, 2002) to describe the incorporation of 
new members into a Gnawa taifa, the term is associated more broadly in anthropology 
with rites of passage. In Van Gennep’s analysis of initiation (1960:65-115), which 
introduced the term to academic usage, the broader connection is made between 
initiation and puberty. For Van Gennep, a successful initiation results in a child 
becoming an adult and forthwith bearing the responsibilities and the liberties of 
adulthood. I’m concerned that I do not overly confuse the issue, since already there 
have been some intimations of “survivals” between West African social practices, 
including secret societies and hunting societies, and the Gnawa (Hell 2002, Paques 
1991). These seem to me to differ structurally from the situation of the Gnawa—for 
example, while West African secret societies tend to be based on ethnicity and are 
exclusive, initiation into a Gnawa taifa is not based on ethnicity or race, and seems to be 
open to any interested, devoted person irrespective of social standing. 
A more general and appropriate example might be found in the general initiation 
by Moroccan men into Islam, which involves circumcision and the recitation of the 
shahada or testimony of faith, but for reasons outlined above I hesitate to compare 
becoming a member of a Gnawa taifa to becoming a Muslim. Van Gennep faces no 
such restriction in using the term to describe initiation into the Issawa “fraternity” 
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(1960:96-98); however, he states that such minor initiations are equivalent not to 
entering a religious community of faith but to marriage. As I see it, the model here is 
quite different: Rather than a change in vertical status associated with a more typical rite 
of passage, as implied by Turner as well in his emphasis on lower status to higher status 
(1969:130), the change from being unaffiliated with a tariqa or taifa to being affilated 
with one is not an upward movement but a sideways one, a horizontal move more 
broadly within society. True, within the taifa there is verticality—a new initiate is 
considered “lower” than an advanced member. However, in this section I am not so 
interested in determining someone’s level within a taifa as I am the simple presence of 
mutual identification, on a horizontal line. As a result, even within such a limited sense, 
“initiation” does not apply to my project because the people I am most interested in here 
are not necessarily those who have joined a Gnawa taifa. Rather, I am interested in 
much more ephemeral and loose shifts in identity 
 
CENTS AND (RELIGIOUS) SENSIBILITIES 
When I asked if non-Moroccans ever became Gnawa, one Spanish man who 
lived in Marrakech was mentioned in passing as a Gnawi. “He is a Gnawi,” Abdellah 
told me. “He has some business in Marrakech, a shop, and he lives there in a house in 
the madina.” One American I know, who does not identify as a Gnawi though he is a 
Muslim, studied for many years with a m’allim in Marrakech, working on a graduate 
degree. Another, who does identify as both a Gnawi and a Muslim, made frequent visits 
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to Morocco and associated with Gnawa in the United States. Hell himself, who is 
French, not only initiated into a local group in Marrakech but also became a sort of 
muqaddem, even as he continued to pursue an academic career in France. He never 
converted to Islam. He gained a “taba’” or stamp of authority from L’Ayachi, a m’allim 
in Marrakech, to conduct rituals and to heal people. Nevertheless, Hell does not 
consider this initiation to be a “conversion” (Hell, personal communication). Before 
him another French anthropologist, Viviana Paques, became a muqadma or shuwafa 
and eventually moved to the Marrakech area, where she was living in 2006. She was 
well known by reputation to the members of Dar Gnawa as the “French shuwafa” of 
Tamesloht, and Abdellah knew her personally and recognized the legitimacy of her 
status as a Gnawa shuwafa. One key element in their “conversions” was that each of 
these Western converts was able to disengage from Western lifestyles long enough to 
gain physical proximity to an active Gnawa community. The demands of Csordas’ 
“portable practice” would not be able to sustain similar paths to initiation for more 
people who are unable to move to Morocco for several years and devote long hours to 
participating in all-night ceremonies. 
I persist in using this term conversion if for no other reason than its resonance as 
a term also used to describe the conversion of currencies in financial trading. It calls to 
my mind capitalism, and it identifies transnational globalization, including not only the 
globalization of religion but also globalization as religion, as a function closely related 
to international capitalism and the international division of labor as underpinning the 
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capitalist world system. But Gnawa initiation is not understood by Moroccan Gnawa as 
a religious identity in any way comparable to their Muslim identity (El Hamel 2008). 
Thus a person can belong to a Gnawa group or leave it without affecting her or his 
status as a Muslim. In my admittedly limited understanding of Muslim theology, it 
appears to me that there is no true religion apart from Islam, which cannot be added to 
nor detracted from. From this perspective, Gnawa beliefs do not and cannot compare to 
Islam, which is a din or religion. As a result, any similarity between Gnawa conversion 
and orthodox religious conversion or reversion to Islam is just that, a formal similarity, 
with no necessary relationship implied at all. Nevertheless, it’s important to note that 
many scholars have favored just this kind of conclusion. In this tale of heterodoxy, 
Muslim practices and areas of expertise traveled from West Africa to North Africa, 
where they found a home in closely knit communities that practiced ecstatic possession 
trance in all-night ceremonies. Anthropologists and others have placed great emphasis 
on the mastery of challenging intellectual and musical knowledge, in addition to the 
proof of divine or spiritual election to positions of leadership (Chlyeh 1998, Paques 
1991, Lapassade 1982). In more recent conversions, newcomers are often sympathetic 
to learning more about Islam, and these heterodox African-Muslim beliefs and practices 
condition the accommodation. Even if newcomers don’t convert outright to Islam, or if 
they don’t need to, being already Muslim, a kind of conversion can often be observed 
(notwithstanding Hell’s rejection of that term to describe his own status). 
 
160 
In “The Anthropology of Conversion” (2003), Diane Austin-Broos favors such a 
loosening in the terms used to describe religious conversion. Austin-Broos argues that 
conversion must be disentangled from not only the sense of “absolute breach” but also 
from the sense of “syncretism.” She views conversion as a “form of passage, a ‘turning 
from and to’” (Austin-Broos 2003:1), in the process envisioning conversion as 
constituting a journey toward a destination. Austin-Broos cites Marshall Sahlins as 
connecting modern society to the market and Clifford Geertz as in turn connecting the 
market to religion (3). After reviewing historical trends toward the growth of “world 
religions,” Austin-Broos attributes this growth to the rise of modern nationalisms, both 
secular-democratic and ethnic-sectarian. But she notes a third historical trend as well: 
“Changes in the rendering of knowledge about the world, especially in the secular 
West” (7). Here, Austin-Broos focuses on the engagement with science, noting two 
means of engaging with science that are alternatives to secularism: Fundamentalism 
seeks authoritative truth, while the constrasting approach seeks a subjective truth. 
Others have called this second approach “postrationalist,” a term Austin-Broos rejects 
in favor of “romantic” (7-8). The term, she argues, covers both neopagan and New Age 
movements, as well as other efforts to re-enchant everyday life with imagination, 
experience, and emotion. Austin-Broos suggests that “in milieus infused with the 
West’s modernity,” which she terms “transcultural modernity,” a vacillation between 
these last two approaches characterizes most conversion experiences, in which converts 
negotiate a “quest for a habitus that embraces text but also accommodates their own 
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capacity for agency” (9). I argue that a version of such an approache might be (1) open 
and accessible to Moroccans, Muslims, and Gnawa, and (2) not incompatible with the 
continued status of such people as orthodox Muslims. The problematic in Morocco 
finds modern religious subjectivities presented with similar choices: “fundamentalism” 
(really, Salafi conservatism) and the “romantic” options offered by Sufism and its 
popular alternatives, including the paths of the Issawa, the Hamadsha, and the Gnawa, 
among others. 
But as I mentioned above, substantive and reliable models of the routes to 
initiation into these groups are not all that common outside of the professional offices of 
muqadma, shuwafa, and m’allim, offices that are confirmed upon being reached, not 
before. Throughout Paques (1975, 1978, 1991), Diouiri (1979), Lapassade (1982, 1997, 
1999), Hell (1999, 2002) and Kapchan (2007), we find regular attention to narratives of 
conversion by m’allims, muqaddimas, muqaddims, and shuwafas. The convert 
commonly has an interest in Gnawa music or is afflicted by a spirit. Often the person’s 
parents oppose his or her continued attendance at lilas. Sometimes a struggle with the 
m’allim requires that the person transfer training and allegiance to another m’allim in 
the same city. Finally, there is usually some supernatural sign or vision that attests to 
the election of the convert, often involving mediating spirits. After a physical sign of 
this transformation is expressed—e.g., after the rising m’allim takes up his master’s 
instrument and plays it, involuntarily, for the first time, the rising m’allim proclaims 
that the completion of his conversion path has been enacted. It is important to note that 
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several of these conversions involve cinema, the enactment of visual technologies of 
mass media. 
 
THE MEANING OF GNAWA STYLE 
In sharp contrast to a set of religious-like beliefs, Gnawa can also be seen as a 
subculture, particularly in Morocco. Over the past 20 years, Gnawa music has combined 
with sub-Saharan identification such that Gnawa has become the premier indigenous 
means by which young Moroccans can identify with Africa (Swedenburg ND). As 
young people come to learn Gnawa songs and play the instruments, they invest 
themselves in an identity that revolves around music and race. At the same time, they 
also often invest their money. True, world music industrial development (Taylor 1997; 
Frith 2000) has produced famous, world-class musicians of which few in the home 
country have ever heard: Jajouka in Morocco (Schuyler 2000) and Les Musiciens du Nil 
in Egypt (Zirbel 1999) are two examples of groups that have tremendous resonance in 
Europe and the United States but almost no currency at home. Despite the appearance 
of irrelevance, however, the impact of these groups is not nil. Even if members of the 
public are ignorant of these groups, local professional musicians and would-be 
professionals tend to be aware of and influenced by their examples, if not in terms of 
musical style then at least as a practical model  model of development to follow. As a 
result, alongside nationalist folkloric impulses toward music development, the world 
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music industry has also influenced some local valuation of folk music and local 
attempts at commoditization (Callen 2006). 
Particularly since the 1990s, Gnawa music has become globalized and has 
returned to Morocco for many reasons, some of them contradictory. By all means, 
government sponsorship for the festival accounts for some of the genre’s explosive 
growth. At the same time, though, to account for high youth enthusiasm for the festival 
we might look to popular reaction against European exclusion on one hand, and 
governmental and Islamist browbeating on the other. On the governmental side, in 
2003, 14 young heavy metal artists and fans were arrested at a concert in Casablanca 
and accused of Satanism. Three were sentenced to prison terms. (See Callen 2006 for a 
full discussion.) These fans listened to heavy metal, not Gnawa or reggae music, but the 
message resonates for Moroccan youth that participating in a musical subculture can be 
a politically charged act. The idea that a government might support some youth musical 
movements while simultaneously opposing others should not surprise those with a basic 
assumption of the diffusion of power within a single governing entity (Foucault 
1977)—one governmental impulse seeks to exclude and denounce youth action, while 
another seeks to co-opt it and incorporate into state regimes of signification. In contrast, 
on the Islamist side, just prior to and during the Essaouira festival, I observed that 
conservative and religious newspapers regularly ran editorials that denounced it as a 
time of drunkenness and debauchery as well as a likely site for Israeli infiltration of 
Moroccan society and the Zionist seduction of the nation’s youth. This unsupported 
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rumor may have had its beginning in the fact that Essaouira has a sizable and influential 
Jewish population whose most prominent member, Andre Azoulay, is special counselor 
to the king and a patron of the festival. Nevertheless, continued attendance at the 
festival and interest in Gnawa styles remained an act of positioning that could possibly 
have led toward identification with Africa and the African diaspora. 
But whether through governmental patronage or through popular enthusiasm, 
Gnawa music has become one of the premier contributions of Morocco to global 
popular culture. As a result, identifying with Gnawa music, whether through purchasing 
recordings or going to concerts, has become a common thing for young Moroccans to 
do. As such, it is a subcultural style, a modern identity by which youth define 
themselves through the products they purchase. Newcomers are encouraged to spend 
their time and money learning more about Gnawa—purchasing CDs and instruments, 
learning the names, faces, and distinctive affectations of the best known m’allims, and 
using clothing items and accessories that identify the person as a Gnawi or Gnawiyya. 
 
THREE CONVERSION NARRATIVES 
Thus we have people like Liz, Ahmad, and Muhammad (names have been 
changed) and their respective conversion narratives, narratives that are nevertheless not 
conventional at all. Liz turned up in Tangier in 2006 after spending several weeks in the 
Sahara Desert and the Atlas Mountains. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, Liz had opened a 
small kiosk for massage therapy four years before, after about 10 years of working as a 
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massage therapist. The success of this kiosk led Liz to open a second kiosk, and Liz 
suddenly found herself a successful small-business owner in need of a vacation. In 2003 
she had given a massage to Randy Weston, a jazz pianist who has played with Gnawa 
musicians for decades, prior to one of his concerts in Ann Arbor. During the massage 
she had asked him about Morocco. He urged her to go visit, and when she got to 
Tangier, he told her, she should go see Abdellah El Gourd at Dar Gnawa. By this point 
Liz had spent several weeks in the Sahara and the Atlas, working her way north. After 
spending a couple of days talking, drumming and playing at Dar Gnawa, Liz liked what 
she had heard. She asked about the music, and I recommended some artists whose 
albums were available in the United States. But she was still unsure how to proceed: 
“What can I do now? Are there any Gnawa back in Ann Arbor or in Michigan?” 
Abdellah replied, “You! You’re in Michigan, and you’re a Gnawiyya.” I felt like I had 
just witnessed a benediction or a commissioning. 
I must admit that it is a bit of a stretch to consider this a conventional 
conversion. Beyond purchasing some music and playing her ginbri, Liz did not choose 
to pursue Gnawa spirituality on her own in Michigan. In particular, she later told me, 
practicing the ginbri had caused her wrist pain. But the link between music and 
spirituality, altough a very fine one, can also be very strong. Her interest and 
commitment were genuine. But can a religious sociality based on such fleeting 
encounters really have an impact? Austin-Broos’ conclusions on the future of 
conversion seem to confirm that it’s possible, not only among more “traditional” 
 
166 
converts, but also among those of a more ephemeral nature. Speaking of the “romantic” 
converts, Austin-Broos argues that they “quest for a habitus that embraces texts but also 
accommodates their own capacity for agency. This perhaps is the mark of a 
transcultural modernity that now informs most of the passages involved in conversion” 
(Austin-Broos 2003:9, emphasis added). Articulating subjective experiences of this kind 
of transcultural modernity is one of my primary concerns here, where we can see Liz 
not only expressing interest in taking an active role not only in defining her spirituality, 
but also in embracing the very particular texts, discourses, and practices of Gnawa 
spirituality. 
If Liz’s conversion story is a bit unusual, Ahmad’s story is more typical. The 
son of a famous Gnawa dancer who belongs to the troupe of a Gnawa m’allim in Rabat, 
Ahmad was one of the principal dancers in Abdellah’s troupe. A fixture at Dar Gnawa 
jam sessions, Ahmad usually wore a mix of hip-hop and Italian-style clothing, and he 
shopped judiciously for rare CDs of Gnawa m’allims, a difficult task: Not only are most 
CDs pirated, but most Gnawa CDs also sustain a random and purely arbitrary 
relationship between the performer advertised on the cover and the music included on 
the disk. Purchasing a CD, then, became an enterprise in judgment and discovery. One 
had to sit in a sales kiosk and listen to CD after CD, seeking to identify a particular 
Gnawa m’allim purely on the basis of auditory clues of his voice, unique style, and 
conventional repertoire. During the Gnawa festival one of the younger members of the 
troupe came to the salon one day carrying a CD he had bought because it featured the 
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picture of rare m’allim. After listening to it on my laptop, though, Ahmad judged it to 
be another copy of one of the volumes of Hmida Boussou’s lila recordings (the same 
recordings I had recommended to Liz), and the younger member was playfully chided 
for not scrutinizing the content more closely before he bought it.  
Ahmad’s interests extended, however, to other areas of consumption and 
identification. I had procured a souvenir bag at the festival, and upon my return to 
Tangier I used it to hold my notebook, pens, and articles and books. At the festival, 
Abdellah had received a “packet” that included the souvenir tote bag. He had given to 
me in private as a gift—none of the members of the troupe knew that he had given it to 
me, since he was concerned about fairness. In retrospect, I am even more honored, since 
the fact that they were they might have been jealous signifies to me that I was 
considered one of them. But at the time it seemed natural that Abdellah would be 
concerned, and I told the others that I had bought it—I had seen them on sale and knew 
what they cost. In Tangier I carried the GNAOUA bag on my shoulder, but I hesitated 
to hold it with the logo facing outward, since I thought that would identify me as a 
tourist and as a potential “mark” for the legion guides and hucksters of the madina. It 
didn’t make any difference—they persisted in yelling at me and pursuing me the entire 
period of my stay. But my reticence offended Ahmad. He felt like I was hiding my 
identification with the Gnawa. He strongly urged me to wear the bag with the 
“GNAOUA” logo facing outward, an act that would identify me as a Gnawi along with 
the rest of them. 
 
168 
For Ahmad, identifying with the Gnawa involved, in part, purchasing and 
displaying goods. This was a bit mystifying to older Moroccans, but seemed to make 
perfect sense to those of a younger generation, like the young man I saw a few weeks 
later. He was sitting in Tangier’s famous Cafe de Paris wearing a dark blue T-shirt with 
a Nike “swoop” symbol on the left side of his chest, up next to his shoulder. On the 
right was the “Berber Z” (Silverstein 2004)—a bold vertical line intersected at the top 
and bottom with inverted half-circles. The man was wearing his ethnic identity literally 
“on his sleeve.” Simultaneously, he was equating this marker of Berber ethnicity with 
one of the most recognizable commercial logos on the planet. This extension of logos 
resulted in sectarian and ethnic identity becoming iconicized (Silverstein 2004). 
Meanwhile, the assertion that these identities constituted “intellectual property” 
(Shaviro 2003) established them as cultural elements that could be sold, purchased, and 
otherwise “possesed” (Kapchan 2007). 
My third and final example is Muhammad, a young man from Paris. He looked 
like a typical Parisian of West African heritage—tall and slender, with dark skin and a 
shaved head—but his ancestry was not from Senegal or Mali; instead, Muhammad’s 
father was from Wahran (Oran), Algeria, and his mother from Oujda, across the border 
in eastern Morocco. His first language was French. It is important that his father was 
Algerian-born under French rule, since this fact formed the basis of his claim to French 
nationality (Silverstein 2004). Muhammad spoke Arabic (although he was not literate in 
Arabic) in addition to English and Spanish. He was about 35. When his mother had died 
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about ten years before, he said, he had visited her home in Oujda and had learned from 
his grandmother that his grandfather had been a Gnawa m’allim. His interest piqued, he 
had attended a Paris concert that Abdellah had played in 1999 with jazz saxophonist 
Archie Shepp to learn more about Gnawa music. He had approached Abdellah after the 
concert and had talked with him, and they became friends. Afterwards, whenever 
Abdellah played Paris or Lyon, Muhammad would clear out his schedule as much as 
possible to spend time talking with him. In 2006 he had saved up to come to Tangier for 
a week, and he was spending every moment possible with Abdellah and the others at 
Dar Gnawa. Two years previously he had traveled to Cuba and Haiti, where he learned 
a lot about Haitian Vodou and Cuban Santeria, both of which share features with 
Gnawa. Muhammad enthusiastically shared with me his experiences in the Caribbean. 
He was also interested in the music of the Roma people (“gypsies”). One evening, 
Muhammad was facing his return to Paris. His time had been too short, and it was clear 
he didn’t want to leave. Nevertheless, he had a wife and daughter back in Paris, and a 
really good job at one of the best bookstores in France, he told me. 
That evening, Muhammad confided in me something Abdellah had told him that 
morning: “Gnawa is not a profession. Get a career, take care of your family, and do 
Gnawa on the side.” In other words, Gnawa is a part-time activity that should not be 
confused with a profession. The second half of Kapchan’s Traveling Spirit Masters 
(2007) is a response to the fact that the “Gnawa have become professionalized and are 
aware that their very identity is a commodity” (146). This is a necessary movement for 
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the Gnawa m’allims to make. It might not seem unlike that someone like a m’allim, 
who is already accustomed to playing for an audience and receiving payment for that 
performance, to become a professional musician. Nevertheless, it is even more likely 
that a professional musician who is well versed in Moroccan folk styles should be able 
to incorporate Gnawa songs and styles into his or her repertoire and perform as a 
Gnawa musician. Ever since the 1970s, when Gnawa songs first began to be played on 
stage, certain of them, particularly from the opening fraja suite, have become 
“standards,” so to speak—“Youbadi” and “Sandiyya,” for example, are two that I’ve 
heard in almost every Gnawa concert I’ve attended, and at the Essaouira Festival in 
2006, I witnessed a crowd of thousands singing along to both those songs. They had 
entered the popular imagination. With such a widely known popular repertoire, how do 
Gnawa m’allims maintain social control over its performance? One thing keeping 
Gnawa m’allims from being swamped by a wave of professional musicians is by 
keeping a continued central postion for trance and specialized knowledge of the spirits 
within the performance—in other words, its local, particular significance. The vital 
importance of the m’allim to would-be converts is evident in Muhammad’s costly 
apprenticeship to Abdellah. Muhammad was looking for more than a technical 
introduction to Gnawa style; instead, like Liz, Muhammad was seeking spiritual leading 
and training in the same particular texts, discourses, and practices of Gnawa spirituality. 
Despite such quests, these very texts, discourses, and practices are in the process 
of themselves being transformed, as I demonstrate below. Moreover, such a milieu of 
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instant identities, ethnic logos, and summer-holiday initiations calls to my mind popular 
culture. In a sense, Gnawa is a Moroccan subculture seeking to become globalized, and 
it lives through practices of consumption and circulation. The transformation here 
comes when money is exchanged for commodity. This is a simple metamorphosis or 
shift, common enough in Moroccan cosmology as the shift from spirit to flesh, from 
blood to milk, or from night to day. My additional point here is to open the space 
further and consider not only transformation but also conversion. 
 
A FOURTH CONVERSION 
 The fact of subcultural identification has been noted, but what of the process 
whereby a person comes to identify himself or herself with a group? I’m interested in 
this process because it sometimes involves a “leap to faith” (Kierkegaard 1980), a 
conscious re-orientation toward a group or identity. This topic is particularly interesting 
to me because, like many anthropologists, I often find myself defending the topic of my 
study to non-anthropologists in the academy and it other social circles. The first time I 
lived in Ghana not as the child of missionaries but rather as a graduate student in 
anthropology researching the Lebanese community in Accra, I can remember going to 
the University of Ghana to hunt up sources in one of the libraries. 
I had been on the historic and beautiful Legon campus dozens of times with my 
parents or with friends, but this time I was identified solely as a foreign researcher. I 
struck up a conversation with another academic in the library. He asked what I was 
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doing there, but when I told him my topic, he laughed out loud. It was a not a friendly 
laugh. He wondered why I wasn’t studying a more useful topic and a more appropriate 
community than a group that was, in his opinion and the opinion of many Ghanaians, at 
best a nuisance and a continued reminder of Ghana’s neocolonial legacy (Nkrumah 
1966) and at worst, alternatively, a parasitic capitalist caste or a corrupt population of 
powerful and greedy foreigners. In fact, even among my Ghanaian friends, the most 
charitable attitude I could elicit concerning the Lebanese was that they were “very 
cooperative among themselves”—in other words, insular and exploitive. In contrast to 
these stereotypes, I found the Lebanese in Ghana to be a rich and varied community 
filled with people who integrated in remarkable ways into Ghanaian society. However, 
this experience of meeting resistance to my research topic has continued to be repeated 
over the years, in the United States as in Ghana and Morocco, leading to elevated voices 
and impassioned defenses.  
For example, in Tangier I sustained a months-long conversation with a friend 
who worked as a waiter at one of the cafes I frequented. During this time I tried to 
convince him that the Gnawa were anything more than low-class, second-rate hucksters. 
Through these experiences, I found that identifying publicly with the group I was 
studying was a bit of a trial by fire. The strength of my identification reinforced itself 
through each repeated defense of that identification. I began to be interested in the 
process by which people come to identify themselves with others, forging bonds of 
solidarity. This is particularly important for Moroccan youth, and even more so for 
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Gnawa youth who choose to identify with a group that faces opposition from various 
factions in Moroccan society whether on the basis of class, piety, or political 
commitment.  
 My own conversion to Gnawa identity included a conscious orientation to 
publicly identify myself with the Gnawa, but I did not go so far as to identify as a 
Gnawa, which seemed to me to imply a certain level of personal, emotional, even 
spiritual commitment that I lacked the will to reach. This did not spring from a lack of 
faith—I had no problem believing in the existence of God, the saints, and the spirits. 
Perhaps they never spoke to me, but I never doubted that they could have. Instead, I 
never had any heightened consciousness or feelings of fear or dread during any of the 
lilas I attended. My lack of a possessing spirit limited my potential for becoming a 
Gnawa in the religious sense. In the subcultural, commercial sense, though, I became a 
Gnawa through my consumption patterns. 
 My lack of a possession spirit was confirmed through my exposure to the full 
range of songs, rhythms, scents, and tastes associated with the mluk. I attended 
numerous tourist lilas during the Essaouira festival, and I attended the beginning of an 
“authentic” tourist lila in Marrakech in the days following the festival. In Fes in 2001, I 
attended a “daytime lila,” a shortened possession ceremony that took place in the 
afternoon and early evening. In Tangier, I managed to attend only one of the three lilas 
held at Dar Gnawa while I was there (Abdellah El Gourd performed at several other 
lilas in the neighboring towns of Asila, Tetouan, and Chefchaouan during this time as 
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well). The lila I attended came late in my stay, just a few weeks before I was to leave. It 
was sandwiched in between two international trips that Abdellah had planned. It was 
just as I had come to expect—music, possession, ritual meals, blessings, prayers, 
conviviality—with three major unexpected features. 
 First, I did not expect that it would be so much fun. The other lilas I had 
attended had been with people I didn’t know, or didn’t know well. But this lila was 
being conducted by friends whom I had come to know well and admire greatly. My 
relationship with those conducting the lila lent a particular spirit of joy to the 
experience. The first night, Abdellah suggested that I sit in the small “smoking” room 
off the main space. The older men and senior adepts sat in an alcove behind the 
musicians, who faced the main floor, slightly elevated. The women sat in the private 
alcove opposite the men and the musicians. We young men were off to the side in a 
small room that connected to the main space through a narrow doorway. This room also 
had a window with a shutter between it and the entryway, a narrow hallway that, during 
the lila, was always filled with children from the street outside. I sat with the young men 
and smoked cigarettes incessantly (they smoked other substances incessantly). On 
occasion one of the musicians would cycle through during a lull in the ceremony for a 
smoke break. We watched and chatted and told stories, and occasionally one of the 




 Second, it was much more expensive than I had been led to expect. In the weeks 
leading up to the lila I had sat with Abdellah while he negotiated with the woman who 
was holding the lila. She haggled about the price. I had never seen Abdellah so meek 
and respectful around a woman—he tended to be reserved and a bit cold around them, 
and the woman was very insistent, loud, boisterous, and even pushy as she tried to get a 
better deal. Abdellah was adamant, though—he needed 5,000 dirhams up front (over 
$500) to divide among the musicians, in addition to the cost of the food, soft drinks, 
incense, and other expenses. I was also present when he distributed that money among 
the musicians—it is possible that he did not keep a portion for himself. In any case, all 
negotiations were transparent and open to anyone who happened to be present at Dar 
Gnawa that day. During the lila itself, I was expecting to pay 10 dirhams for each 
blessing—at the daytime ceremony in Fes, I had paid with a 5-dirham coin once—it 
was all I had left—and everyone had laughed good-naturedly at me. But I quickly 
realized that the expected donation at Dar Gnawa was 20 dirhams for each blessing. 
 Third and finally, the only heightened emotion I felt during the lila was anger. 
On the third and final night, I was still sitting in the smoking room. Abdellah had 
invited me to sit with the men (perhaps feeling that my experience needed variety), but I 
told him I was more comfortable sitting with the young men—there were chairs in the 
room, but in the alcove, the older men sat on cushions on the floor, and my back had 
been hurting, so I remained with the young men. One of these was a young man with 
Down syndrome. He was possessed by a spirit, and he danced eagerly when his suite 
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was being played. Most of the time, though, he suffered a lot of teasing. He was a bit 
young to be sitting with us—we were all in our twenties and thirties, and he appeared to 
be a teenager. But it was clear that he had been placed there to keep him out of trouble. 
Still, the kids out in the entryway were poking sticks and straws through cracks in the 
window’s shutters, in front of which this young man was sitting. He kept reacting 
angrily and telling them to stop, but they ignored him. Finally, he opened the shutter 
and started hitting at their hands. They grabbed his arm and pulled it through the 
window and tried to close it on his arm. He was struggling and trying to keep from 
yelling, since the ceremony was going on in the next room. I watched all this with a 
growing sense that someone should do something. In retrospect, I should have 
suggested that he trade places with me. However, when one of the boys took out a 
lighter and started burning the young man’s arm, I got angry. The young man with 
Down syndrome was writhing in pain and screaming, but the loud music was drowning 
him out and nobody could hear him in the pre-dawn dark. I leapt up, crossed the room, 
yanked his arm back in the window, and slammed the shutter on the hands of his 
tormentors, hissing at them to stop.  
Needless to say, I got the attention of everyone in the little room, and even some 
of those in the main room saw what I did. Word got to Abdellah, who was playing at the 
time. When the song was over he came back into the room and asked me what had 
happened. When I told him, he looked very sad. “We almost made it through the whole 
lila without any problems,” he said sadly. He seemed to be disappointed that I hadn’t 
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handled it with more tact and subtlety. I felt bad too, and I apologized when I saw him 
that evening, but he just smiled and said I shouldn’t worry: Sometimes, bad things 
happen. 
My conversion began slowly. I did not realize how closely I identified with the 
Gnawa until Ahmad urged so strongly me to carry my bag with the logo facing outward. 
When he did so, I recognized that my actions were being watched, and that he thought I 
was ashamed of being identified with them. I could demonstrate my conversion with the 
display of a commodity. 
 
SPIRITUAL COMMODITY 
 How does commoditization itself come to be naturalized within a Gnawa pop-
cultural context? It does so in the resolution in tensions between Gnawa as religious 
initiation and Gnawa as global commodity. On the one hand, within the larger cultural 
movements of Nass al-Ghiwane and the Essaouira festival, Gnawa music has become 
largely divorced from the control of the m’allims. On the other hand, though, the 
m’allims and the initiatory tendency they represent continue to wield some power and 
authority. This continued influence is important because basic Gnawa values involve a 
kind of fundamental egalitarianism that is sometimes at odds with capitalism, and this 
egalitarianism continues to imbue subcultural Gnawa identifications with a leftist, 
anticapitalist structure of feeling (Williams 1977), even as the “business” end of the 
industry becomes quite firmly lodged in commoditized relations of exchange. I should 
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note that I am using egalitarian here in a political sense, not an economic sense, and in 
particularly emphasizing equality in the autonomy of each m’allim. As I understood it 
from Abdellah, Gnawa ta’ifas are not hierarchically organized among themselves, and 
each Gnawa m’allim is considered to be basically equal to every other. That was why he 
refused to judge another m’allim. When the payments for the festival were announced, 
Abdellah could recognize that some m’allims were more successful than others and thus 
more valuable to the festival, but he seemed to consider the money paid to each m’allim 
to attend should have reflected the equality in status to which each m’allim should have 
access. Below, I attempt first to demonstrate a vaguely egalitarian impulse within 
Gnawa subculture with an anecdote about the Essaouira festival. Second, I illustrate the 
consequences of the tension between initiatory and subcultural conversion in the 
example of Hassan Hakmoun, the only fully professional Gnawa musician. 
 Abdellah had not been invited to the Essaouira festival for several years. In the 
Spring of 2006, however, he told me that he had detected that the organizers were 
putting out feelers to gauge whether he would be able to come. I sat with him and 
observed as he received phone calls and visitors to see if he would be open to returning 
this year. He initially put them off and tried to negotiate, refusing to commit until he 
had better knowledge, even though (as he later discovered) the terms were already set. 
In this sense, the marketplace of the Essaouira festival was already “prix fixe,” with no 
space for open-ended negotiation (Kapchan 1996). Gnawa troupes were brought in from 
across the country to open on the main stages, while the largest draws headlined. The 
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troupes that were chosen to play the main stages were those that had toured 
internationally, that knew how to command a crowd of 10,000 and keep to a tight 
schedule. Some Gnawa troupes, however, were invited only to play “lilas”—all-night, 
fully acoustic sets that showcased the ritual repertoires of their respective regional 
traditions. These stages were smaller and less prestigious, and the troupes playing them 
were paid less. But Abdellah was shocked to learn how much less they were being paid. 
 After the offers were made and the contracts signed, the m’allims started calling 
around to each other to report how much they were earning or had heard that others 
were earning. Abdellah had a terrible look on his face as he told me how much one 
small, little-known group from southern Morocco was making—only Dh7,000, or 
around US$600. Some troupes playing the main stages made up to Dh26,000, he said 
(over US$2,000). Dar Gnawa was to get Dh14,000, well over US$1,000. When I heard 
the news, I remarked that the amounts seemed pretty fair to me for a week’s pay, given 
that the official Moroccan minimum wage was around Dh90/day, and the unofficial one 
for unskilled laborers was Dh20/day. Abdellah looked disapprovingly at me and stated 
that it wasn’t much to divide equally between seven people. Seven was the limit that the 
festival would pay for in terms of transportation and per diem allowance. Dar Gnawa 
took eight, adding an outsider who had previously worked out an arrangement with the 
troupe but whose presence had to be covered out of their share. I had not considered 
that the total would be divided equally. I had thought that the troupe members would 
have a scale for remuneration, depending on age, experience, and commitment to the 
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troupe. I felt ashamed that I had assumed this. But Abdellah added more: Not only 
would the members would have little to show from their week in Essaouira, but those 
with jobs would also have to take unpaid leave from their jobs. The member with the 
best job, one of the troupe’s leaders, worked as a custodian at the Tangier port. He 
worked long hours mopping and cleaning for little pay, but as a government job it was 
secure and had good benefits. He already took off extended time each summer touring 
with Abdellah, and he was concerned that he not ask his superiors for more time off. I 
relate these details not to discuss the festival organizers’ strategies for responding to a 
variety of pressures from suppliers, performers, underwriters, and advertisers. Rather, I 
would like to draw attention to the alarmed reactions of the Gnawa to the social 
stratification and inequality inherent under capitalist value systems. 
 In a well-supported and sophisticated series of arguments, Bertrand Hell (2002) 
observes that the initiatory Gnawa identity, Gnawa of the ta’ifa, once depended on a gift 
economy that involved spiritual payments between humans and spirits. This economy 
has already disappeared. But until around 10 years ago, the primary Gnawa initiates 
(musicians and other spiritual professionals) played a limited mediating role in this 
economy, and they benefited from it to a greater or, much more usually, to a lesser 
extent. Many of the scholars writing about the Gnawa have commented on the reduced 
lifestyles of some of the greatest Gnawa m’allims—extremely modest homes, 
widespread illiteracy, and a general lack of prospects for the upward mobility of their 
family members (Hell 2002, Kapchan 2007, Swedenburg ND). Within this context, 
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Abdellah El Gourd of Dar Gnawa was an exception that proved the rule—a working-
class technical education, literate in four languages, with his family occupying a single, 
historical structure. But the source of his stable income, namely a modest pension from 
the US government as a reward for twenty-six and one half years of labor, derived from 
non-Gnawa sources. Abdellah did not need to conduct all-night ceremonies for the 
money, although he conducted lilas as was fitting to his convenience and disposition, 
and he charged a typical rate befitting his high stature within the Gnawa community of 
Tangier. In contrast, as Hell has documented, those m’allims who seek to support 
themselves at a level beyond subsistence as professional spiritual workers have found 
themselves depending more and more on commoditized exchanges through the use of 
cash in non-symbolic transactions (Hell 2007). This process has come about in parallel 
with the rise of Gnawa subcultures. 
 As these cash exchanges have become more and more common, exclusively 
initiatory Gnawa identification has become increasingly rare. Bertrand Hell (2002) 
identifies the work of Aisha Qandisha, the camel-footed she-demon who is also a 
possessing spirit well known to Gnawa, with the transition from a gift economy to a 
monetary economy. Hell recognizes this transition in the monetization of the ceremony. 
As the full ceremony has become more and more expensive, a truncated version has 
become more common, which has resulted in the loss of entire families of spirits (Hell 
2002). I discovered a second feature in Tangier—the rise of the “private lila.” 
According to Abdellah, in 2006 some m’allims in Tangier were conducting lilas that 
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were limited only to a single guest list, such that the only ones present to share in the 
ritual meal and other blessing would be those who could be expected to pay money. 
Abdellah said he was not on good terms with these m’allims, since such a practice went 
against his understanding of the lila, which is required to begin in a public space with an 
invitation to all adepts within hearing to attend if they wish, no matter if they can pay or 
not. For example, the young man at Dar Gnawa had Down syndrome and clearly could 
not pay anything, yet he had a place there by virtue of his possession and his belonging 
to the taifa. Any sense of “pay to play” would have been roundly dismissed by members 
of the community. In addition to these innovations within the lila, the space of 
possession has also become desacralized in the transition from ceremonial space to 
concert hall. When I asked Abdellah about these shifts, he conceded that he could not 
recognize Gnawa practice today. “What we knew as Gnawa is over,” he told me. In 
other words, the spirit of capitalism has overthrown the Gnawa ethic of spiritual 
“work.” 
This is not a sustainable capitalism, however. The commoditization of Gnawa 
culture has not resulted in social reproducibility. I confirmed the fact with numerous 
Gnawa practitioners and interested observers: There is only one fully professional 
Gnawa musician, and his name is Hassan Hakmoun. Hakmoun came to the United 
States as a teenager. His mother had been a shuwafa with ties to Gnawa communities, 
and he had learned to play ginbri as a child in Marrakech (Kapchan 2007). After 
moving to New York, Hakmoun developed a bourgeoning career as a professional 
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musician. He has had albums reviewed in the New York Times and Rolling Stone. He 
never initiated into a Gnawa ta’ifa, or if he did, his initiation did not result in his ability 
to defend himself effectively against Gnawa who challenge that he lacks tagnawit, 
“Gnawa-ness” or authenticity (Kapchan 2007). My point here is not to debate 
Hakmoun’s authenticity. In fact, as Kapchan points out, any perceived lack of 
authenticity does not reduce his being celebrated as  “cultural pop icon and a Gnawi” by 
Moroccan audiences (Kapchan 2007:139). He is well known among urban Moroccan 
youth. Instead, I wish to draw attention to his position apart from the m’allims and other 
initiatory professionals, and his simultaneous success in the pop market. This state of 
affairs would seem to argue against the conclusion that initiatory conversion has some 
relation with subcultural conversion. This is not necessarily the whole story, however. 
I sat in Dar Gnawa with Abdellah and several young men from the troupe and 
some visitors. We had been discussing Hakmoun because, on the CD player at the time, 
was an album I had supplied on which a Moroccan-German ginbri player and Gnawa 
popular performer, someone not unlike Hassan Hakmoun, was collaborating with a 
Cuban musician and several others, including members of a pop-Gnawa group. A 
Caribbean singer and a US rapper were also featured, and each sang or rapped long 
verbal passages. Singing about Aisha Qandisha, however, the Gnawa performer merely 
repeated the line Lalla Aisha jaya (“Lady Aisha comes”) numerous times, with no 
further lyric. Abdellah was disappointed: “Why isn’t he singing more? He just repeats a 
single line.” Abdellah considered this lyrical limitation to be a demonstration that 
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glaring deficiencies existed in the singer’s knowledge of Gnawa culture was limited—
“He doesn’t have the knowledge.” Knowledge here is ma’arifa, the specialized 
knowledge that a Gnawa initiate has about the spirits and their identities. This is no 
defense of orthodoxy—the m’allims are not policing knowledge by trying to maintain 
control over initiates from another ta’ifa. It is understood that each ta’ifa or town or 
region will have a specific corpus of knowledge concerning the names of the spirits, the 
songs played for each, the suite to which each belongs, the particular color, incense, and 
food associated with each, and the order in which each spirit would come in a typical 
ceremony. In other words, Abdellah is not disputing the content of the singer’s 
knowledge. Rather, he is point out its perceived lack. Indeed, discussing or even 
debating Gnawa knowledge is not uncommon among initiates—I spent many hours 
listening while members of Dar Gnawa debated the meaning or the content of Gnawa 
knowledge with minimal input from the m’allim. Abdellah’s presence manifested a 
light but necessary touch. Even at only Dh7,000 for a week’s labor, m’allims and the 
initiatory converts in their taifas remained necessary ingredients in the musical slurry at 
Essaouira—their presence authorized the proceedings and rendered small but valuable 
nuggets of authenticity from the boiling sluice box of commercial pop culture. 
Even as initiatory Gnawa identities were described as crumbling, popular 
Gnawa identities are ascendant. Such successes can be attributed to the efforts of the 
group’s leaders to make Gnawa identities more accessible, particularly through the 
consumption of commodities. This consumption comes through the production of 
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electronically mediated popular culture, which in turn derives from the development of 
a cultural economy based on information and the valuation of cultural heritage. 
Transformations in Gnawa identities have mirrored transformations in Moroccan 
society more generally, and in some cases even anticipated them. As a result, changes in 
Moroccan society, including changes in the religious landscape, reveal a particular 
engagement with globalization, particularly the trade in cultural identities. Attempts to 
control or determine the means by which newcomers can “convert” to a new identity 
reveal tensions within the contradictory paths that modernity has taken in Morocco 
within this racialized subculture. In the following chapter, I turn to the specifically 
musical basis for interaction between Gnawa practitioners and their would-be 





Chapter 5: Transposition in Performance 
 
“The speaking follows the music—it is the complement of the sentence. 
Musicians know the music. They must create a space before they jump into it. If 
the musicians respect one another, they will prepare one another to enter the 
space.” Abdellah El Gourd, 2006 
 
This chapter examines the process of transformation from the perspective of the 
aesthetics of musical performance. I examine how the process of transforming one’s 
foundational outlook can be seen as a kind of “transposition” (Csordas 2007). Upon 
encountering new modes, scales, timing sequences, etc., and deciding to participate, 
musicians tend to jump into the frame and begin the “work” of transforming their 
previous knowledge to meet the demands of the new performance context. In the same 
way, young people who have come to learn about Gnawa beliefs and practices through 
their attraction to the music often decide to participate in the life of the larger 
community. Gnawa social contexts are similarly participatory, and newcomers are 
invited to sit and chat with established members. As a result of this openness, 
newcomers are encouraged to bring their prior experiences to the table and make their 
own unique contributions. The resulting harmonies differ from what had previously 
obtained, even though intervals and contrasts are usually maintained.  
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The history of Blackness in Morocco should lead observers to expect that 
Gnawa would play a mediatory role between powerful competing forces. In order for 
the globalization of a religious form to occur successfully, its beliefs and practices must 
be made transposable. Gnawa play a central role in enabling transformations in the 
religious and music economy of Morocco necessary to achieve such transposability. 
Below, I suggest some of these transformations. I conclude that the musical metaphor of 
transposition is an apt description of how newcomers arrive at a new Gnawa sensibility. 
This is particularly the case for people who come from social backgrounds that are 
atypical for Gnawa troupes historically—Westerners, ethnically Arab Europeans, and 
Moroccans from social milieus that have not historically been sites of Gnawa 
recruitment.  
 
THE GRAMMAR OF COLLABORATION 
Abdellah, El Gourd, a m’allim or master of Gnawa music, was speaking with me 
in 2006. We had just returned to the northern tip of Morocco, Tangier, after traveling 
together down to the south of the country to attend a world music festival, the most 
popular domestic music festival, which features Gnawa music. Abdellah and his troupe 
had played one of the main stages with three non-Gnawa musicians: two from Paris—a 




The afternoon before the concert, Abdellah’s troupe, which is named Dar 
Gnawa or The House of Gnawa in honor of their home base in Tangier, had met with 
the three newcomers and had played with them for about an hour. Originally, the 
festival organizers had requested that Abdellah and his troupe arrive in Essaouira two 
days before the festival started so that the visiting musicians could have more time to 
practice with the Dar Gnawa troupe. Abdellah explained to me that he had to refuse 
their request because some of the troupe’s members had regular jobs that they couldn’t 
leave so abruptly. The festival organizers were interested in improving the quality of the 
collaborative performances, but the working-class musicians saw it as an attempt to get 
more work for the same “wages”—missing work hours in their regular jobs lost them 
income, the supplemental funds supplied by the festival already barely covered that loss 
of income. When we got back to Tangier, I asked Abdellah how the practice session had 
gone. He had told me that the musicians were all respectful. Over the years, I had 
spoken to other foreigners at the festival and asked them what Gnawa music and culture 
signified to them. I was interested to see whether he had also noted the low level of 
knowledge of Moroccan culture among tourists, and so I was eager to know what kinds 
of questions the musicians had asked Abdellah, and how he had spoken to them about 
Gnawa traditions. My eagerness showed, and Abdellah’s impatience did too. 
“The speaking follows the music,” he told me in English. In other words, that 
kind of interaction wasn’t important at that first meeting—it was merely the 
“complement of the sentence”—something that came about after the “work” of musical 
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collaboration had already taken place. Abdellah’s English was far more fluent than my 
Darija (Moroccan Arabic), and we also shared an interest in the grammar of Modern 
Standard Arabic. There are two kinds of clauses in MSA, the verbal clause (al-jumla al-
fa’liyya) and the nominal clause (al-jumla al-ismiyya). The verbal clause is formed 
much like a typical English verbal sentence, with a subject (faa’il), a verb (fa’l), and an 
object of the verb (maf’ul)—the only difference is that the subject and the verb are 
witched in order in Arabic: VSO instead of the English SVO. The terminology used to 
describe a nominal clause is very different in both languages. Arabic ordinarily drops 
the copula—it does not mark the equivalent of the “linking verb” (e.g., “is”), so there 
are typically just two key elements in the Arabic nominal clause: a subject (mubtada’) 
and a predicate (khabr). In the jumla fa’liyya the subject tends to be marked in 
nominative case (al-marfu’) and the object in accusative case (al-mansub), which also 
applies to a variety of other objects (objects of the preposition are in the genitive case 
[al-majrur]). In contrast, in the jumla ismiyya the subject and the predicate are both 
typically always in nominative case. For someone like Abdellah, who was already 
trained in Modern Standard Arabic and in Spanish when he learned English, it would 
make sense to identify as al-jumla al-ismiyya an English clause built around a copula. 
(Abdellah told me that, at the age of 19, he originally took the specialized test for his 
Voice of America position in Spanish, but the following year he was told that he would 
have to re-take it in English. He taught himself English in order to study English 
materials for the test and thus keep his job.) As it tends to be understood in English 
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grammar, such clauses do not operate as regular verbal sentences. Instead, as in MSA, 
in such sentences both the subject and the predicate remain in nominative case. Thus, 
“He is I” is preferred instead of “He is me.” The first noun (here, “he”) is the subject, 
while the second noun (here, “I”) would probably have been called in Abdellah’s 
English grammar textbooks a “predicate noun” or more generally the “subject 
complement.” 
As a result, we might interpret this statement to be saying that talking about 
music is less important than making music, which he places in the subject position. This 
seems to be a good thing for a musician to argue, and Abdellah is committed to 
participation. When I spent time at Dar Gnawa, much more time was spent making 
music than talking about it. Early on in my time there, as I sat and appreciated their 
music, I felt insecure about joining in, since I’m not proficient on any instrument. At 
one point Abdellah told emphatically me to “Do something! Clap if that’s all you can 
do” because it bothered him that I was merely appreciating or spectating and not 
participating. Afterwards, I clapped, and I even beat on a drum a few times. But I 
wonder if we can’t push his meaning beyond a bias toward participation to take into 
account the fact that Abdellah chose to use the language of the static, conventional, and 
restricted jumla ismiyya to describe such collaborative exercises that were basically on-
stage jam sessions. Would he have used the terminology of a jumla fa’liyya—dynamic, 
strong, vivid—to describe the music he produced with long-time collaborators like 
Archie Shepp and Randy Weston? He often spoke proudly of their respective 
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repertoires—the conventional musical idioms he used when playing with Shepp versus 
contrasting ones he used when playing with Weston, idioms that had developed over 
years of playing together, even decades in the case of Weston. Abdellah appeared less 
able to articulate details about his playing in the fleeting interactions at the festival. 
And yet Abdellah didn’t dismiss the collaboration completely. At first, what was 
key was the interaction itself, the play of timing and coordination among participants 
within a sequentially ordered performance. “Musicians know the music,” he said—they 
know their own bodies and capabilities. This on-stage performance is something being 
newly created, which is why “they must create a space before they jump into it.” They 
have to trust one other, to catch and carry and rely on one another. “If the musicians 
respect one another, they will prepare one another to enter the space.” The idea that 
musical performance can be compared to a conversation is not new. Accepting that 
performance is essentially a communicative phenomenon (Bauman 1984), Monson’s 
(1996) groundbreaking work on improvisation and interaction in jazz convincingly 
demonstrates that “jazz can be seen as a musical language, improvisation as musical 
conversation, and good improvisation as talking or ‘saying something’” (1996:73). 
Further, the dialogic nature of African-derived musics lends them particularly well to 
conversation analysis (Berliner 1999). The onstage interaction between Gnawa and non-
Gnawa is dialogic, with the musicians producing a co-constructed “narrative” of sorts 
(Kapchan 1996, 2007; Keil & Feld 1994) in which “participatory discrepancies” (Keil 
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1995, 1994) serve as a means by which “repair” sequences within the narrative can lead 
to a closer understanding of the process of co-construction (Monson 1996). 
Needless to say, the space that is being created is hybrid, multiple, and new; 
nevertheless, there still remain questions of ownership and belonging: To whom does 
this performance space belong? How is it appropriated or allocated? This was a point of 
contention for Abdellah. This was only his second invitation to Essaouira in nine years. 
The first time he had gone was back in the 1990s. He told me that at that time he had 
been giving an interview to a journalist and had gone “off-script”: When asked about 
the Gnawa music being played, he replied that it wasn’t Gnawa music. When pushed to 
amplify, he gave his honest opinion that the music being played on stage was world 
music or pop music, not Gnawa music. He told me that he later realized that this 
statement had embarrassed the festival organizers. But given that Gnawa performers 
and non-Gnawa performers were sharing the stage, and the Gnawa performers were far 
more familiar with the pop and jazz styles of the visitors than vice versa, is there any 
way that the Essaouira stage can be considered a Gnawa space? I think that it can, for 
exactly that reason. Even though the music being produced was a hybrid style, in the 
musical exchange the more dominant position was held the Gnawa performers. It’s true 
that they were being required to transpose their music, but they had a better idea of what 
lay before them, what they were transposing to, than the visitors, many of whom were 
playing catch-up. This asymmetry results from the fact that Western styles and genres 
are freely available and well-known in Morocco, whereas Moroccan music exists in the 
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West only in specialty stores in large urban centers, in manipulated, fragmentary 
“slices” of sound (on movie soundtracks, for example), or on the Internet on French- or 
Arabic-language sites that might be difficult for some Americans and Europeans to 
navigate. In contrast, American and European pop get daily radio play in Morocco, and 
cassettes and CDs are available for purchase in even the smallest towns. 
 
TRANSPOSITION OF IDENTITIES 
The space of performance in Gnawa ritual is a sacred space dedicated at the 
beginning of an all-night lila ceremony to the performance of spirit possession. It is 
somewhat contradictory that a religious form so particular and restricted should be 
connected with a musical style that crosses boundaries so freely (Kapchan 2007). 
Thomas Csordas (2007) has recently proposed that two aspects of religions seem to 
favor their universal appeal: portable practice and transposable message. By portable 
practice he intends that the rites are easily learned and that those who perform them do 
not need to commit to an ideological or institutional apparatus. Moreover, there is little 
esoteric knowledge to be mastered, and what knowledge exists is not tied to a specific 
cultural context. By transposable message, Csordas speaks to the capacity for its 
message to be transformed to other cultural contexts and universalized to all: “The basis 
of appeal contained in religious tenets, premises, or promises can find footing across a 
diversity of linguistic and cultural settings” (Csordas 2007:261). Csordas defines 
religion as “phenomenologically predicated on and culturally elaborated from a 
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primordial sense of alterity or otherness... an elementary structure of embodied 
existence” (261). Such a technical and objective definition of religion is not really 
suitable for my project, but I hope that we can still find some fruitful moments of 
creative parallelism between Csordas’ subject and my own. From a Moroccan Muslim 
perspective, Gnawa beliefs and practices are not religious, although they are associated 
with spiritual things. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a religious scholar, the 
Gnawa lila might look like a religious ritual. So we can argue that the problem with the 
Gnawa lila is that while its message is quite transposable, its practice is certainly not 
portable, at least not in the fullest undertaking of the ritual. 
At the most basic, the Gnawa message might be summed up in the idea that we 
can maintain an uneasy but ultimately sustainable relationship with the spirits through 
trance (Kapchan 2007), a relationship that is marked, moreover, less by bitterness and 
death than by sweetness and life (Hell ND), even as a feeling of dread and loss remains 
palpable (Swedenburg ND, Fuson 2001). Its practice, however, is not portable without a 
strong tolerance for animal sacrifice, a long-term commitment to apprenticeship, and a 
schedule that is flexible enough to sustain long periods of rituals. Professionals who 
officiate the ceremonies spend years gaining the necessary knowledge, which is difficult 
to learn and quite extensive for non-Moroccans and non-Muslims. Gnawa practice writ 
large is necessarily linked to Moroccan “popular religion,” particularly with its 
emphasis on blood sacrifice and conventions of ecstatic ritualized performance that can 
involve cutting, burning, and poisoning oneself. Finally, the full ceremony can take two 
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long nights. These requirements pose less of a challenge among communities with high 
unemployment, strong informal economies, and flexible working arrangements, but 
they can present a problem to others, particularly those in the industrialized West. 
The apparent solution to this problem is to transform the practice in order to 
make it more portable, and this has been done, most significantly with the introduction 
of shorter ceremonies. But the point I wish to make with regard to Csordas is that the 
transposition of the Gnawa message is enabled by the fact that the practice (supposedly 
non-portable) has a musical element that is as portable as any musical form (Feld 
2004a). Moreover, since Csordas’ topic for reflection concerns the globalization of 
religion, it makes sense to examine how Gnawa music and trance have fared in the 
global market (Kapchan 2007). Certainly central to Gnawa globalization has been what 
Csordas terms “mediatization”—the dissemination of materials through electronic 
media—a topic to which I return momentarily. 
Before I do that, though, it’s necessary to specify a few features of Csordas’ 
argument concerning globalization and religion that I have some difficulty integrating 
into my project. First, it is difficult to know from this article how Csordas recognizes, 
measures, and evaluates the incidence of “globalization.” Does he consider 
globalization to indicate merely the actual extension of a religious practice to another 
part of the world? How does he measure distance, and how does he limit time? For 
example, what enables him to distinguish the extension of Christianity from Palestine to 
Asia Minor and Greece in the first century C.E. (presumably not globalization) from the 
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extension of Mormonism from Utah to Samoa in the twentieth century (globalization)? 
There appear to be some unquestioned assumptions here based the simple application of 
world-systems theories (e.g., Gunder Frank 1995) without attending to the arguments of 
some of their sympathetic critics (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1989). A broader perspective on the 
non-European origins of the “integrated global system” might be in order. Moreover, it 
is unclear how exactly Csordas defines “globalization.” He poses a somewhat simplistic 
dichotomy between a grim Marxist judgment of neocolonialism vs. the speculation of 
an airy “postmodern free-floating-signifier image,” reproducing the very dichotomy 
presented by Stokes (2004) that opposes despairing Marxist political-economic 
judgments to joyful capitalism-friendly judgments of cultural hybridity. Although it 
appears that Cordas uncritically valorizes a crude hybridity argument, I can’t declare 
that this is the case. Nevertheless, Csordas does not explicitly make somewhat more 
complex point that market-oriented trends are unstable and resist control while local 
signification varies (hybridity), even as the exploitation of the poor by the wealthy 
under global financial capitalism continues under a singular capitalist global system 
(political economy). In other words, we don’t have to give up one premise (“no single 
entity controls capitalism”) to accept another one (“exploitation continues according to 
a singular logic”). There is no necessary dichotomy. 
More to the point, when Csordas proposes that when Skylab fell from orbit in 
1979-1980 and provoked worldwide millennial crises, it was an example of “the local 
religious imagination tak[ing] up the encroachments of global economy and 
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technology” (262). I can’t imagine how the significance of Skylab in this situation is 
any way constructed as a cultural artifact differently from, say, Krakatoa or, for that 
matter, day and night, monthly cycles, tides, or growing and harvesting seasons. All of 
these are “global” in Csordas’ sense. I’m not saying that he is alone in using global to 
refer simply to “things that happen to the whole world in our present era”—this is 
common enough among anthropologists, including others for whose work I have great 
respect, and whose work is more directly oriented toward transnational political 
economy, such as Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2000, 2005). I don’t claim any special 
understanding of the term “global”—if anything, I claim less understanding than many. 
However, when I use the term, I feel unable to do anything other than restrict it so as to 
preserve its utility. Therefore, for my purposes here, I try to connect the “global” to 
ways of thinking and the “local” to ways of acting. I’m following Karatani (2004) here, 
who is also unable to look at the axes of particular-general and individual-universal as 
anything but dissimilar ways of examining and evaluating evidence. This perspective 
can be illustrated by the phrase “think globally, act locally”: We can only think 
globally—the global is a fiction best conceived through rational thought—and any 
action is local, or empirically verifiable. Skylab was a local event, and each individual 
response to Skylab was also local. For me, there is no access to a “global” view of 
Skylab except that which can be constructed in an argument. Its global nature is not 
empirically verifiable, because to verify it would demand evidence from every corner of 
the world. To falsify the claim, all one would have to do would be to turn up a situation 
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in Borneo or Guyana where a group asks “What’s Skylab?” and suddenly it could be 
proven not to have been global after all, but localized only to those populations that had 
access to international news media or who could see the burning object in the sky, 
unobscured by clouds or trees. Globalization is a powerful idea and correctly connected 
to universal perspective, whether religious or economic. The assertion of the “globe,” 
the whole world, is only something a god could do, or a capitalist. 
Unsurprisingly, Csordas himself arrives at a very similar end. After speaking 
simply of globalization and religion, and then of the more interesting of the 
globalization of religion, Csordas finds greatest interest in the idea of globalization as 
religion. He sees this happening in two ways. First, globalization is a religion in a weak 
sense: The people who believe in globalization follow its tenets like religious people 
follow a doctrine. This is not unusual, nor is it very profound, particularly after the 
spectacular financial failures in the fall of 2008, when thousands of business 
professionals were revealed to have misplaced their foolishly optimistic faith (and with 
it the fortunes of millions) in infinitely rising real estate values. The second sense, the 
stronger sense, is that globalization itself might be a religious phenomenon: 
Does it possess a mythic structure, an eschatological promise, a soteriological 
message, a magical spontaneity, a moral imperative, a dogmatic inevitability, a 
demonic urge, an inquisitional universality, a structure of alterity or Otherness 
that is at some level inescapably religious? (Csordas 2007:265) 
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It appears to me that Csordas here is talking no longer about globalization but about 
capitalism, and making a point that Marx made in Volume I of Capital: 
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. 
Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a value in use, 
there is nothing mysterious about it. .... But, so soon as [a table] steps forth as a 
commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its 
feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, 
and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than 
“table-turning” ever was. (cited in Tucker 1978:319-320) 
Both Marx and Csordas find capitalism to be much more like a religion than it is like 
any other social institution. However, Marx differs from Csordas by focusing on a much 
more mundane event. Instead of looking at Skylab falling from the sky, Marx looks at 
the construction and sale of a table. It’s hard to imagine how a heavenly body burning 
into the atmosphere might not be taken to hold religious significance. A much more 
difficult, more everyday, and thus more necessary task, is to discover how something so 
common as a table, or a T-shirt, or a handbag, might also command all these elements—
myth, eschatology, salvation, magic, morality, dogmatism, demons, universality, and 
alterity. 
Such a perspective is limiting, but it also solves a conundrum: What is the 
globalization of Gnawa music and culture? How can we measure it? We can’t. All we 
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can measure empirically are the various “local” manifestations of Gnawa music and 
culture, in a variety of different contexts. The fragmentation thesis of free-floating 
signifiers—first proposed beginning in the 1950s by European anti-Stalinist and anti-
Soviet communists but readily adopted and deployed by anti-communist neoliberal 
postmodernists in the 1980s (Karatani 2004)—proposes that capitalism is not directed 
or controlled. This is a perfectly acceptable conclusion. Moreover, it is backed up by 
empirical evidence, not the least of which was the collapse of Soviet state-sponsored 
capitalism after 1989. I could discover no articulations by Moroccan Gnawa musicians 
that they were being exploited by global capital, a conclusion supported by Kapchan 
(2007) and by Hell (2002). If anything, they were profiting comparatively well from the 
increased interest in their music. Indeed, Gnawa as a signifier seems to be even more 
“free-floating” than most, having become attached to all kinds of musical and personal 
styles since the 1990s. Nevertheless, from a more rationalist or religious perspective, I 
can see how it would be possible as well to “think” a global context wherein Gnawa 
identities hold an exploitable and exploited position. 
 My perspectives on the transposition of music within global culture are 
influenced here by the work of ethnomusicologist Martin Stokes, among others. In a 
review article, Stokes (2004) outlines recent theoretical perspectives of 
ethnomusicologists responding to the effects of the “global order” on music and through 
music. He distinguishes between two general trends in ethnomusicology, and though he 
cautions against simplistic understanding of these trends, he does note that they might 
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appear to reflect the classic split between Marxist and Weberian perspectives. The first, 
which Stokes demonstrates using the work of Veit Erlmann, develops a postcolonial 
critique of the global imagination through a Frederic Jameson-inspired analysis of the 
ways late capitalism appears to be “a system geared … toward the orderly production 
and consumption of difference” (Stokes 2004:48). The cultural economy of late 
modernity continues to articulate the systemic crisis that is endemic to colonialism. In 
contrast, Stokes argues, the second broad perspective remains hesitant to assign an 
overall logic to global cultural flows. This view is demonstrated through the arguments 
of Mark Slobin, who conceives a world along lines described using Arjun Appadurai’s 
language of “-scapes.” This view calls for localized, linguistic, nuanced critiques of the 
various and often-contradictory ways these structures (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, etc.) 
are able to “articulate particular translocal musical contexts” (49). 
Before calling for the “renewed commitment to detailed ethnographic and 
historical descriptions” (Stokes 2004:50) that, by itself, I argue above to be insufficient, 
Stokes notes that two scholars, Les Back (1995-1996) and Ted Swedenburg (2001), 
have shown particular fluency in making a convincing case for the “emancipatory 
potential for ‘globalization from below’ within a specific Marxian framework” (50). 
Their kind of analysis avoids what Stokes makes clear to state is a crude and reductive 
stereotype, that researchers can appear to be conducting either a “pessimistic Marxian 
critique” or betraying “an optimistic radical liberalism” (50). In his insightful rendering 
of the place of Pakistani-British reggae singer Apache Indian, Back (1995-1996) rejects 
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Stuart Hall’s position that, given the choice between essential primordialism and 
postmodern pluralism for identity construction, strategies for political mobilization 
might require some closure. In contrast, Back argues that alternatives include a “politics 
of the multiple that refuses the confines of the Subject while avoiding any banal form of 
assimilationism” (1995-1996:146). While he refrains from supporting the ways cultural 
hybridity has been “marketed and reterritorialised to satiate the saccharin desires of 
corporate multiculturalism,” Back also argues strongly that “sacrificing certitude for 
fragmentation may bring about new political possibilities” (147). Echoing Stokes, Back, 
too, supports approaches that “remain sensitive to the particularities of ‘the local’ while 
being alert to the global matrices of diaspora cultures” (147). Stokes and Back both call 
on ethnomusicologists to conduct finely grained, historically specific analysis that also 
traces the roots and routes of global capital forces, the “local globalization” 
(Swedenburg 2000) of popular music. 
Stokes also includes a strong critique of some analyses of discourses about 
world music that valorize their hybridity. The movement by critics and scholars 
probably mirrors an equivalent trend in audiences. In such cases, the authenticity/purity 
argument has merely been inverted and remains salient, such that hybridity has become 
an authenticating force for world music (2004:61). Stokes is correct to state that such a 
stance has several shortcomings. First, in this simplistic structure (hybrid equals 
authentic), it can exoticize hybridity. Second, it can nostalgically and romantically 
assume resistance, since many of these hybrid-music producers are influenced by rock-
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n-roll and other oppositional musics from the West, which, while they might signify 
youth rebellion to Western listeners, do not necessarily mean the same thing within non-
Western cultural contexts. Third, in its opposition to the “official” pure musics 
supported by national folklore troupes, the perspective delegitimates and dehistoricizes 
“the complex social and culture life of state-invented traditions” (Stokes 2004:61). 
Finally, Stokes confirms that emphasizing hybridity can obscure important distinctions 
between powerful and powerless, noting that “hybridizing strategies often have an elite, 
rather than subaltern, dynamic” (61), which can result not only in the erasure of 
“polluting” or “primitive” elements but also in the too-glib assumption of a necessary 
correspondence between aesthetics and everyday life. Many Gnawa musicians are 
involved in a far wider range of daily activities than playing music, such as holding 
down full-time jobs or trying to keep small businesses solvent, and to uncritically 
assume that their lives revolve around producing music would be a mistake. 
 
PATHS CONVERGING AND DIVERGING 
If globalization entails a spreading from one locality to another, particularly 
from one class, race, or ethnic position to others, then we need to examine how Gnawa 
are being recruited from new social milieus and initiated through new means. How do 
Gnawa accommodate newcomers to their traditional beliefs and practices, including 
their music? Based on my own observations as well as on research reports, I argue that 
they do so by focusing on two “conversion” paths whereby people have come to 
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identify with Gnawa music and culture: religious vocation and subcultural style. In 
addition to these two, there are at least three other ways of understanding Gnawa 
identification: (1) as an ethnicity, by which new adherents must prove their place with 
their mastery over language and culture; (2) as a musical genre, whereby the 
authenticity of a conversion is detected aurally through hearing the musician’s technical 
proficiency and the knowledge of songs and lyrics; and (3) as racially marked minority, 
in which the heritage and legacy of enslavement and oppression is seen in the 
phenotypic skin and features—as well as the stereotypic poverty and social exclusion—
of the black musician. These are important as well, and I feel that I have done some 
justice to them in other sections of this dissertation. Here, though, I wish to focus on the 
two paths of Gnawa as a religious vocation, involving traditional conversion over many 
years, and Gnawa as a subcultural style, whereby through the use of commodities as 
money, young Moroccans buy into a Gnawa identity, which in turn buys them social 
acceptance. 
These two paths are also intricately connected to each other and to ethnicity, 
racialization, and musical genre. First, Gnawa’s status as a religious vocation is pre-
eminent in the academic literature. Ted Swedenburg’s  (ND) primary focus on music 
does not prevent him from recognizing “the Gnawa as a popular religious association or 
sect (ta’ifa), with ethnic minority roots, rather than as an ethnic minority per se” 
(Swedenburg ND:2). Gnawa membership is less dependent on language and culture, 
and more dependent on a particular relationship with the spirits, and yet ethnicity 
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remains important. Second, Gnawa ethnohistories recall numerous West African 
identities, such as Bambara, Hausa, Fulfulde, etc. Yet despite the lack of concrete 
genealogies back to specific West African ethnic groups, anthropologists like Viviana 
Paques (1975, 1978, 1991) have also noted that Gnawa form a kind of ethnicity within 
Morocco, as least sharing features of their cosmologies with West African groups. 
Third, the ties to West Africa are reinforced for many who listen hear the songs played 
during ceremonies. Scales are pentatonic and sound unlike much popular or folk music 
of Morocco (Schuyler 1997). Fourth, Gnawa have historically tended to be among those 
Moroccans marked racially as black. Most black Moroccans do not identify as Gnawa, 
and most black Moroccans are likely not descended from slaves. Nevertheless, Gnawa 
culture has been identified with black Moroccans and blackness with enslavement (El 
Hamel 2002). Moreover, blacks are over-represented toward the lower socioeconomic 
levels of Moroccan society. Finally, however, in a movement that began in the 1970s 
but rapidly increased in the early 1990s, Gnawa musical and material artifacts have 
come to be associated with youth subcultural styles and marketed as such. But even this 
subcultural movement is doubly connected to commodified blackness and ethnicized 
popular music. 
The ethnographic case is rich for analysis, but I must limit my focus to 
conversion—religion, pop culture, and money. It is true that these set up a sort of 
natural opposition—faith vs. commerce—but both also share a deep connection through 
the concept of conversion. It is important to note that any and all of these processes—
 
206 
religious vocation, ethnic identification, musical practice, racialized social status, and 
subcultural consumption—may be present at once in the path of a single individual.  
 We may begin with “traditional” Gnawa conversion in the religious sense. I’m 
using the term “traditional” here to refer to the traditions of social scientists like myself. 
In this kind of conversion in the literature, a young Moroccan, perhaps in his or her 
twenties, becomes attracted to the possession trance dancing or the music of the Gnawa 
and begins attending lilas, all-night healing ceremonies. Perhaps the young person has 
an affliction that needs healing. In any case, he or she might spend up to a year or so 
attending lilas in the outer of three concentric rings that Hell proposed in Chapter 2 of 
Le tourbillon des génies (2002)—the audience of pure spectators. If the young person 
has an affliction or is possessed by a spirit, he or she might move into the second ring, 
which is made up of the clients of the Gnawa who have paid money or have attended to 
seek healing for a particular affliction. These clients wait until the song that is played is 
the one associated with their possessing spirit, and then they dance in distinctive styles. 
Finally, after several years of working the spirits, a young person might become 
initiated into the inner circle of the local group, which is organized around a 
muqaddim/muqadma (or spiritual professional), one or more shuwafs/shuwafas (or 
clairvoyants), and a m’allim (or musical master) and his troupe of musicians. According 
to Hell and others, the whole path from interested spectator to master musician or 
spiritual professional takes a decade on average. The path to initiation—which gives 
one authority to call oneself a Gnawi or Gnawiyya—might take two to five years. Many 
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non-Moroccans have become initiated into a local order, moving from the middle ring 
to the inner ring. A few have even become m’allims or moqadmas. These have been 
given authority by a m’allim to conduct ceremonies on their own. In any case, I want to 
draw attention to the tremendous investment of time and, as a result, money, that 
following such a path demands. 
 
CONCLUSION: MUSIC, CULTURE AND TRANSNATIONAL REGGAETON  
Initiatory and subcultural identities can be distinguished, but only because they 
are usually found in counterpoint to one another. In a video on Youtube since late 2007, 
singer and rapper Elam Jay teamed up with Gnawa musicians to produce the single and 
video, “Gnawi-Tone.” The reference was to reggaeton, the style of music developed 
from Jamaican dancehall by rappers in Venezuela and Panama that then moved around 
the world in 2006 via Puerto Rico and New York City (Marshall 2006). In the essay 
“We Use So Many Snares,” Marshall describes the process by which what was called 
“Spanish reggae” in 2002 came to light as a new and vibrant style by the summer of 
2003. The most distinctive feature of the new style was its 3-3-2 rhythm, two triplets 
followed by a double beat. The subtle and swift interplay between double and triple 
rhythm is a key characteristic of Gnawa music as well as of reggaeton. Marshall 
identifies the 3-3-2 rhythm as the “riddim” of reggae (hence the “reggae” of reggaeton) 
even though the beat is found in numerous other Caribbean styles, such as soca, son, 
salsa, meringue, etc. What is distinctive about reggaeton, though, is the fact that it 
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features the beat “sped up” and rendered electronically—this was done by Jamaican 
dancehall deejays in the late 1980s, as they “juiced up” reggae beats for the dance floor. 
Afro-Panamanians came to produce dancehall in New York in the 1990s, and they took 
it back to Panama, whereupon it spread around the Spanish Caribbean, particularly 
Puerto Rico, and eventually developed into the hip-hop/dancehall hybrid reggaeton 
(whence the “ton” of reggaeton). From Puerto Rico reggaeton returned to New York 
securely under the control of Puerto Ricans, where it simmered from 2002 to 2004 
before going mainstream via the Latin-Grammy-winning hit “Gasolina” by Daddy 
Yankee. “Gasolina” charted on Billboard and around the world in 2005. The lyrics 
establish a sexual metaphor for the hook: (male voice) A ella le gusta la gasolina (“She 
likes gasoline”) / (female voice) Da me mas gasolina! (“Give me more gasoline!”); 
nevertheless, perhaps the ongoing US conquest of Iraq in 2006 and its ensuing control 
over Arab oil wealth (which formed the subject of many conversations while I was in 
Tangier) provide an explanation for why that single was so popular in Tangier that 
spring and summer. I heard it incessantly. By the time I left in the fall, reggaeton 
compilation CDs produced in Holland by Moroccan-Dutch deejays were available on 
the street in Tangier. 
Given the fact that both Gnawa music and reggaeton share similar rhythmic 
structures, it was only a matter of time before Gnawa reggaeton was produced, so I was 
not surprised to see the video Gnawi-Tone video featured in 2007 on a Moroccan 
website. On the video, one of the musicians who is uncredited is Mustapha Baqbou, 
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now a highly respected m’allim, perhaps one of the most highly respected in Morocco 
since Hmida Boussou died in 2006 (Bensalmia 2006). Baqbou is uncredited, but we can 
see him playing the hajhuj in the video, in a café, in the background. Baqbou played 
with the Moroccan pop supergroup Jil Jilala back in the early 1980s. His hajhuj-playing 
(Gnawa) predecessor in that group was Muhammad Derhem, who is also the principal 
singer in this video. The third vocalist is Elam Jay, who raps; in dancehall, this is 
known as “toasting” (Back 1995-1996).  Derhem is not a m’allim, but he is an initiate 
who, like Hassan Hakmoun, knows how to play the hajhouj and sing. Derhem’s life has 
been marked by using his Gnawa identity to make a living. And his chosen stage name 
means, literally, “money.” 
The video begins with a shot of Baqbou playing ginbri on a balcony, but the shot 
quickly swoops down to follow Derhem as he walks through the streets of a typical 
Moroccan madina, singing a typical-sounding Gnawa pop song. An elderly man is 
watching a program on an old television set outside a shop. As Derhem passes by, he 
hits the TV, and the shot draws down to the television, physically carrying the viewer 
from the “unmediated” street into the electronically mediated world of television. The 
“Gnawa” part of the intro over, Elam Jay is revealed onscreen on the television to begin 
the “reggaeton” intro segment. The early shots of Elam Jay reveal him to be on a lavish 
set, in costume, rapping in French, English, and Darija into a large microphone 
suspended from above. It looks like a typical rap video. Jay is wearing muscle shirts, 
gold jewelry, and cornrows—when I showed the video to my students in North 
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Carolina, they said they thought he looked and sounded like American R-and-B singer 
D’Angelo. The Gnawa musicians and the rapper are subsequently united during a 
rhythm break. The camera follows seagulls flying about a castle’s ramparts, the iconic 
scenery from the Essaouira casbah used famously by Orson Welles as the set for his 
film adaptation of Othello (1952). In the video, Jay and a troupe of Gnawa dancers are 
hooded. One of the dancers begins a beatbox rhythm with his mouth, which is then 
expanded into the return of the reggaeton beat, now mixed with the ginbri’s strumming 
to produce a hybrid Gnawa-reggaeton sound. As Jay and the dancers execute their 
modified hip-hop performance, the dancers are spinning tassels on their caps, a distinct 
element in Gnawa street performance. Later shots return to Derhem, finding him now in 
another typically “everyman” working-class setting: a Moroccan cafe. It is here that 
Baqbou makes his first reappearance, sitting at one of the tables and playing the ginbri 
as Derhem sings before his audience. 
After a second break, the set moves on to a temporary stage set up in 
Muhammad V Square in Casablanca (1920), distinct for the “Mooresque” architecture 
surrounding it. This setting enacts a nationalist and popular resolution of the tension 
heretofore maintained between the elite settings of Elam Jay (the mediated commercial 
identities of a hip-hop video) and the competing popular settings of Muhammad 
Derhem (the local and “unmediated” commercial identities of street and cafe). On the 
stage, Derhem and Jay stand side-by-side, enacting their formal equivalence, while 
Baqbou continues to appear from time to time in shots, usually backstage with the 
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dancers. We can read Baqbou as indexing an initiatory-Gnawa imprimature of 
authenticity and Elam Jay as indexing the modernity of transnational capital. Derhem, 
however, represents a reconciled statement of account—he is pure money, mediating 
between the two and converting the commodity of Gnawa culture into the commodity 
of global popular culture, back and forth. 
 In the illustration above, I wish to draw attention to the triad of Baqbou-
Derhem-E.Lam Jay. We have a successful collaboration between three agents: a 
prospective reggaeton artist—Elam Jay, who spent his youth in Switzerland, is actually 
better known as a singer of devotional songs in the soulful style of British Muslim-pop 
singer Sami Yusuf; an established Gnawa pop singer—Derhem is not a m’allim; and a 
respected m’allim experienced in pop styles—Baqbou was a member of the Moroccan 
pop-folk group Jil Jilala after Derhem left it. This kind of collaboration appears poised 
to successfully enable newcomers’ access to Gnawa identities while maintaining some 
sort of Gnawa control over defining identities and genres. The “performance space” is 
not under the direct control of a government—the video was financed privately, 
apparently in conjunction with an advertising campaign for the Moroccan telephone 
company Wana (Jeff Callen, personal communication), which is owned by a Moroccan 
holding company that appears to be connected to the Moroccan royal family. The video 
was distributed via the Internet. While this is a negotiated space, and Gnawa have little 
strength in the struggle for control over capital, they do control social capital to the 
extent that Gnawa pop seems to require the maintenance of very real ties to initiatory 
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identities. However Gnawa is defined generically, the figure of the m’allim remains a 
fixture, and m’allims must be made locally, after long apprenticeships, within the 
religious-initiatory context. Through such innovative collaborations between initiatory 
Gnawa, popular Gnawa, and global pop-cultural styles, as exemplified by the Gnawi-
Tone video, Gnawa musicians were be able to resolve tensions between Gnawa as a 
religious initiation and Gnawa as a global commodity. 
 How do Moroccans subjects determine their own identities? And how can 
metaphors of transposition and conversion help elucidate transnational flows of music 
and culture? In this section, I have proposed that Moroccan modernity is connected to 
European capitalist modernity but that it is not completely derivative from it. Instead, 
Moroccans themselves make active decisions to identify themselves. These decisions 
are limited and constrained by conventional patterns of conversion and transposition, 
but they in turn serve to engage Moroccan subjects in broader transnational flows of 




SECTION III: PILGRIMAGE AND FESTIVAL 
 
“Pilgrims are, and always have been, tourists of a certain ilk.”  
Deborah Kapchan (2008:481) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Morocco is well known for the place pilgrimage holds in its religious landscape. 
Each year, millions of Moroccans visit the graves and holy sites of long-dead virtuous 
men and women, zawaya, and other sacred sites. Much of this activity overlaps with 
tourism, more so since incomes of Moroccans have risen since the mid-1990s. 
Particularly for the marocains residents a l’etranger (MREs), Moroccans living and 
working in Europe, a trip home during summer months has become itself a kind of 
pilgrimage to the land of faith. Many of these trips are organized around visits to an 
ever-increasing number of religious-themed music festivals. In what ways have 
religious journeys become re-inscribed in modes of tourism and popular commodity 
consumption? This chapter relies on ethnographic research conducted between 2001 
and 2006. During this period I attended the Essaouira Gnawa festival three times, the 
Fes sacred music festival twice, the Tangier jazz festival once, and two psychedelic 
trance raves, one in the desert and one on the beach. I visited all of these as an attendee 
except the jazz festival—I was privy to some off-stage jam sessions and socialization—
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and my third Gnawa festival in 2006, which I attended backstage and “undercover” as a 
very minor non-performing performer, a kind of official “groupie.”  
My interest in the festival began with my interest in Gnawa music and culture, 
but as I continued to return to the festival over the years, I found that it grew much 
bigger than anyone could have foreseen, and its growth is not isolated—numerous 
competitors have developed alongside it. This tremendous growth has led me to 
consider the quesion, what is the role of the international cultural festival in mediating 
the transnational flows of music and culture? I propose that these festivals have 
developed as alternative and secular musems, and that those visiting these festivals have 
become something similar to pilgrims (Kapchan 2008). Festivals have been developed 
in other regions of Morocco and around other kinds of music. But the Essaouira festival 
is held in the South, and it is inspired by and features the music and culture of a 
racialized Moroccan subculture whose roots like in systematic enslavement and who 
trace their heritage to sub-Saharan West Africa. Moreover, Gnawa music indexes a 
local variety of Blackness for Moroccan audiences, one that is intimately connected to 
heterodox religious practices. Finally, during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, i.e., 
after the lifting of a two-decade-long period of political repression, the Gnawa festival 
became the largest and most popular of all the summer music festivals in Morocco. 
Taken together, these fact suggest that changes in Moroccan society, including the 
religious, political, economic, and cultural landscape, can be determined to be oriented 
in some way toward a recognition of Morocco’s African identity, at least insofar as that 
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identity is expressed through shifting patterns in the consumption of popular culture. 




Chapter 6: The Promise of Sonic Translation in Morocco 
 
The name of the Gnawa festival changed between its first and subsequent 
editions. According to Zineb Majdouli (2007), the festival was entitled Festival Gnaoua 
d’Essaouira in 1998, the “Gnawa Festival of Essaouira.”12 After that first year, 
Majdouli relates, it became clear to the organizers that the festival was not merely about 
Gnawa music but also about world music, and so the festival’s title was changed to 
Festival d’Essaouira Gnaoua Musiques du Monde. This title has been rendered in 
English on the official website of the festival as “Gnaoua Festival and Musics of the 
World of Essaouira.”13 The decision to change the title may have partly been a 
commercial decision—promoters needed to broaden the horizons of the festival in order 
to bring headlining acts—Cheb Mami, Rachid Taha—that had nothing to do with 
Gnawa music but that would attract Moroccan audiences. It seems to me, though, that 
the decision went deeper: Apart from these headliners, all the other concerts attempted 
to showcase collaboration in one form or another. 
Collaboration is endemic to musical performance. While all musics are 
composed and performed under interactive conditions of some kind, there appears to be 
some particular efficacy in African-derived musics for interaction to produce a groove 
(Keil and Feld 1994). A key characteristic of West African and other musics is the 
                                                       
12 Majdouli’s book is directly relevant to this project. Unfortunately, I did not read it in time to 
incorporate her arguments, so that task will have to left to a future version. 
13 At http://www.festival-gnaoua.net/11eme-edition.html?lang=en, viewed 22 June 2009. 
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existence of participatory discrepancies, slightly off-tempo rhythms and tones that serve 
to communicate with the other musicians (Keil 1994, 1995). These participatory 
discrepancies hold creative potential for the groove (Keil and Feld 1994). The creation 
of participatory discrepancies in rhythm is accomplished through a “temporal 
‘stretching’ in which interlocking parts purposefully do not articulate a precise duple or 
triple division of the pulse” (Waterman 1990:215). Rather, there is some indeterminacy 
in the division of time, a vibratory dissonance in which the rhythm is pulled apart. This 
is a participatory art of timing, since it requires members of the ensemble, as well as 
listeners, to find this dissonance and establish themselves along that narrow peak. If 
players pull too far from the subdivision of time, they risk true dissonance, bad music, 
but if they play too closely to the established subdivision, they risk formally precise and 
correct but completely lifeless music. The tension between these two poles creates the 
groove (Waterman 1990). It is also a source of social construction (Keil 1995).14 The 
change in the title of the festival was largely to reflect the festival’s focus on 
collaborative approaches to Gnawa music. 
Just as performers must learn to collaborate, so must the diverse audiences 
listening to them become “perennial coauditors” (Kapchan 2008) of these new hybrid 
genres. Deborah Kapchan calls this impetus toward mutual understanding on a sonic 
                                                       
14 An argument could be made concerning the role of African-derived music in social construction based 
on the application of interactional analysis (Schegloff 1968; Kendon 1972, 1975) to the ethnography 
(Moerman 1988; Keating 2002; Streeck 2004) of music (Berliner 1994; Monson 1996). If I were to make 
the argument, though, I would use the deviant-case analysis of Schegloff (Ten Have 1999:15-17) to 
identify moments in Gnawa collaborations (and really, any communicative music) in which creative 
mistakes occur such that the musicians, in the course of repairing the mistake, find themselves carried 
into the groove (Keil 1994, 1995; Keil and Feld 1994). 
 
218 
level the “promise of sonic translation” (Kapchan 2008:467). Such a promise 
necessarily underlies any attempt at cross-cultural understanding and sharing, and it also 
forms a basis by which experiences of transnational cooperation can be considered 
plausible.  
 
THE PROMISE OF SONIC TRANSLATION 
The Fes Festival of World Sacred Music is the premier festival in Morocco in 
terms of international visibility by elite classes. European royalty and figures of 
international stature have attended—Bono and other members of the Irish rock group 
U2 attended in 2007—and the Dalai Lama played a key role in its establishment. This 
latter role was prompted by Faouzi Skali, a Moroccan anthropologist and leader in one 
of Morocco’s most prestigious Sufi tariqas, who influenced the Dalai Lama to get 
involved. I attended some of the public concerts in 2001, standing in the back of a large 
crowd of rowdy teens. In 2002 I had better funding, and I managed to attend several of 
the concerts. It was rewarding to see such great musicians from all over the world and 
from such a variety of religious traditions—from Syria, France, the United States, 
Mauritania, Nepal, and many other places. 
In addition to playing the elite foil to Essaouira’s populism, the Fes festival also 
offered contrast over the question of collaboration. Here, there was not even a 
suggestion that the artistic integrity of the musician would be affected by an attempt at 
“jamming.” Instead, the onus of collaboration was on the audience members to 
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“collaborate” in a joint attempt at appreciation. The immediate goal of audiences at such 
transnational festivals, Kapchan argues, is “to consume and sonically inhabit a 
multiplicity of ... cultures” (2008:470). Such an exercise is only possible due to the 
promise of sonic translation. 
Kapchan does not intend to propose that such a promise can always, or even 
ever, fully, be kept. Sometimes the audiences were unable to connect at all with the 
musicians. Nevertheless, she focuses on the audience members’ faith in the “ultimate 
translatability” of the messages being communicated through the music. Such good 
faith leads audiences to find new forms of social community, what she calls the “festive 
sacred” (Kapchan 2008:467). 
 
TOURISM AND PILGRIMAGE IN MOROCCAN RELIGION 
The question of religion is difficult in Morocco, since so much of popular 
culture can be interpreted both as religious and as not religious. On the one hand, 
scholars have recognized as religious attention to spirits, rituals, trances, altered states, 
pilgrimages, appeals to God and the saints, etc. Indeed, Dale Eickelman (1976) has 
characterized these “traditions of pilgrimage” as themselves indicative of the nature of 
“Moroccan Islam.” At the same time, from another perspective, these various elements 
are not equivalent to “religion” in the sense my consultants held of the deen of Islam. 
Indeed, as I sat among members of a Gnawa ta’ifa (local group) in Tangier and listened 
to them discuss their sect’s features, one thing was clear: All considered themselves 
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orthodox Muslims whose faith was not affected in the slightest by their “work” enabling 
possession by the various spirits of the Gnawa pantheon. They vigorously defended 
their practices against charges by more orthodox-minded Moroccans that they practice 
sorcery or charlatanism. In their view, belonging to their specific Gnawa ta’ifa made 
them better Muslims because it redirected their lives toward spiritual matters and kept 
them in a close, virtuous community. However, their work was just another part of 
everyday life as a Muslim and did not constitute anything religious by itself. I myself 
have great difficulty speaking on the nature of Moroccan Islam, since I have not 
mastered fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, and particularly the Maliki school that is dominant 
in Morocco. (I have also not studied closely the Quran and the Hadith, the sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad in the original Arabic.) As a result I feel restricted from doing 
anything but accepting the conception of Islam as presented by my consultants. As I 
have reconsidered religious identification in Morocco, my study of local, indigenous 
terms for the various beliefs, practices, and conscious states that I had previously 
bundled together under the banner of “religious” has led me to wonder what else I 
might be missing in the many other “non-religious” aspects of Moroccan popular 
culture. So I am led away from formal religious structures (e.g., fiqh in Morocco) and 
beyond pseudo-religious structures (e.g., pilgrimages to holy sites) before settling to a 




Festival and pilgrimage have long genealogies in the academic literatures of 
anthropology, folklore, and Moroccan studies. In his detailed study of Moroccan ritual 
life, presented in two volumes in 1926, Edvard Westermarck (1968) raises the issue of 
“pagan survival”—the idea that Moroccan religious festivals that deviate from Muslim 
norms in other regions can be identified as an underlying paganism continuous with 
Morocco’s pre-Islamic cultural past. Although such beliefs continue to enliven popular 
approaches to Gnawa music and other Moroccan styles (see Chapter 1), Abdellah 
Hammoudi (1993) finally puts that question to rest for academic approaches. 
Hammoudi concludes that, at least with regard to the Bilmawn festival of Ait Mizane in 
the High Atlas, nothing about the festival suggests that it is anything but an ordinary 
Muslim feast. Within the American tradition, Dale Eickelman’s (1976) study of the role 
of religious life in Boujad finds an city whose very life depended on an annual 
pilgrimage to the musem of its saint, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (d. 1601), such that the 
vigor and power of what Eickelman calls “maraboutic Islam” in Morocco can be 
correlated to the relative importance of Boujad vis-a-vis the rest of Morocco. Indeed, 
the health of the town and its status as a pilgrimage site can be measured by attendance 
at its annual festival. In this chapter, I am less interested in proving primordial origins 
for festivals than in asserting continuity of another kind, since music festivals are 
widely thought to be commercial and “new” ventures whose only provision for 
continuity is the folklorization of culture as a marketing ploy. 
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Victor Turner (1982) introduces festival in a more general sense. This book 
accompanied a concurrent exhibit at the Smithsonian Museum on festivals. As a result, 
its tone is less scholarly and more popular, as it anticipates non-specialist readers. One 
result of this tone is a return to the fact that the items curated come from ways of life 
that differ from non-Western ways of life, and many of the entries seem to take extra 
care to remind readers of connections and discontinuities. As I read over the selections, 
however, I was struck by how much such a tone might apply to my topic. The 
Moroccans making pilgrimages to Moroccan summer music and culture festivals 
operated on European calendars. For working-class and middle-class Europeans, the 
time of excess and freedom for the past 20 or 30 years has been the summer vacation 
period and particularly the month of August. Marocains residents a l’etranger tended to 
be working-class Europeans, but when they returned to Morocco, for that period of 
excess and transgression they resisted boundaries and were momentarily positioned in 
the Moroccan middle classes, who also took summer vacations from the hot and 
crowded interior cities to the cooler coastal resorts. As a result, the MRE attendees at 
the summer festivals experienced a bit of a rise in class position, as migrant laborers in 
Europe have done more generally in Moroccan society, with predictably unsettling 
effectsof the stability of Moroccan class alignments (McMurray 2001). Summer 
festivals thus enact a kind of anti-structure. In a Bakhtinian sense (Bakhtin 1984), 
festivals in Morocco afforded a sense of the carnivalesque, albeit carefully 
circumscribed and somewhat limited. 
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For Gnawa musicians and other performers, this summer vacation season also 
coincided with the work season. This was a time of travel and labor but also a festive 
time; most of them held other jobs that were mundane and busy during the fall, winter, 
and spring. For Turner, festivals are “‘high tides,’ ‘peak experiences’ in social life 
which mark an occasion or an event with ceremony, ritual, or festivity. People in all 
cultures recognize the need to set aside certain times and spaces for celebratory use, in 
which the possibility of personal and communal creativity may arise” (1982:11). For the 
members of Dar Gnawa, summer was a time of travel, expense accounts, late nights and 
slow days (see Kapchan 2007 for a description of Gnawa performers “on the road” in 
Europe). 
Turner proposes three meanings of festival: interpretive, operational, and 
positional. The interpretive meaning speaks to the means by which participants make 
sense of the festival. Sometimes there are degrees of interpretation, with a privileged 
level or caste which has access to its “true” or esoteric meaning (1982:19). I’m not 
convinced that Gnawa members would consider their knowledge of the festival to be 
more “true,” because the Essaouira festival is not really a part of Gnawa practice. It is a 
kind of secular musem, but the Gnawa form not a Sufi tariqa but a collection of local 
taifas; they have no shaykh, so there’s not single, privileged perspective on the 
gathering. After the festival, however, the members of Dar Gnawa did follow Turner’s 
model, re-hashing the festival experience and trying “to put into words, however 
lamely, what they have experienced in the ‘meta-experience’ of culturally stimulated 
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action,” when they tried to evaluate the ways in which the festival, for them, “distill[ed] 
all other kinds of experience to draw out the part that [was] essential to each of them” 
(Turner 1982:19). Turner associates this kind of meaning with the ideology or beliefs, 
whether held by specialists or laypersons, of the community. By positional or situational 
meaning Turner intends its position within other Levi-Straussian symbolic structures, an 
analysis that I am unable to do at this point. However, Turner’s appeal to operational 
meaning—the festival’s social-scientific meaning within a social structural approach—
is my major preoccupation in this chapter: What does the festival do in Moroccan 
society? This is the level of my social-scientific approach, but I’m not trying to 
operationalize the festival’s interpretation on my own. Instead, I am interested in 
understanding how the interpretations that are articulated by participants and other 
positioned actors, including myself as an active participant and some sort of outside 
professional analyst, operate within larger questions of mine concerning Moroccan 
subjectivities, economies, and identities. 
 In Turner’s edited volume, Roger Abrahams’ chapter is particularly influential.  
One of the most plainly written and accessible of the chapters, its primary emphasis is 
on restoring the value of festivals to their local economies, a significance that Abrahams 
argues is lost on the typical attendee to the Smithsonian, who lives in a technologically 
advanced capitalist economy. In doing so, he appears to be speaking as well to many of 
the Moroccans who attend the Gnawa festival—they are also largely urban, either 
working-class or middle-class, and they live lives separated from agricultural cycles of 
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death, rebirth, fertility, and harvest (Morocco’s urban population passed 50 percent of 
the total in the mid-1990s.) Abrahams argues that for agricultural people, there is a 
direct and deep connection between the terms of the festival and the way of life of the 
people. In agricultural societies, festivals mark the points at which workers can break 
from their labor in planting, cultivation, and harvest,  
“Those important times which permit a joyous, if anxious, contemplation of the 
procession of nature, these festivities call the people together for nothing more 
complicated than celebration. But it is precisely at these points of repose that the 
accumulated repertoire of expressive devices can be brought forth so that the 
message of the occasion is epitomized in each move and magnified by the very 
evidence of the profusion of sounds and symbols.” (Abrahams 1982:166-167) 
Summer festivals also take place in times of pause from the workweek, and for 
Moroccan migrants these periods are also times of socializing with extended family 
members, since the rise of single-family apartments has produced more nucleation of 
middle-class and rising middle-class Moroccan families (Kapchan 1996; McMurray 
2001). They are also fecund times, when weddings can be planned because male 
workers are home and flush with their saved earnings (McMurray 2001). In such cases, 
marriage rites and seasonal festivals can coincide. 
Summers are a time of joyous repose, and it makes sense that they would be 
marked as well by an accumulated repertoire of expressive devices. Moreover, summers 
are also “the plateaus of the year when in fact nothing important occurs... Festivals ... 
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must initiate their own energies, even as they organize the celebrants for mutual fun and 
profit” (Abrahams 1982:167). At root, festivals must make their own value. Those that 
falter and fail to attract celebrants, like Eickelman’s Boujad musem, make their own 
failure. 
 In contrast to agricultural festivals, Abrahams finds that nostalgia plays a 
significant role in “our festivals”: The ability to choose a festival to attend, the choice 
that accompanies modern subjectivity, is a positive force that contains its own negation, 
the loss of a sense of deep engagement with life cycles. The result is nostalgia, “a 
sentimental backward looking that capitalizes on the old festival vocabulary of 
intensification: now gigantism becomes a means of advertising and promotion; and 
miniaturization, often of the same symbolic object, produces the memento, the souvenir, 
the means by which one can recapture through memory the pleasure of the experience” 
(Abrahams 1982:171). Indeed, the Essaouira festival can be seen as a time of nostalgia 
for some mythical past when Gnawa troupes played lilas for a meal and a place to sleep 
(Hell 2002; Kapchan 2007). No one involved in the lilas really wants to return to such a 
time—particularly the Gnawa performers!—but the effervescence produced out of the 
nostalgia associated with an appeal to tradition leads to very large amplified speakers, 
huge crowds at “traditional lilas,” and “big” m’allims who are household names in 
Morocco and mobbed by adoring fans. At the same time, compact disks of prior 
performances as well as all manner of tiny souvenirs are produced and sold (see Chapter 
3 for my account of how such souvenirs are employed as emblems of identity).  
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At one level, pilgrimages in Morocco are deeply religious affairs. But musical 
tourism has transformed pilgrimages to reflect the pursuit of non-sacred commodities. 
In turn, pilgrims have come to imbue some of these commodities with sacred force. As 
a result, what has become of Moroccan religious identities? I present this chapter as a 
pilgrim and a tourist of a certain ilk (Kapchan 2008:481). In my first attendance at these 
festivals, I didn’t yet realize I was making pilgrimages. But I as I returned a second time 
(and in the case of Essaouira, a third time), I realized that when I spoke to festival 
attendees, those who were repeat attendees sometimes considered themselves pilgrims 
too. They viewed their present experiences in light of previous ones. They compared 
this year to previous years, they met old friends and befriended new ones. They sought 




Chapter 7: Gnawa Festivals in Essaouira 
  
In this chapter, I outline how my engagement with the Essaouira festival 
changed over the years. These changes resulted not only from my deeper intuitive grasp 
of Moroccan society and my increasing knowledge of Gnawa beliefs and practices; 
also, the changes stemmed from the shifting context of my engagement with the 
festivals. Although my engagements were unique to my particular mix of knowledges 
and competencies, they were also quite conventional. For my first visit in 2001, I was 
more-or-less an informed tourist. In 2002, I attended not as a tourist but as a researcher 
interested in everyday Moroccan lives, and I socialized more with working-class 
Essaouiris who expressed more than a bit of ambivalence about the festival. Finally, in 
2006, I was involved alongside a third kind of insider: Among the dozens of Gnawa 
performers and their hangers-on, I was fully as inconspicuous as a 6-foot fair-skinned 
American could be. I’m not claiming an increasingly privileged or “insider” 
perspective. Nevertheless, as my objective engagement with the festival changed, so 
were my subjective experiences transformed. 
Like the Egyptian state (Ali 2002), the Moroccan state played a role (however 
contradictory) within Moroccan society in modernizing the populace through 
attempting to impose progressive political attitudes, particularly in the period following 
the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Within this context, however, 
the same freeing that enabled the graduates to protest their unemployment also granted 
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Islamists greater access to social mobilization. Many Islamists expressed opposition to 
Gnawa music and culture for a number of reasons. Some Islamist newspapers argued 
that the Gnawa practiced witchcraft or sorcery. They identified Gnawa culture with 
alcohol consumption, with Western musicians, with leading the youth astray, and with 
Jews.15 The Jewish association came from Essaouira’s formerly large Jewish population 
and the continued presence of a Jewish community there, a member of which was 
Andre Azoulay. Azoulay had the portfolio of special advisor to the king, and his efforts 
in support of the festival contributed to its success. However, as depicted in a petition 
signed by 24 prominent Moroccans and published in a 2002 issue of Tel Quel magazine, 
certain Islamist leaders and newspapers considered his position close to power to be the 
sign of an alleged Israeli conspiracy. The petitioners point to an article that was 
published in the newspaper Attajdid (associated with the Islamist Party for Justice and 
Democracy, PJD) and written by a Casablanca “pseudo-imam,” Abdelbari Zemzami. 
The petitioners argued that exactly this sort of racist fear mongering led to, under the 
“fascist politics of the Sharon government,” continued Jewish immigration to Israel and 
the continued displacement of Palestinians (“Halte au racisme anti-juif!” 2002:34). The 
signers called upon Moroccans to confirm the continued legitimacy of Jewish 
Moroccans as full citizens. By being associated with the Jewish minority of Morocco, 
                                                       
15 In a note to her discussion of the anti-Zionist and leftist Moroccan Jewish activist Abraham Sefraty, 




however, Gnawa are similarly cast by some Moroccans as unwanted foreigners, as 
outsiders. 
 
2002: THE FESTIVAL REVISITED 
 I began this project with a description of my first visit to the Gnawa festival, in 
2001. In the summer of 2002 I returned to Morocco with better funding, which meant I 
could come earlier and stay later. This time I had gone to Tangier first, to make contact 
with Abdellah El Gourd, the Gnawa m’allim I had “clicked with” the previous summer 
when Deborah had introduced us in his home, Dar Gnawa, in Tangier. Abdellah was 
welcoming, and I spent a few days there. Then I had gone on to Fes to attend the Fes 
Festival of Sacred Musics of the World (Kapchan 2008) with Deborah and Jonathan, 
and I also got to know some of the students in the language school. As a result, by the 
time I made the trip back to Essaouira, I was more familiar with Morocco and more 
competent in Moroccan Arabic. 
At the Marrakech train station I got into a shared taxi to Essaouira. One of the 
people in the cab was Swiss man attending the festival for a second time who was 
relatively well informed about Gnawa culture and eager to see this year’s acts. He was 
familiar with ethnographic interpretations of Gnawa beliefs and practices. I paid for an 
extra seat in order to make peace with my fellow passengers who were forced to 
accommodate my large frame next to them. I checked into the same beach hotel, but I 
had the idea that I could find a cheaper and more convenient place to stay if I could get 
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back to see some of the people I had met the previous summer. I found Najib again and 
greeted him before I went in search of Muhammad and Ahmad.  
I found that Muhammad had disappeared. Ahmad was in sole possession of the 
shop, and it was clearly struggling, with reduced stocks. When I mentioned 
Muhammad’s name, Ahmad responded with curses and invectives—he called 
Muhammad a thief and a crook, an embezzler who had been cheating Ahmad. He felt 
betrayed by Muhammad. It was sad to hear that my friends were no longer friends. But 
it made sense, since they were after all business partners and related on a professional 
level, and most businesses tend to go bankrupt eventually for one reason or another. I 
hung out again, this time with Ahmad. 
 I started pushing Ahmad to help me find a place to stay. He volunteered his own 
rooms in a building not far outside the madina walls. He rented a storeroom there for his 
music, and he also had a bedroom. He invited me to lunch at his home, too, on the 
following day, Tuesday before the festival. Ahmad had a four-year-old boy, an 18-
month-old girl, and a lovely wife, and the meal was amazing. But I noticed that he 
wasn’t very comfortable in his home—I got the impression he was smoking cigarettes 
with me in the salon only because I was there as a guest. He seemed more comfortable 
in his “bachelor’s pad” about a mile closer to town, into which he had said I could move 
the following day. Wednesday morning I checked out of my hotel and went back to the 
shop with my suitcase, and at lunchtime we went and deposited my things at his room 
and he taught me how to come and go, which was a bit difficult. Finding the building 
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without street signs or numbers meant I needed to find the mosque, then remember 
which alleys to follow before turning up at the right door. I was to knock at the door and 
be admitted by the downstairs residents. The first time I tried to do it on my own, I got 
lost and had to call Ahmad to walk me through the streets by phone. He gave me a key 
for the door at the top of the stairs, which led to a central space with five rooms off of it: 
one was a kitchen, one a shower/toilet, a larger room was the residences of an older 
single man, and two smaller rooms were Ahmad’s storeroom and his bedroom, where I 
kept my suitcase with my video camera and laptop. Ahmad gave me a key to my room 
as well. He came and socialized with me in the evenings. 
 During the days I met up a few times with some of the graduate students who 
had been taking Arabic in Fes. One of them, working on a PhD in English, spoke fluent 
French; they were both taking intermediate standard Arabic. They had made friends 
with some students from Casablanca, and we socialized a bit. One of the students had 
spiked his hair in a “fauxhawk,” and I asked him about the more audacious punks and 
rastas in the crowds, with their tattoos, facial piercings, and expensive studded leather—
were these from Paris or Madrid? He swore up and down that they had all come from 
Casablanca. The students were very proud of the cosmopolitan nature of their city. They 
were hard to understand—they mixed French slang and Moroccan slang in complex 
ways, and they didn’t slow down very much, although they tried to use more a more 
formal register of Arabic to communicate with us. In general the concerts were as 
disappointing as before, with the exception of the set by Oumou Sangare, the great 
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Malian singer—she sang her own repertoire from the formerly exclusively male genre 
of hunting songs (Duran 2000), with little interference from collaborators. It was a truly 
magical set. 
I tended to spend my mornings in cafes and hotels watching the World Cup—it 
was held in Korea and Japan in 2002, so the games came at awkward times for 
Mediterranean time zones, too early in the morning to be convenient or pleasant. Most 
of the time that I wasn’t going to concerts, however, I spent with Ahmad and his 
friends. Aside from being busier than usual in his shop, Ahmad more-or-less ignored 
the festival and concerts. One night we watched a late movie in the room of one of the 
other residents; another time Ahmad took me to the market and had me buy meat and 
vegetables, and then we gave them to a small restaurant across from his apartment. I 
went to see a concert, and when I got back Ahmad had procured a big box of tiny, cold 
beers, and we feasted on the tagine with the other inhabitants, including the woman who 
lived downstairs. 
 My general impressions of that festival focus on the intense crowds and the 
terrible service in cafes and restaurants. Waiters jostled customers at the cafes and 
refused to make change, apparently hoping to get rid of them in order to get them to 
leave and be replaced with new customers. I began to look at the festival like Ahmad 





2006: BACKSTAGE PASS  
By the summer of 2006 I had been living in Tangier since February and was 
close to all the members of Dar Gnawa. My wife, Rachel, had just left for the United 
States—we rented a car and drove around the north and to Fes before heading with her 
luggage to the airport in Casablanca, and then I drove the car it back up to Tangier and 
bought a train ticket for Marrakech. I didn’t want to ride second-class. I had done that 
numerous times and it wasn’t very comfortable, or so I thought to myself as I justified 
the added expense (around $30 instead of $15). I met Abdellah and his troupe in the 
glistening new Tangier train station and spoke with them as we waited for the train, but 
when the time came to board I went to my air-conditioned reserved seat at the front of 
the train. Upon arriving in Marrakech, though, I decided to stick with them, and they 
didn’t graciously didn’t mention my abandoning them earlier. They had their 
instruments and costumes, which wouldn’t fit in a normal taxi, so they rented two 
minivans at the train station to take them to the bus station. We sat there for a couple of 
hours, waiting for the bus to fill. At one point Abdellah bought me breakfast at the bus 
station’s restaurant. Finally we took off for Essaouira. I still hadn’t decided whether to 
ask Abdellah about staying with them, but I managed to make myself useful by helping 
keep track of the gear and corralling some of the watermelons they had bought at a 
truck stop outside of Marrakech. 
When the bus arrived in Essaouira, I asked Abdellah if there would be room for 
me at their apartment. He had already described how it would be—apparently there was 
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a village that had been built to house employees of a state-owned mining company. The 
festival rented these apartments from the company for the week and gave them over to 
the visiting Gnawa troupes. Abdellah had pointed out that the invited musicians got 
hotel rooms. I helped carry equipment to the apartment, and it seemed clean and secure, 
so after Abdellah assured me that it would not be forbidden by the festival organizers, I 
decided to stay. Several weeks before at Dar Gnawa I had complained about the cost of 
the hotels, which had cost me around $50/night during previous stays. Abdellah thought 
that sounded reasonable, and I shot him a look that suggested my strong disagreement. 
(My typical target in Morocco was under $15/night.) The door of the apartment opened 
into a hall, which led to a large salon lined with banquettes, the cushioned benches that 
also serve as beds. There was a central courtyard, open to the sky, with a water faucet 
and a sink. The bathroom was next to the kitchen with the stove; the dining room had a 
cupboard with dishes, a table and chairs, and three more banquettes. The bedroom had a 
large double bed. There were keys for the dining room and bedroom, as well as a single 
key for the front door. Abdellah kept all the keys, so one of the younger members had to 
stay in the salon at all times to let the others in and out. I stood door duty a few times 
that week—there was a television with local stations to watch, and usually someone else 
to talk to. 
Abdellah let me keep my suitcase and laptop in the bedroom, which he shared 
with his nephew Walid. Walid and his father Ahmad had come down from Youssoufia 
for the festival. Ahmad, Abdellah’s older brother and a mining engineer, was staying 
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with friends in town, but Walid, 18 and awaiting the results of his recent “Bacs” test, 
wanted to spend time with his uncle and the other Gnawa. The dining room was the 
domain of Abdelkader, Khalid, and Nour Eddine, the three senior members of the 
troupe. The first thing they did upon arrival was to make a written inventory of the 
dishes, pans, and utensils on a sheet of paper. Abdellah witnessed the list in person and 
signed it. These men also did all the cooking and policed the younger guys. The rest of 
us slept in the salon, which led to some late nights. The apartment on the upper level 
was occupied by M’allim Hmida Boussou and his troupe. Apparently these two 
apartments were the only two in which alcohol was banned—“no Gnawa drunkards!” in 
the words of Abdellah.  
I tried to shadow Abdellah as much as possible, but he had to go to some official 
functions that were open only to the m’allims and the invited musicians. He described 
these severely as “soirees,” generous feasts where the wine flowed like water and 
respectable m’allims got drunk. Abdellah left early. He and the three senior members of 
the troupe also went to a practice session of around four hours with the invited 
musicians. I asked to go along, and at first it seemed like I would be able to, but at the 
last minute Abdellah asked me to stay behind. I was invited along to some official 
greetings with some of the other m’allims. They were all staying in the same village, 
but people were on different schedules, so visiting involved some coordination. One or 
more of the elder members would go out and check that the m’allim was in (I was along 
on a couple of these preliminary visits), and then we would go back and get Abdellah 
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and whoever else was around. We would go and sit and talk for 20-30 minutes, and then 
move on.  
I also made it into a joint interview with Abdellah and Hmida Boussou, in the 
upstairs salon. A camera crew was there from 2M, Moroccan state television’s premium 
channel, along with a reporter. Both m’allims were invited to play ginbri a bit for the 
camera; both played a bit and then passed the ginbri on. One young man from Hmida 
Boussou’s troupe played a more energetic tune while others in the room clapped along. 
The camera zoomed in on Walid, who was swaying back and forth with his eyes closed. 
Neither he nor his father identified as Gnawa at all, but Walid’s apparent “trance” so 
entranced the camera crew that they focused on him for a significant amount of time, a 
long cut. Because I was sitting next to Walid, I made it into the shot, and thus my image 
was broadcast on national television for a second or two, and they all laughed at me that 
evening while we watched. Evidently, one of the preoccupations of the journalists was 
to document the visual evidence of possession. When he was done playing the ginbri, 
the young man returned the ginbri to Boussou and kissed both Boussou and Abdellah on 
their foreheads. The journalist liked that so much that she convinced him to do it a 
second time, for the camera. 
The most important part about living with the performers, however, involved the 
evening visits we received from other m’allims. As a “dry” apartment, we attracted the 
more pious of the Gnawa visitors, including Hammoud and his friend Abdeljalil from 
Marrakech. Hammoud was a m’allim, the other members told me, but he never held 
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lilas. Instead, Hammoud was the best ginbri maker in the country, Abdellah had told me 
previously, and Abdellah bought all his ginbris from him. On two separate occasions, 
younger members of Dar Gnawa told me that Hammoud was “one of the very best of 
men” (min ni’amat al-rijal). He had a full beard and the mark on his forehead of 
Muslim men who pray more often than the required five times per day. He spent many 
hours with us in the salon, playing and singing. His friend Abdeljalil was less obviously 
pious—he was clean shaven and had a rough way of talking, evidence of his childhood 
lived on the street. Both men had some connection to Meditel, the Spanish-owned 
telecommunications company that was state-owned Maroc Telecom’s major competitor. 
Maroc Telecom was the official telecom sponsor, but Meditel had a small stage far 
down the beach. Hammoud and Abdeljalil were staying in an apartment farther away 
from the madina. They offered to let me ride with them back to Marrakech after the 
festival, and right before we left there was a problem with the landlady: Hammoud, a bit 
absent-minded, had forgotten his towel in the apartment, but the landlady wouldn’t let 
him back in to retrieve it—she reported that it wasn’t there, which suggested to me that 
they were not staying in a very reputable place. We left without the towel. Another 
frequent visitor to the Dar Gnawa apartment was someone they called “The Policeman” 
(al-bulees) a tall and formidable man with a large mustache who was a police officer 
and also a performer in one of the troupes. It was clear that he respected Abdellah a 
great deal—he had an amazing meal delivered to us one evening. The Policeman liked 
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to talk about politics, a topic that the rest of us were starved for, since politics was the 
one discussion topic that Abdellah discouraged among the members of Dar Gnawa. 
I spent my mornings socializing with the Dar Gnawa members, typing up notes, 
and going in to the madina to an Internet cafe to check my email. In the afternoons I 
tried to catch some of the World Cup matches, but it was another bad year for that. A 
Gulf businessman had bought a monopoly on the broadcast of all games of the first two 
rounds to Arab countries. He was charging exhorbitant rates through his subscription 
satellite channel, so the bars in the larger hotels were the only places where the games 
were being shown in Essaouira. In 2002, if I one cafe was showing a game I didn’t want 
to see, I could just go around the corner to the neighboring cafe. In 2006, I had to try to 
convince the bartender and other patrons that the other game was much better. My 
frustration was doubled because Ghana was in the tournament for the first time. I did go 
to the hotel bars, but I was careful to drink only soft drinks. Given where I was living, I 
did not want my breath to smell of alcohol, nor did I want it said that I had been spotted 
drinking beer! I spent my evenings accompanying Abdellah to whichever concerts he 
felt were worth attending. At night sometimes we slept early (by midnight), and 
sometimes we were up very late. One night a m’allim from Marrakech, Abbas, came 
with two members of his troupe, along with Hammoud and Abdeljalil. Abbas had not 
been invited to the festival this year, but he had been hired to play the Meditel stage. I 
was already asleep when they arrived around midnight, so I woke up and sat in my 
shorts and tried to wake up. They were in high form! They played, sang, and clapped 
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for hours, until 2 or 3 in the morning. I would clap along until one of my friends would 
stop me, because Abbas’s two troupe members would launch into intricate rhythm 
breaks of handclapping, the loudest and most perfectly timed clapping I had ever 
witnessed. 
 Clearly, this visit to the Essaouira festival differed radically from the others. 
This time, while I did see Najib Sudani again (and felt vindicated when Abdellah had 
almost as much trouble understanding him as I did), I didn’t find Ahmad again. The 
music shop was closed up tight, and I couldn’t find my way back to his apartment. I 
asked a few people about him but nobody seemed to know where he had gone in the 
intervening four years. Additionally, in retrospect it seems I was much more aware of 
what was going on, even if I attended fewer public performances than ever before and 
remember being just as confused and overwhelmed as the previous two times. 
Two broad images remain in my mind concerning this most recent experience. 
First, the festival does not just exist for the international tourists or even for the 
Moroccan tourists. For the Gnawa who come from all over the country, it’s an intensely 
social and intimate time for them to see each other, socialize, and catch up. I remember 
joyous meetings in apartments, cafes, and on the street, not just as m’allims met each 
other again after five or ten years, but as members of the troupes met up again: The 
older ones swapped stories, and the younger ones met people they had been hearing 
about for years. I was walking with Abdellah when an old beggar stopped him and 
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kissed his cheeks. The old man started explaining who he was, and Abdellah 
remembered meeting the man’s father on one of Abdellah’s trips in the 1980s. 
Second, the anonymity of the Gnawa stood out. When they had their costumes 
on, they were clearly identifiable as Gnawa, but in street clothes they were just 
nameless, and moreover dark-skinned, Moroccans. When I had walked back with him 
from the opening parade (defile) several days before, Abdellah had been in costume. As 
we walked, people saw Abdellah in costume, with his dark skin and white beard, and 
called to him. Some people came up to him for autographs or to ask to have their picture 
taken. Few recognized him as “Abdellah El Gourd”; instead, he was a generic Gnawa 
m’allim. But if they said “tabarak Allah” or some such polite greeting when they took 
the picture, Abdellah would respond in a friendly manner. However, he got increasingly 
tense as we walked on, especially as people started yelling at him, “Gnawi!” or “Saha 
Koyo!”—a Gnawa greeting that has been stereotyped through its use as the title of a 
Gnawa jazz group and their album. On more than one occasion, people just walked up 
to him and snapped a shot, or even posed for shots next to him without greeting or 
asking permission. He ignored these people and tried to keep walking, muttering 
“Garbage!” in English under his breath for my benefit. 
 Later in the week, when Abdellah was out of costume and walking around in 
street clothes with me and Abdelila, the youngest member of Dar Gnawa, he attracted 
far less attention. From my field notes:  
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The night we went walking around (following Dar Gnawa’s performance: me, 
Abdellah, and Abdelila), we kept meeting Gnawis in the crowd who were very 
excited to see Abdellah and gave him lots of greetings. No one else recognized 
him. The only time bystanders recognized him was when he was in uniform, 
returning from the defile. After we walked through the concerts and saw what 
was going on, we returned, but Abdellah wanted to get something to eat. (He 
had refused an ice cream cone that Abdelila offered because of his bad teeth—
he can’t eat cold things.) So we went to a milk shop, went in and sat down. As 
we were getting into the back, another customer recognized Abdellah, greeted 
him and embarrassed him, kissing him on the forehead. He tried to convince the 
other patrons that Abdellah was a m’allim. He just sat there silent, while the two 
young men talked about him in Berber. He translated into English for me, and 
Abdelila got the point too, so we ignored them. 
The milk shop was on the main business street outside of the madina and far from 
tourist sections of town. We entered all the way into the shop and found a table as far 
from the street as we could. It seemed like Abdellah was trying to get away from all the 
notoriety. Abdellah had been honored but a bit embarrassed by the attention shown by 
Gnawa who were genuinely interested in getting to know him. This last show of respect, 
however, was not sincere—the man was just looking for attention, a fact that Abdellah 
could understand because he understood the Berber that the men were speaking to each 
other. It seemed to me that the Gnawa were a spectacle. Clearly, racialized media 
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representations, exemplified by the joint press conference, contributed to the means by 
which Abdellah’s body became a spectacle. He himself contributed to this process as 
well—the means by which he was making his second career of musician and performer 
was a process of commoditization of the body of the Black Gnawa master. His identity, 
even his whole person onstage was subsumed under the title of “Gnawi,” and he was 
paid well for this, at least for the part under his control. But I think at this point he was 
looking for something apart from such a taxing existence. He wanted to relax and enjoy 
ordinary life for a few minutes. If he was being greeted by respectful people who knew 
him or who shared friends with him, then he could be warm and welcoming back. But if 
someone just knew him as a celebrity and wanted to show him respect just so that 
person could gain some currency from the association, then Abdellah was less willing to 
cooperate. 
 
ESSAOUIRA FESTIVAL: TOURISM AND GNAWA CULTURE 
 The Essaouira festival was a secular festival supported by private capital, the 
state, and the crown. It seemed to be designed to serve four major purposes: to attract 
foreign tourists, to attract domestic tourists, to attract MRE tourists, and to bolster the 
Gnawa popular music community and industry. A fifth probable goal—real estate 
development in Essaouira—cannot be discounted. Throughout my three visits, I was an 
international tourist on the lower levels. I did spend quite a bit of money on hotels on 
the first two visits, and I also spent a bit of money in restaurants and cafes on the third 
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visit as well. Such peripheral spending is necessary, since most performances are free. 
On the first visit I did buy tickets to some of the private performances, but these tend to 
be much smaller venues than, for example, at the Fes festival, where large crowds of 
well over a thousand audience members can be attracted to spend the equivalent of $10-
$30 on a ticket. In contrast, most of the similarly priced private concerts at Essaouira 
seemed to seat no more than 100 people. 
The Fes festival also scheduled some free public concerts, but these tended to be 
attended mostly by local residents, who number around 1.5 million total. In contrast, 
Essaouira’s year-round population is closer to 70,000. The majority of the hundreds of 
thousands of concert attendees at the Essaouira concerts seemed to be, as a result, 
mostly domestic tourists. Since Essaouira is a resort city, the strength of its economy 
depends on packing the large tourist hotels as well as the many more modest ones. 
Although there are year-round events, the Gnawa festival is the largest. Due to plentiful 
rain and a stable market for phosphates, high economic growth rates persisted 
throughout the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. (Real incomes 
were static through the late 1990s, but incomes in 2006 were almost double those of 
1997.) This growth in wealth led to increased consumer spending on leisure. The 
Gnawa festival benefited from the increased spending. 
The third purpose of the festival, recouping the investments of the MREs, 
derived from a state-sponsored emphasis on developing the tourist market for 
Europeans of Moroccan heritage who are encouraged to return for longer vacation 
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periods to Morocco. Advertising during the summer sometimes seemed almost entirely 
directed toward these “foreign Moroccans,” particularly banks encouraging the foreign 
workers to recycle their Euros through that particular bank. The “hard sell” was so 
emphatic that a billboard advertisement I saw in Tangier in September 2006 stood out: 
Meme en Septembre 
 Vous pouvrez toujours 
 Compter sur nous 
 Attijariwafa Bank 
The slogan “In September, you can still always count on us, Attijariwafa Bank” drew 
attention to the overwhelming mass of advertising targeting MREs during the summer 
season. The deictic pronoun “you” draws attention to the fact that all summer, a barrage 
of advertising had been unleashed in which “you” was understood to exclude all but the 
MREs. Now, in September, once again “you” could indicate ordinary domestic workers. 
 Finally, the festival had the goal of developing Gnawa popular music. In this 
regard portions of the festival operated as a kind of industry festival, like SXSW in 
Austin, Texas, which seeks to link individual musicians and bands with industry figures 
in A&R (“artists and repertoire”) who develop talent and are tasked with “signing acts.” 
More than once in 2001 and 2002, I was mistaken for a producer or talent scout. Upon 
hearing I was from Austin, working-class foreign musicians (usually European or 
Caribbean) immediately produced business cards and asked me to keep them in mind. I 
clarified that I was a student, but I promised to do what I could. Gnawa popular 
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musicians from the higher levels who had toured in Europe and the United States acted 
in this respect as models for those less experienced in collaboration, showing them how 
to play stages and talk to the media and to other professional musicians. One example of 
this modeling took place in 2006, when for the first time I saw members of the several 
Gnawa troupes who were playing the main stages “lead clapping.” They would 
exaggerate the motions of the handclaps, with hands high over their heads, so that 
audience members could detect clearly where the beat was falling. Such efforts at 
socializing audiences into unfamiliar, complex, and new rhythms call to mind Paul 
Bowles’ observation in 1946 that when White audiences at New York jazz shows 
attempted to clap along to the beat, their efforts usually resulted in “spontaneous 
desultory applause” (Bowles 2003b). Here I want to draw attention to the fact that in the 
audience, members of other troupes observed this maneuver of successful crowd control 
and learned how to do it themselves. 
 A related action of the festival has extended beyond popular music. 
Notwithstanding Abdellah’s repeated claim that the festival is not about Gnawa culture, 
it has clearly had an effect if for no other reason than it has brought together Gnawa 
m’allims who otherwise would have been exposed to Gnawa styles and personalities 
from other regions on a much lower scale. Gnawa travel for numerous reasons, mostly 
related to career and family, and they also make pilgrimages and do some “holy 
wandering” as well (Hell 2002), but these contacts can be spaced far apart and be quite 
ephemeral, particularly outside of the Rabat-Marrakech-Essaouira circuit, and for more 
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marginal members of the community who can’t afford to travel. The festival brought 
together the recognized leaders of the community, but it also subsidized travel and 
sociality for some of these more remote members of the greater Gnawa community—
from the Sahara, from Oujda, from Asila and Fes. The “eighth member” of Dar Gnawa, 
the Tailor, was encouraged to do this by Abdellah. He was uncomfortable having 
Abdellah as a master, and perhaps the feeling was mutual. His presence at the festival 
was a sort of in-kind exchange, since he had spent months in sewing and decorating the 
new costumes that the Dar Gnawa troupe wore all summer. The Tailor’s pay was an 
equal portion of the payment, and the opportunity to meet other Gnawa at the festival. 
He found on from Rabat who agreed to apprentice him; when the other members of the 
troupe returned directly to Tangier, the Tailor followed his new master to Rabat, where 
he spent two weeks, funded from his portion of the proceeds. He came to Dar Gnawa 
when he got back to Tangier, and he showed us his tiny ginbri given to him by his new 
master, the “training” ginbri of a young adept. In an operational sense (Turner 1982), 
the esprit du corps and conviviality of the Gnawa performers’ village indicated by this 
story is far more significant than any of the other aspect of the festival. 
 In a second example, during the opening parade on Thursday one of the more 
elderly performers in the troupe of Ahmad Baqbou collapsed and died from a sudden, 
massive heart attack. This event introduced a subdued tone to much of the rest of the 
festival, at least in the Gnawa artists’ village. The news of the death was kept from the 
audience, and more than one Gnawi grumbled about that—they felt someone should 
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have made an announcement and offered a tribute to the memory of the fallen 
performer. Within the Gnawa artists’ village, however, the death resulted in many visits 
around. We made our rounds on the following morning. Ahmad and the senior members 
of the troupe had accompanied the body to Marrakech for the funeral and to grieve with 
the man’s family, but those who were left received us and served us tea for a few 
minutes. As we visited around that day and on Saturday, the death was a topic of 
conversation, and we learned a bit more about the man and his family. It served to bind 
the community together more closely. 
If pilgrims are tourists of a certain ilk, then my tourist adventures in Morocco 
can also be seen as pilgrimages of a sort. I attended two raves, four years apart: Dunes 
2002 in Merzouga, on the sand dunes of Morocco’s small portion of the Sahara desert 
south of Errachidia, and Rhythms of Peace 2006, on the beach south of the small tourist 




Chapter 8: Raving Fits of Giddiness: Electronic Optimism  
 
We ride, ride, ride out across the stony desert. Not on camels, but in a Peugeot 
rental car, the merciless sun penetrating the white roof and threatening to bake us. The 
volume on the tape deck is all the way up as Jawad (all names have been changed) hits 
fast-forward and rewind, trying to find the short Surat al-Nuh, the Quranic chapter of 
Noah, among the other chapters that are being chanted by the young voice so aware of 
cadence and climax. 
“Go back, you passed it!” says Khalid in Arabic, sitting on Jawad’s right next to 
the passenger door. I slow down, thinking I’ve missed a turn, but he was talking about 
the tape. Jawad holds down rewind for thirty seconds, then presses play again. 
“I love this part,” he shouts to the back seat in French. “The reciter has very 
good rhythm.”  
In the back, three girls chatter away in French. Two of them are French, and the 
third is a Moroccan who has grown up in France. They’re spending their vacation 
together so the Moroccan can show off her homeland. They decided to come from 
Rabat down to the sand dunes of Merzouga, just this side of Algeria, when they learned 






DUNES 2002 IN MERZOUGA 
We started that morning from a large tourist hotel north of Rissani, HQ for the 
rave organizers. I met up with Jawad and Khalid there, in a large group sitting around 
the pool and sharing some brownies while they recovered from lunch. This is the 
second day of the rave, so they had been dancing all night and had snatched a few hours 
of sleep back at the hotel. Jawad grew up in Casablanca, but his family comes from al-
Hoceima, on the north coast of Morocco, where it’s involved in the import-export 
business and in real estate. His Casa connections got him a free ride through the rave—
he’s here in an official capacity, a friend of the younger brother of the guy who’s 
bankrolling the event. 
“He paid for it?” I asked. 
“Well, not by himself—he has investors, you know, in Canada. He’s a producer. 
He took care of the international part from Montreal, the deejays et cetera, and his 
brother arranged things in Morocco.” 
After he saw that I had a car, Jawad had relegated the three British South Asian 
boys we had been sitting with to a van with all the others, taking along only his best 
friend and the three French girls. We had headed south, the quiet country road winding 
through the fertile Ziz Valley with its walled oases, dodging an occasional donkey cart 
and passing slow-moving traffic. Upon arriving in the dusty little town of Rissani, I had 
looked for direction. 
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“Keep going straight,” Jawad had said, waving me past the signs that directed 
tourists to the ruins of the ancient city of Sijilmassa. 
This section proposes a few alternative models for contact and collaboration 
between groups. It does this through the rubric of music, specifically trance music that 
circulates as capitalist commodity. Identities are constructed within capitalist 
consumption, and this consumption is also speculative. Trance can signify embodied 
experiences that are accessible to subjects; trance can also signify a commoditized 
bodily practice that can be paid for before the use value of the trance is realized. This 
line of reasoning leads us to consider the consumption of trance by subjects as they are 
reproduced under capitalism. First, I should point out that the terms of the exchange are 
hidden under capitalism. These terms are clear and open in non-capitalist forms of 
exchange like barter and plunder—as Mauss concluded, there is no free gift in a barter 
(gifting) system (Mauss 2000). In contrast, under capitalist (monetary) systems, there 
appears to be the “free gift” of profit (or surplus value), even though this free gift is not 
really free. Second, because the terms of capitalist exchange are hidden, capitalist 
subjects come to be more speculative than those subjects reproduced under non-
capitalist exchange regimes. In other words, capitalist exchange encourages those 
involved to be more superstitious, because commodity and money fetishism leads them 
to expect profit. They want something for nothing. This argument helps to explain why 
particularly Westerners, but also increasing numbers of Moroccans, like to assume 
identities that relate to trance, even though they don’t belong to the communities. They 
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have not put in the work—they have not “paid the price” for the blessing. According to 
Bertrand Hell (2002), initiation into a Gnawa community generally precedes and 
accompanies authentic possession, but often trancers want possession without initiation. 
As capitalist subjects, they rate value against a general equivalent (money), but they are 
blind to the real terms of exchange. As a result, they speculate in fits of giddiness.  
Circulation can be subsumed under transportation. Here, the trans of trance 
refers not only to the transportation of spirits or bodies, but also to the transportation of 
ideas like “music” or “trance,” their circulation among people in commodity exchange. 
As Kojin Karatani explains,  
Capital does not care whether it gets surplus value from solid object or fluid 
information. So it is that the nature of capital is consistent even before and after 
its dominant production branch shifted from heavy industry to the information 
industry. It lives on by the difference. And as the father of cybernetics, Norbert 
Weiner, suggested, information is originally nothing but difference” (emphasis 
in original; Karatani 2004:267).  
Since trance as commodity might be considered properly as a branch of the information 
industry, a consistency remains in the structural relationship that places Gnawa music 
and Morocco at the forefront of capitalist development, and the Sahara Desert as 
intrinsic to that development. For Gnawa, Morocco, and the Sahara Desert, difference is 
a stock-in-trade. In the rest of this section, I consider how commodities of trance and 
identity circulate and are exchanged in a transnational economy of psychedelic trance. 
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Despite a historical and geographical emphasis on Gnawa music’s African origins, 
trance remains a distinctive draw for audiences to Gnawa music, even in Morocco. Hell 
(ND) goes into great detail about possession. Here, though, the representation of the 
relationships between Gnawa adepts and the spirits who possess them, while by no 
means reducible to merely a tool of marketing, retains great power in attracting 
audiences to the music. In a very real sense, possession captures us and holds us 
captive. Our desire for possession mirrors our subconscious desire for commodities 
(Kapchan 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). 
Many of the consumers seduced by mystical trance come from Western Europe 
and North America, where the exotic paranormal has been a valuable commodity at 
least since the 1830s. A recent and distinctive evolution of this tendency since the late 
1980s has been rave culture, which has long-standing ties to black European culture. In 
post-punk European popular culture, “colder” variants of techno were developed by 
Belgian and German deejays, but it took Britons, and specifically black Britons, to 
develop “warmer” breakbeat techno, influenced by reggae, punk, and hip-hop 
(Hesmondhalgh and Melville 2001). The expanded use of rhythm breaks in breakbeat 
music demands greater concentration from the dancers—during the breaks, they must 
be more proficient in keeping the rhythm going in their own bodies. The development 
of breakbeat music created an alternative movement within club culture nearly 
oppositional to the mainstream, since trance dancers had to pay closer attention to the 
more complicated rhythms. By the late 1990s, the stereotypical rave scene was centered 
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on the Spanish island of Ibiza, one of the Mediterranean Balearic Islands, where each 
summer hundreds of thousands of young Europeans gathered to celebrate hedonism and 
techno music in the numerous dance clubs. “Trance-dancing” of this sort is roundly 
criticized in Gnawa circles. Hell argues that a key feature of Gnawa practice includes 
laughter, which emphasizes humility through mocking both the self and the world of 
appearances. Each initiate is led to “take charge of his own destiny” (Hell 2002:362)—
to read signs, listen to the spirits, and live comfortably in community. Gnawa 
possession leads initiates to become more fully human, to become conscious of their 
humanity. This result is directly opposed to that produced by trance dancing, which Hell 
characterizes as either “nothing more than a hedonistic quest for blurred sensations, or a 
phenomenon of more-or-less controlled depersonalization” (Hell 2002:362). At first 
glance it seems that such trance dancing, which occurs frequently in Gnawa touristic 
performances outside of Morocco (Kapchan 2004a) and at Essaouira, could be 
compared to dancing at raves. 
In fact, however, deejays and dancers at the 2002 rave also spoke derisively of 
Ibiza. Psy-trance (“psychedelic trance”), the kind of music at the Merzouga rave, is 
known for its environmentally conscious approach to raving and its attention to cultural 
and social justice. With its “organic” sounds and emphasis on a mystical union with 
nature, psy-trance is related to Goa trance, an underground branch of electronica that 
developed within the hippy communes of Goa, India, in the 1990s (Benedetti 2001). 
These raves are typically held outdoors and in remote places, like deserts, beaches, and 
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forests. A similar North American psy-trance movement revolves around the Burning 
Man arts festival held each year in northern Nevada. From its inception in 1986, 
Burning Man was known only to adepts until the Internet popularized the festival and 
Wired magazine ran a feature article in November 1996, where I first heard of it. 
Although 35,000 people participated in the 2005 festival, Burning Man remained a 
“participation-only” event—no pure spectators were allowed, but rather all had to 
participate in some way. Organizers continued to ban monetary transactions, with goods 
exchanged only through barter and gifting; although the average ticket price was around 
$200, some participants paid more in order to subsidize lower-income participants 
(Burning Man ND). Similar to Burning Man after 1996, an internet-based network or 
community of psy-trancers maintained long-term, consistent ties between members. 
This network is implicated in capitalist regimes of signification through the leisure 
industry and eco- and ethnotourism, and it is mediated, moreover, through Internet sites. 
Nevertheless, the dancing here contrasts sharply from the hedonism of Ibiza and does 
not provide an exact opposite to Hell’s conception of Gnawa possession practices. 
Dunes 2002 was billed as a ‘Gnawa Rave’ in an email I received one Thursday, 
which included a website. I visited the site, found directions, rented a car, and arrived in 
Erfoud, a small town north of Rissani, late Friday night. The following morning I 
traveled on to the hotel between Erfoud and Rissani, where I paid for a ticket and got a 
wristband. I observed ravers sleeping in the hotel lobby. After lunch, I saw a group of 
Gnawa musicians packing up their instruments and costumes as they prepared for the 
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second night. They looked tired and seemed to feel a bit hostile toward the half-naked, 
dirty, exhausted ravers, dreadlocks askew, scantily clad, body piercings and tattoos 
prominently displayed as they snored, stretched across banquettes in the hotel lobby. I 
let the musicians be, confident I would see them again that night at the rave. I was eager 
to see how they played with electronic music. 
When I pull up to the dunes with Jawad, Khalid, and the girls, everyone piles out 
and goes in search of friends. There is no sign of the Gnawa musicians or their van. The 
hostel is a square box of a building, two stories tall. Next to it, ravers are camping in a 
small tent city that extends right to the edge of the dunes. Behind the campground, the 
food and water courtyard spreads across a flattened part of the dunes. It has banquettes 
and low tables under low tents around the sides of a carpeted courtyard, and a kitchen at 
one end. Behind the food center is the rave courtyard, and over another sand dune I can 
hear the pounding of a generator. But the Gnawa are nowhere to be seen. 
That night, through pounding rhythms and savage, primordial sounds, the wild 
and contorted abandon melts individual moves into corporate and corporeal grooves. As 
we face the sound, two small pyramids rise before us in the night. Each is constructed of 
three poles connected at the top and spread at the bottom, with white string arranged, a 
taut net across the ribs. A black light tube attached to one of the ribs makes the 
interlacing filaments shine and glow in the night. The towers shift and shimmy, casting 
an eerie blue glow over the courtyard. 
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Two opposing lines of squat black tents, each open on three sides, surround a 
courtyard paved with mats and faded maroon carpets. At the back end, a patchy cloth 
wall makes a barely tangible barrier between the interior of carpet and tent and the sand 
dunes rising outside. Across the front of the courtyard a larger tent stretches, the two 
light pyramids standing before it. Next to them, the speakers suffuse the yard with a 
sound so sharp and bold that it seems to penetrate even the lumber holding up the tents. 
At the front of this bigger tent a low table holds the electronic mixer huddled over by 
Rene, a deejay from Geneva. He’s lanky and shirtless, his long dark hair held back by a 
loose ponytail and headphones. His small hands, lit by a small flashlight in his mouth, 
dance over the controls and cue up the next rhythm tracks during a break. His glasses 
reflect the red and green console lights. 
Rene is satisfied. He takes out the flashlight and replaces it with a cigarette. The 
beat has never stopped pounding, but he’s clearly off the hook for a few moments. He 
takes a long drag and turns to his companion as the clean-shaven younger man 
improvises a flute solo over the electronic mix. The melody hovers over the beat, 
anticipates it, then departs in a swirling arabesque of oriental scales. The fresh attack 
animates the dancers. 
The young and beautiful creatures contort their trunks and wave their limbs. 
During a break in the beat, a girl in a bikini top sways up her two or three layers of 
ankle-length diaphanous skirting, the gossamer not quite concealing her shapely thighs. 
She swings her arms, holding in her hands glowing filaments that distort and exaggerate 
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the length of her fingers. Next to her a shirtless boy cavorts in wraparound shades, his 
slender chest and six-pack abs undulating above a dark happy trail down to his low-
riding and baggy pajama bottoms. The kids are dancing close, but they appear entirely 
insensible to each other, each lost in a hidden and personal world of trance. 
I never saw the Gnawa musicians again. As I drove the rental car over the 
mountains on my way back to Fes, I could only conclude that the lila had been 
cancelled. The following week, however, I was speaking with a friend, another graduate 
student studying Arabic, and I mentioned where I had been. He was astounded—he had 
also gone to Merzouga in search of the rave, but he had attended the lila instead of the 
rave. We had both left in haste and had failed to find out whether the other was going. 
While I had been looking for the lila and had been sucked into the rave, he had been 
looking for the rave and had stumbled across the lila. In his judgment, it was a typical 
tourist lila: 
The lila ... had a particular focus on money—specifically, obtaining financial 
gains through this particular production and repetition of whatever they were 
saying during the event. ... As far as reasons why the two were separate, one can 
only guess that the lila had religious meaning while the rave had debauchery as 
its intent and goal. ... Regardless of meaning, though, both events were 
organized for financial purposes in different ways. (Patrick Collins, personal 
communication, April 2006) 
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We can assume that the lila and the rave had been held two or three miles from one 
another, close enough so that those in the know could visit back and forth, but far 
enough away that undesirables from the rave would not be able to find their way to the 
lila. No doubt the Gnawa musicians shared Hell’s reaction against the worst aspects of 
techno club and rave culture, which, it’s true, can include hedonism, abuse, 
grandstanding, and deep irresponsibility. Perhaps the ultimately near-total separation 
between the rave and the lila gives evidence of negotiated compromises between the 
organizers and the Gnawa performers fearful of the association with rave culture. 
 
NATURE AND CULTURE ENTRANCED 
Such sensitivity on the part of the organizers would appear to be indicated by 
psy-trancers’ concern for social and environmental responsibility and propriety. 
Nevertheless, such a compromise belies the long history of mutual accommodations and 
exchanges that have been made between blacks and non-blacks in North Africa and 
West Africa, tortuous and unlikely relations across divides much more fraught with 
danger and even death (see Chapter 1). 
The Gnawa musicians were probably included in Dunes 2002 as a marketing 
strategy designed to draw Western tourists enthusiastic about African trance music. But 
their inclusion also likely signified the desire of organizers to help struggling Gnawa 
musicians find audiences through shared interests in “spirituality,” a pattern in 
marketing Gnawa music more generally in Europe (Kapchan 2007). Perhaps the 
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ultimately near-total separation of the rave from the lila gives evidence of negotiated 
compromises between the organizers and the Gnawa performers fearful of the 
association with rave culture. Hell documents a major crisis that the Gnawa community 
has recently been undergoing, and he rightly identifies this crisis with the spirit of 
capitalist commodity exchange, which is embodied by the camel-footed she-demon 
Aisha Qandisha and results from individualist approaches to spirit possession (Hell 
2002:314-315).  
A second reason for the separation might stem from concerns over maintaining 
the integrity of local knowledge and performance traditions. In a jazz concert I attended 
in Houston, Texas, in the spring of 2001, pianist Randy Weston played an entire set 
with his quartet, followed by separate performances by two Gnawa troupes, one from 
Marrakech and the other one, Dar Gnawa, from Tangier (the first time I saw Abdellah, 
but I didn’t meet him at the time). The boundaries between the three styles—American 
jazz, Marrakchiyya Gnawa, and Tanjawiyya Gnawa—were crossed only during the 
final number, a jam session involving all the musicians at once, with audience 
participation encouraged. 
Nevertheless, to explain the continued speculation on future development of 
Gnawa world music, perhaps we can look to a common interest of both psy-trance and 
Gnawa, the natural environment. Gnawa masters are known to have special abilities to 
control nature. To illustrate this point, Hell tells of the founding of the zawiya at 
Tamesloht, near Marrakech: When the mystic healer Mulay Abdallah Ben Hsein 
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founded Tamesloht in the 13th century, he drove off all the wild animals living there. 
Avoiding the simplistic hagiographic interpretation, Hell notes the lesson: To live 
peacefully, people need the help of magicians who can drive away unknown 
supernatural forces. The ability of saints to expel or subdue dangerous and deadly 
animals “serves to draw attention to the fact that in Morocco, saints are considered as 
true masters of the invisible, uniquely able to have at their disposal the power to 
constrain spirits” (Hell 2002:257). Two economic elements are outside the control of 
capital, labor and natural resources. According to Karatani, “the capitalist commodity 
economy discovers its limit in those things that it cannot organize at its disposal. ... 
These are the natural environment (that agriculture seeks to organize) and human beings 
(the labor power that industrial capital exploits as commodity)’ (emphasis in original; 
2003:198). Interestingly, Karatani finds a solution to environmental pollution in the 
commoditization of nature, transforming what was previously seen as a ‘free good’ into 
a commodity through the use of ‘green taxes’ that include the cost of recycling waste 
materials into the cost of production (2003:283). Nature in the sense of natural 
resources is one of the two economic elements that are entirely independent of capital. 
As we drove across the desert toward the rave, we were listening to a cassette of 
the Quran. Specifically, Jawad was interested in hearing the short chapter of Noah. As 
related in Hebrew scripture (Genesis 6-10), the story finds Noah on the precipice of an 
apocalypse. In his wrath at human sinfulness, God threatens to “destroy men whom I 
created and blot him out from the face of the earth, as well as the beasts, creeping 
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creatures and birds, for I am sorry I created them” (Genesis 6:10; Hurault 1990). 
Deciding to save the only person who pleases him, God commands Noah to build a 
large boat that will carry him, his family, and a selection of animals unharmed through 
the flood. The Quranic chapter (Surat al-Nuh) expands on the period just before the rain 
began to fall. Noah recounts his antideluvian efforts, prior to an impending crisis, to 
convince the sinful people of his day to turn from their idols and seek God. The 
language is beautiful: 
And behold I called unto them openly; and, behold I preached to 
them in public; and I spoke to them secretly, in private; and I said:  
“Ask your Sustainer to forgive you your sins - for, verily, He is 
all-forgiving! He will shower upon you heavenly blessings abundant, and 
will aid you with worldly goods and children, and will bestow upon you 
gardens, and bestow upon you running waters. 
“What is amiss with you that you cannot look forward to God's 
majesty, 
seeing that He has created you in successive stages? Do you not see how 
God has created seven heavens in full harmony with one another, and 
has set up within them the moon as a light and set up the sun as a lamp? 
“And God has caused you to grow out of the earth in growth; and 




“And God has made the earth a wide expanse for you, so that you 
might walk thereon on spacious paths.” (Quran 71:8-20; Asad 2004). 
Noah uses his best powers of description, trying to tempt his listeners to look about 
them and see the beauty and grandeur of the created world, and acknowledge the 
magnificence of its creator. Perhaps in the future, desert trances can accomplish this 
wonder free from the idol of speculation. In fact, I never heard of the Dunes rave being 
repeated—it appeared to have been a financial failure. Another rave I attended four 
years later, however, was decidedly more capitalistic, although this did not solve all of 
its problems. 
 
PEACEFUL RHYTHMS IN ASILA 
In 2006 I was living in Tangier and searching for “Dunes 2006” on the Internet 
to see whether I could return to Merzouga to see how the rave had transformed. I 
couldn’t find an evidence to indicate that the Dunes rave was still operating, but a 
search for “psy-trance Morocco” led me to a rave being planned for the beach near 
Asila. Based on my experience in Merzouga, I was wary of being too much a tourist, 
since my budget by July was greatly reduced: My wife, by then five months pregnant, 
had just rented an apartment in Ohio as she prepared to return to her teaching job. The 
website instructed those interested to buy tickets online (in Euros) and meet in Tangier 
for a chartered bus (payable in Euros) to the site. I remembered the hotel “staging area” 
for Merzouga and the fact that people could hitch rides down to the rave, and I planned 
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accordingly. I rode the train to Asila and hitched a ride on a motorcycle-truck from the 
train station to the town. I walked around looking for ravers, but it was the height of 
Asila’s tourist season and I couldn’t find any strange-looking folk to ask for directions. 
So I caught a shared taxi back to Tangier and rented a small car for two days. The 
following day, Saturday, I set out again with the driving directions to the rave on the 
seat beside me. After a few mishaps, I began seeing signs on a small coastal coastal lane 
about five miles south of Asila. 
The primary staging area consisted of a parking lot and an admissions hut on a 
hillside overlooking the Atlantic. I was trying to get a Moroccan ticket, since I had just 
received my residence permit for Morocco, and I could save around half the price, 
payable in dirhams. I talked my way through the gate and began down the tortuous track 
toward the secondary staging area. All of a sudden I saw a uniformed police officer 
walking next to a young man. They indicated they would appreciate a lift, and I picked 
them both up. The police officer, Ahmad, was from Tangier; the young man, Pedro, was 
a Mexican living in Barcelona. They spoke Spanish together, and I spoke Arabic with 
the officer and English with Pedro. We arrived at the secondary staging area, where the 
police had taken over a building. I parked there and walked the last mile with Pedro 
along the beach. We met two more police officers at a rocky gap on the beach, just prior 




The rave area was on a broad section of beach with the stage back away from 
the water. We approached along the beach from the north. To the south of the stage was 
a group of semi-permanent structures that constituted the “official” vendors, selling 
water, soft drinks, and beer, and a large tent with concessions. The generator was 
behind those structures. To the north of the stage stretched a causeway of licensed 
concessions—both outside and local vendors. For example, a young German man and 
his girlfriend ran a juice tent. They subsidized their raving by traveling from gathering 
to gathering selling glasses of orange juice on demand for 1 Euro. In contrast, across 
from that tent was a restaurant run by a Moroccan family from Ksar el-Kebir selling 
roasted chicken and fish. Inland from the causeway was the tent village housing the 
attendees. At the end of the causeway was the official gate and a tent with officials, and 
beyond that was the rocky place two police officers were sitting. As we waited to get 
our passes, I learned that Pedro was from Michoacan, where he had attended psy-trance 
raves. He appeared to be in his late twenties. He had been living in Spain for three 
years—currently, he was working part-time in Barcelona in a restaurant and going to 
culinary school there. He wanted to be a chef. His English was very rusty, but 
functional. He had last attended a psy-trance rave in Portugal two years before. As we 
approached the rave and he heard the music, a smile crept over his face: “I haven’t 
heard this music for so long!” 
This rave differed from Merzouga in several ways. First, the attendees seemed to 
be more connected through the Internet to the larger psy-trance community. They knew 
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each other from other Mediterranean raves—most notably one in Turkey in the spring, 
to see a solar eclipse, and one two weeks before in Portugal. In Merzouga, the attendees 
had tended to be tourists in Morocco who had heard of Dunes through ordinary tourist 
networks. Second, the Merzouga rave had been better funded. It was better organized, 
more expensive, and took care of attendees more carefully, but it had probably also 
been less profitable. In Asila, there was more of a “market” atmosphere, with licensed 
vendors selling products for cash. Finally, the police presence was much more evident 
here. As I sat eating fish and chicken with Pedro and a fellow Mexican named Marco, 
we saw Ahmad arrive dressed in street clothes, hitching a ride this time on a tractor. I 
saw him and waved as he stepped down, and he came over and greeted me and Pedro, 
but he put his finger to his lips about his police identity—he was on an undercover 
mission, looking for “hard” drugs (cocaine, heroine, LSD, etc.). 
I walked around and talked with attendees and took pictures and notes. I could 
communicate with nearly everyone using English, the lingua franca of the event. All 
advertising and signage were in English, but it served only for the most facile of 
conversations. For deeper communication, attendees resorted to their various native 
languages. I recognized Portuguese, Spanish, German, and French. Deejays were from 
the typical European countries (Britain, France, Germany) as well as Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, Scandinavia, Brazil, Mexico, and Israel, and the attendees seemed to come 
from these countries as well. Sometimes they gathered around little flags planted in the 
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sand or attached to their clothing, little national circles marked off by ethnolinguistic 
unity and exclusion. 
I had bought a day pass, good for two days since I bought it Saturday afternoon. 
I was able to buy the pass at the Moroccan rate, but I had to surrender my passport to be 
verified and held until I left. I told them I would be leaving that night to return to 
Tangier, since I didn’t have camping equipment, and the woman promised to have my 
passport waiting for me at the primary staging area back up on the hill. 
We were eating fish and chicken in the Moroccan restaurant when Pedro and 
Marco left abruptly. They had recognized the music of Swedish DJ Atmos—“He’s very 
good”—and didn’t want to miss his set. Pedro was at this rave because he knew one of 
the DJs, a Mexican named DJ Lamat. When one of the girls on Lamat’s guest list 
couldn’t come, he invited Pedro to take advantage of her guest pass, and Pedro spent a 
lot of time explaining these details to the organizers. In the end he went without a 
wristband, since he couldn’t find Lamat. He knew Marco from a previous rave, and he 
also introduced me to some other Mexicans, who spoke better English than many of the 
other attendees. After finishing my chicken, I returned to the stage, but I couldn’t find 
Pedro again. 
Later, as I was preparing to leave for the night, I recognized one of the other 
Mexicans Pedro had introduced me to, and I asked her to give a note to Pedro with my 
email address, to follow up, in case I didn’t see him again. The woman, whose name 
was Maria, asked me if I could drop her off in Asila. She had run out of alcohol, and she 
 
268 
really needed it to survive, she said. She was apologetic—she didn’t smoke or use 
drugs, just alcohol, but she needed it immensely. Her friend, also from Tijuana, spoke 
better English—she had dated an American from San Diego and had lived there with 
him for several months. She tagged along as we walked back up the beach to the car, 
then drove up the track to the gate, back out to the road, and then to Asila. The women 
were tiny, young, scantily clad, and spoke no Arabic, so I stuck around and helped them 
find a liquor store, where they bought prodigious amounts of whiskey, gin, and wine. I 
then drove them back to the beach and dropped them off along with some others we had 
encountered walking on the track down to the beach. I returned to the main gate to pick 
up my passport. When it wasn’t there I waited and fell asleep in the car waiting, and it 
was finally returned around 1 a.m. 
I had planned to return on Sunday, but I was so tired after Saturday’s exertions 
that I just couldn’t make it back. I also felt a bit of disenchantment with this rave, since 
it seemed to maintain sharper distinctions between Moroccans (largely there in service 
roles) and foreigners (most of the ravers), with fewer MREs in attendance. I returned 
the car Sunday evening. Later that week, I read in the newspapers that there had been a 
major drug bust Sunday night, with all manner of illegal hard drugs confiscated. Lots of 
people had been arrested and the festival shut down. I felt good for Ahmad, who had 
seemed so hopeful that he would be able to find drugs and lawbreakers, but I was 
worried that some of the friends I had made might now be dealing with the Moroccan 
criminal justice system. 
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 Asila formed a minor branch of the larger European circuit of psychedelic trance 
culture, which in turn depended on a line running from Tel Aviv to Goa. The network is 
dependent on Internet sites and discussion boards, but it is maintained through 
consistent reinforcement of participants at these raves, who maintain long-term social 
relationships, even though several years might pass from one meeting to the next. In this 
kind of case, it is useful to draw on Antonio Melucci’s theory of “movement networks” 
(1985). Under the conditions of social organization since the 1960s, people may form 
loose movement networks around cultural symbols. These networks may or may not 
give rise to or transform into movements periodically at times of crisis; the essential 
point is that they encourage others to participate in these networks. These social actors 
may belong to multiple networks, they may be militant only partially and for a short 
period, and they tend to become personally and affectively identified with and 
implicated in the groups (Melucci 1985, 1996). Groups of people who identify with 
psychedelic trance and a spiritual, participatory approach to environmental activism 
identify affectively with the rave beat. This affective identification might lead to the 
formation of networks surrounding these identities, indicating some potential for a 
movement network. As Melucci points out, the medium of the network is the message 
they present: a new form of challenge to pre-existing cultural codes. The Asila festival 
was also a hopeful foray into maintaining cordial Jewish-Muslim and Israeli-Arab 
relations, since so many DJs were Israelis, and I assumed at least some of the ravers 
were as well, although I did not encounter any who identified as such when I was there. 
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 Published scholarship on festivals tends to focus on festivals that are more 
central to a local community and that have been in place for much longer periods of 
time (Guss 2000, Brandes 1988, Noyes 2003). David Guss’ vivid analysis of four 
festivals in Venezuela calls attention to the “pluralistic nature of festive forms” 
(2000:3), which he contrasts to the typical academic interest in the function of festivals 
to highlight folkloric particularity and locality in the service of national identity. The 
four festivals on which he chooses to focus his attention serve as sites of contention 
over racialization (Curiepe’s San Juan festival), indigeneity (Caicara’s Day of the 
Monkey), corporate influence in shaping “criolo” identity (British American Tobacco’s 
campaigns in Caracas) and gendered performances of “mestizaje,” in dances associated 
with the Tamunangue celebration honoring San Antonio de Padua in the state of Lara. 
The Gnawa festival fronts racialization and serves to develop Gnawa identity as a local 
marker of Africanness, even as corporate and state sponsorship of the Essaouira festival 
promotes Gnawa music as an alternative route to the competing modernities of Western 
pop culture and of pan-Arab pop culture. 
 The vision of the rave as a site of hedonism and the relaxation of social control 
calls to mind Stanley Brandes’ close study of fiestas in Michoacan, Mexico (1988). 
Michoacan’s intermediate location between Mexico’s two largest cities, Mexico City 
and Guadalajara, has contributed to the vibrant nature of its festivals, which can swell 
populations of the festival towns by a factor of four. The raves clearly depart from the 
fiestas due to the fact that the fiestas find significant sources of funding from the local 
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communities themselves, while the raves are principally funded by outside capital, and 
local attitudes toward the raves are primarily extractive. Nevertheless, Brandes 
documents that influence of the state in developing festivals in Michoacan surrounding 
the Mexican Day of the Dead as a means of developing the tourist sector in Michoacan 
(Brandes 1988:88-109), which provides a parallel to the manufactured “musem” of 
Essaouira. Moreover, the raves also show evidence of the delicate balance between 
social control and license that Brandes points out in the Michoacan fiestas. Finally, 
since my consultant Pedro spoke to the vibrant life of the rave scene in Michoacan, 
perhaps there are some continuities between fiestas and raves there, continuities that 
also obtain in Morocco and in society more broadly. 
 Dorothy Noyes’ exhaustive and ambitious study of the Patum festival in Berga, 
Catalonia (Spain) provides the third foil to my analysis of Moroccan festival and 
pilgrimage. The Patum festival is a local festival, continuous for four hundred years, 
that started as a Corpus Christi procession (May-June) but transformed over the 
centuries into a fire-festival with costumed Turks, knights, eagles, giants, dwarves, 
devils of various sorts, and a donkey/dragon that ended up circumambulating the central 
square amidst fireworks, smoke, and enforced participation. Noyes relates 
transformations in the Patum to social transformations, most recently from the 
paternalism of the Franco period to the multiculturalism of Euro-globalization, all 
within the context of a determination that the Catalan democratic rejection of both 
assimilation and violent separatism had become all the more fragile as the region de-
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industrialized amidst factory closings and rising unemployment. At the end of her 
fieldwork, Noyes could distinguish two factions in Berga: the networkers, who wished 
to validate ties more strongly with international capital and tourist networks, and the 
integristas, who valued resistance to outside influence and recourse to exclusive, local 
control over the Patum. 
 Clearly, parallels exist on a superficial level between the Patum festival and the 
Gnawa festival with regard to networking vs. integrisme. As a matter of fact, my 
principal consultant, Abdellah El Gourd, himself kept one foot squarely in each camp, if 
he tended more toward the integriste side: He resisted attempts at power-sharing 
between himself and anyone else to define Gnawa culture, and he appeared to group 
capitalists, tourists, and drunkards under the same banner; at the same time, he remained 
a tireless booster of Gnawa culture to outsiders, keeping a rigorous and sustained 
touring schedule across Europe, North Africa, and North America year after year. And 
he never turned away anyone, no matter how annoying or clueless, from his evenings at 
Dar Gnawa, opening the door at 5 p.m. year-round and welcoming anyone in Tangier 
who could find it and wanted to jam with the Gnawa. He found an integriste ally in 
Hmida Boussou, whose only recording was an entire traditional lila recorded for the 
ethnomusicologist Antonio Baldassare and released in a five-album set, and in Mustafa 
Baqbou, who danced a more “networking” series of movements over his career, away 
from and toward popular music. Abdellah’s choice to collaborate almost exclusively 
with well-known African-American jazz and blues musicians underscored his 
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determination to share his cultural wealth only at the highest levels through 
collaborations with performers in elite genres. 
 At the same time, while the Patum slowly collapsed toward the end of the 1990s, 
popular Gnawa engagement with the market increased at a dizzying rate, even as 
traditional Gnawa practice similarly declined (see Chapter 3). So there are correlations 
and divergences between the two. The Essaouira festival remains a tourist spectacle, 
supported by capitalists, tourists, and “drunkards.” 
 
FESTIVAL AND THE MEDIATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CULTURAL 
FLOWS 
 At one level, pilgrimages in Morocco are deeply religious affairs, and these 
pilgrimages continue to take place and to be transformed. The old pilgrimage centers 
continue to receive pilgrims and to wax and wane as their saints’ baraka does as well. 
When I was in Morocco in 2002, I met an older American man in Asila who had been 
friends with a friend of mine in Marrakech in the late 1990s. The man, Yusuf, had been 
born in California to an affluent family but his father had died and they had lost 
everything. He had started traveling in the 1950s and 1960s to Afghanistan and began 
smuggling marijuana from Afghanistan to Europe. He converted to Islam and married 
an Afghan woman, but he had a terrible accident in the Swiss alps and had suffered a 
brain injury. His temperament changed and he descended into a violent depression, 
causing his wife to leave him. Finally he returned to God and his faith. He had moved to 
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Morocco because it was a Muslim country and it was cheap to live there of his disability 
and social security checks from the US government. He didn’t speak very good Arabic, 
but he prayed more than necessary and practiced dhikr daily. He was seen as a very 
pious man. Our mutual friend told me that he died on laylat al-qadr, the holiest day of 
the year, later in 2002, when he was electrocuted in the shower. He had been buried in 
the cemetery in Asila. When I recounted his story in 2002 to a Gnawa m’allim visiting 
Dar Gnawa from Asila, he agreed that he had heard of Yusuf although he had never met 
him. The m’allim also confirmed that a few women did visit Yusuf’s grave, evidence 
that new saints continued to arise and to attract pilgrims. 
But musical tourism has transformed pilgrimages to reflect the pursuit of non-
sacred commodities. A 2005 tourist brochure published by the state that I found in a 
travel agencies in Tangier confused religious and secular musems, using the same word 
for “traditional” musems and for music festivals. As a result, pilgrims have come to 
imbue some of these commodities with sacred force, snapping up recordings of Gnawa 
m’allims. As a result, what has become of Moroccan religious identities? I have 
presented this chapter as a pilgrim and a tourist of a certain ilk (Kapchan 2008:481), 
taking an identity that correlates in more than one respect with other tourist/pilgrims. 
Through our corporate and individual experiences we sought transcendent meaning, 







The tbiqa [incense brazier] still remains, and its trampling underfoot by the 
crowds. But each time I witnessed such a scene, an initiate would always come 
to pick up the glowing embers with his bare hands, without being burned. He 
would replace the embers in the brazier and calmly turn the pots right side up. 
And soon wreaths of jawi incense would once again rise up into the night. 
Invariably, the initiate would punctuate his intervention with a joke. A bon mot 
even as [the demon] Aisha Qandisha emerges? The initiate would seem to be 
directing a chuckle toward the heart of the crowd, even such an overexcited mob 
as this. (Hell, 2002:363; my translation) 
 
 My goal in this project has not been to direct a chuckle at the mob; my goals are 
much less ambitious and laudable than that. Nevertheless, I had hoped to document 
some responses to globalization that, while being no less serious about its effects, yet 
maintain a sense of proportion and even—despite fear, loss, and dread—a measure of 
joy. My intention has been to demonstrate how conceptions of race have informed 
popular cultural expressions in post-independence Morocco, and how these expressions 
have in turn helped to shape Moroccan modernity. 
 Section I, History and Ethnography Across the Sahara, focuses on race and 
slavery in relations between Morocco and the interior of West Africa. Beginning in 
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West Africa, I discuss possible origins for the Gnawa and other Black people of 
Morocco, including enslavement and forced migration. I argue that race has played a 
central role in popular culture and the public imaginary in Morocco. I also raise the 
possibility of non-coercive transformations in ethnic affiliation and offer origins for 
Blacks in Morocco other than forced migration. I emphasize the institution of slavery as 
it existed in West Africa and the changes it underwent in North Africa. Within 
Morocco, I point up the special role played by Black people in medieval records, 
asserting continuity in sustained representations of Blackness, and I outline resistance to 
enslavement, conquest, and oppression in Morocco. I conclude with a more detailed 
examination of scholarly and particularly anthropological research on the Gnawa, 
Morocco, and West Africa. 
 Section II, Enculturation in Modernity, articulates Moroccan aesthetics into 
global conventions and movements. It confirms that colonial experiences provided an 
incisive critique of modernism, leading to the dystopian visions of late modernism. The 
section proposes that metaphors of conversion and transposition can help elucidate 
transnational flows of music and culture. The metaphor of conversion raises the 
question of money and commodity, buying and selling; the metaphor of transposition 
implies musical practices such as collaboration. In all such interactions, race remains at 
the forefront as members of the New World African diaspora and their predecessors 
play a mediating role. 
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 Finally, in Section III, Pilgrimage and Festival, I consider the role played by the 
international festival in mediating transnational flows of music and culture. The section 
returns to questions of “religion,” this time challenging the “religiosity” of pilgrimage 
and the “secularity” of music festivals. I examine the role of two festivals in Moroccan 
society: the annual Gnawa festival in Essaouira, and much more occasional 
psychedelic-trance raves. My position was transformed over my three visits to 
Essaouira: from an informed tourist in 2001, to a somewhat jaded outsider in 2002, to a 
non-performing resident of the Gnawa village in 2006. Essaouira was revealed to hold 
numerous purposes in Morocco’s society and economy, not least of which is its role in 
maintaining and sustaining relationships among Gnawa practitioners. My reactions to 
the psytrance raves were more ambivalent—I found the first one to hold tremendous 
promise for the future. The second one, however, less successfully disentangled itself 
from the storm. 
 As the storm blowing out of paradise rages on, there are numerous possible 
alternatives: to try to make sense of the pile of debris, to try to push the sound against 
the wind or to give in and let the wind carry it, to try to right the disturbed brazier and 
set the incense burning again. I have tried, in my way and at various times, to do some 
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